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This thesis demonstrates how general and fundamental is the 
notion of event in the theory of computation. 	It points the way to 
a more complete theory of events. 
The central idea is that of event structures consisting of 
relations on sets of events. 	Event structures are accompanied 
by an idea of state called .configuration. They model the behaviour 
of computations in time. 	To reflect this finiteness restrictions 
are appropriate. 
Using event structures as an intermediary the approaches of net 
theory and denotational semantics are related. 	This is formalised 
by representation theorems which express mathematically the 
translation between equivalent though apparently very different 
descriptions. 	In this way, for example, the net theoretic notion 
of confusion is related to concrete domains while using natural ideas 
of state of event structures Petris finiteness axiom of K-density 
on causal nets is assessed as too restrictive and accordingly his 
formulation of state, as a case, too wide. 
Apart from their unifying role event structures are important in 
themselves because of their abstract yet intuitive and operational 
nature. Their range of importance is widened considerably by the 
demonstration that event structures may represent functions of 
arbitrary type - rather abstract objects - while still preserving 
their operational nature. This is achieved by relating event 
structures to the bidomains of Berr 
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Chapter 1. 	Introduction 
The idea of an event in computer science arises in the work of 
many different authors sometimes with different aims in mind (for 
example in distributed computing with [Pet], [Hew] and [Lam], and in 
denotational semantics with [Kah and Pio]). 	This thesis examines the 
role of. events, teasing-out the concept where it occurs implicitly and 
relating sometimes apparently divergent approaches. In nature the 
thesis is exploratory, and consequently a little unbalanced, but it is 
hoped that it will at least help towards an appreciation of the 
important role events can play in the theory of computation. I see 
the work here as a step on the way to a theory of events in 
computation. Such a theory, important in its own right, would have 
a strong unifying influence in the theory of computation. 
1.1 Basic ideas 
This section is an informal introduction to those basic and 
general ideas which guide and continually appear as this thesis 
develops. 
What is an event in computation? Many examples will be given; 
typical are acts of synchronisation between computing agents 
operating concurrently, and atomic actions of input or output.. Just 
as in physics, what is considered to be an event depends on how 
abstract is the level of description. The creation of a supernova, 
the collision of two billiard balls, the communication of two agents 
in a Milner net are all regarded as events but at very different 
levels of abstraction. A shared property is that once started they 
must finish; strengthened a little we might suppose they have 
connected compact duration in time. The naive view is that an event 
is essentially an instantaneous action. More accurately, according 
to this view an event is atomic, that is has no internal structure 
(at that level of description), and an all-or-nothing character, at 
any time it either has or has not occurred. An event, still atomic, 
but with a duration in time can be reduced to this case by splitting 
it into(instantaneous beginning and a subsequent end event. We 
mention another possible view of events.. Keep the view that an event 
once started must end but drop atomicity. Accordingly then an event 
might have connected compact duration in time and also internal 
structure, events inside so to speak; defined in this way events could 
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be called episodes. 	It would be possible for episodes to overlap 
and have subepisodes. Unfortunately here we do not follow up this 
line. For most of our work the naive view suffices. 	(In chapter 
9 though, the orders on higher type events, associated with functions 
and functionals, express relations on the internal structure of 
events.). 
We are concerned with how computations can be modelled by 
relations on events. The events with relations are called event 
structures. An event structure is an abstract description of a 
computation picking out certain events related to the computation and 
describing the possible courses the ccmputation may follow. Event 
structures take several forms. Typical are (E,<,) and more 
generally' (E, F ,). 	The set E of events possesses a causality 
relation <, a partial order on E, or - a subset of P(E) x E. 	In 
the case of (E,<,) an event e cannot occur until the events in .f {e} 
have all occurred whereupon it may occur. The causality relation f 
is a little more general; it allows an event to occur in different 
ways. For (Ej-,) an event e can occur once all the events in any 
of 	'Iel have occurred. The relations expresses an incompat- 
ibility between events; certain events occurring exclude certain 
others. Often X will be a binary symmetric relation on E so events 
mutually exclude each other in a pairwise fashion. 
This is really only half the picture. We must somehow express 
the dynamic behaviour of event structures. Alongside an event 
structure we should specify those states or configurations of events 
which can occur in the computation; this expresses formally what the 
two relations on events mean 	For event structures of the form 
(E,<,* ) configurations, which are sets of events which have occurred, 
will at least be <-left-closed in accord with the intuition of <. 
Some consistency requirement will be imposed by 	too; for X a 
binary and symmetric relation a configuration cannot include two 
events in that relation. 
Scott domains of information can be reDresented by event 
structures with the construction above. Less information about the 
computation corresponds to less events having occurred, so config-
urations are naturally ordered by inclusion which, it turns out, gives 
a domain. 	In fact event structures represent suitable classes of 
domains, generally specified by axioms; not only do event 
structures yield the class of domains but also from a domain D in 
the class an event structure can be recovered naturally so that its 
domain of configurations is isomorphic to D. This is the form of 
a representation theorem. It expresses that two classes of 
descriptions are equivalent and provides a means of translating back 
and forth between the two equivalent descriptions. Typical examples 
of representation theorems appear in group theory and lattice theory: 
for example rings of sets correspond to distributive lattices and 
fields of sets to boolean lattices etc. ([,r]EG]).Event.-structure 
representations of domains are generally far simpler and more 
intuitive than the represented domain. 
In addition Petri nets represent event structures,with some 
qualification (see chapter 4). Thus representation results are a 
fundamental tool in relating theories with radically different 
vocabularies. Coupled to a theory of events they could sometimes 
justify or falsify an assumption of another theory perhaps through 
checking its physical feasibility or relating it to something more 
intuitive and acceptable. 	(This is just begun here, though see the 
appraisal of K-density - chapters 2 and 5 - and 5.6 where Scott's 
thesis - "computable functions are continuous" - has implications for 
event structures.) 
An important fact about event structures is that they model 
possible behaviour in time in an intuitive way. They have an oper-
ational yet simple nature. If an event is to occur it must occur 
at finite time. This will impose finiteness restrictions on the way 
in which an event is caused. In this thesis we use a variety of 
finiteness restrictions; the one natural to net theory where an 
finite set of events can occur concurrently to cause another is less 
restrictive than that appropriate to denotational semantics. Here is 
one we use a lot for event structures of the form (E,<,): 
-f l f e} is finite. 
An event need only wait for finitely many events in order to occur. 
For event structures of the form (E,/-,) the corresponding 
restriction will be on the definition of configurations; in any 
configuration an event must have depended on only finitely many events 
to occur so every set of possible immediae causes of e in 	el 
can be assumed finite. 
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structure. As described an event structure stands for all possible 
courses .a computation may follow. 	(it represents a datatype.) An 
event is under no obligation to occur even when it is given unbounded 
time to do so. For some computations naturally associated with 
such an event structure this may well not be the case for certain 
events (see 2.3 ), an example where the same event structure 
represents two situations we would like to distinguish formally. 	(An 
attempt is made using restless events in 6.4.) 
Finally I should apologise for one big omission. There is no - 
chapter dealing with morphisms on event structures, although morphism-
like constructions are occasionally used.. This is largely because of 
lack of time and partly because it is still unclear what extra 
structure to put on event structures to "force" event-occurrences. 
(The natural idea of contracting a convex set of events in (E,<,) to 
an event depends on this issue.) 
1.2 Events in context 	 - 
A major aim of theoretical computer science is the 
development of a mathematical theory in which to model reasonably 
completely the world of concepts and ideas in computer science. Such 
a theory must be both broad enough in. scope and rich enough in its 
power of abstraction to handle the full range of phenomena at approp-
riate levels of detail. Two main theories of this nature are 
denotationaJ. semantics [Sco] initiated by Scott and Strachey and net 
theory [t'IFroc] started by Petri.. As indicated in section 1.1 we can 
relate the two theories using representation results and the inter-
mediate concept of event structures. 
Roughly Petri nets are a generalisation of flowdiagrams to 
allow concurrent activity and non-determinism. The emphasis is on 
modelling control through focussing on how actions (interpreted by 
events in the theory) and local states (interpreted by conditions) 
depend on previous occurrences of actions or states holding. Nets 
highlight the pattern of behaviour in time which in the case of 
transition nets is simulated by playing the "token game" on markings. 
Concurrency is represented more naturally than in alternative approaches 
where it is generally represented as non-deterministic interleaving. 
Net theory is a useful pragmatic tool in the understanding and design 
of distributed systems and hardware; it includes techniques to prove 
5 
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properties of such systems. 	In adlition the graphical represent- 
ation of nets guides the mind's eye in design and makes them attractive 
to , those involved in the pragmatic side of computing. 
The mathematical approach in denotational semantics, originated 
by Scott, is more abstract. In denotational semantics a programming 
construct is attributed with a mathematical meaning; it is denoted 
by an element in a partially ordered domain of information. The 
denotations of compound constructs are built-up by operations on the 
denotations of the sub-constructs. Only for domains corresponding to 
basic datatypes such as the booleans does the information order 
directly reflect the idea of later behaviour in time. Nevertheless 
some idea of behaviour in time is captured by formalising the notion 
of those points of information which may be realised by a computing 
agent in finite time and by requiring that computable functions 
between domains be continuous - this expresses that eventual behaviour 
in time is exactly the "limit"' of the finite behaviours. 	Denotational 
semantics has been very successful in giving a formal meaning to a 
wide class of programming languages thus enabling proofs of properties 
of programs. It has the advantage over more operational methods of 
giving semantics in that it cuts down on the arbitrary detail such 
semantics often possess. 
We now discuss deficiencies in the two theories at their present 
stage of development. The general line is: denotational semantics 
is sometimes not operational enough while net theory is sometimes not 
abstract enough. Where possible we point out how a mathematical 
theory of events should help and how the issues raised in section 1.1 
have a bearing. 
For net theory I think it is fair to say that the mathematical 
foundations have not been worked out very thoroughly, and it is the 
more foundational aspects which coirn us here. I believe there is 
a reason. Net theory, and the foundational work in particular, 
attempts to be very general. In practice when a net is used to model 
some situation it bear inscriptions as part of the modelling process. 
The inscriptions relate the net to the situation described, sometimes 
serving to interpret the conditions and events or detailing when events 
may or must occur. Such inscriptions play an essential role in the 
modelling. 
However they appear to be ignored in the foundations (see the 
treatments of K-density and morphisms in [NA'c] for example). 
There very little commitment is made to the range of interpretations 
in mind. Once the range of interpretation is unclear it becomes 
very hard to recognise when and what extra structure is required; it 
is difficult for the theory to recognise its limitations and grow. This 
may be one reason why the theory of net morphisms is so weak. 	- 
Unfortunately we say little on morphisms in this thesis. However 
we can be more constructive in our appraisal of causal nets and 
K-density where again I believe lack of commitment has misled. 
Causal nets were chosen by Petri to represent the net analogue of 
history or partial history; they are chosen to represent a course a 
computation may follow. As such their events and conditions are 
regarded as having occurred or as being" inevitable. This is not true 
of events generally. This cries out for extra structure. Petri has 
insisted that causal nets be K-dense, imposed as a finiteness 
restriction.. 	(it is intended to ban Zeno machines for instance.) 
Using a simple theory of states of event structures and representation 
results we shall give a critical appraisal of K-density, conclude that 
the present Thrmulation is too restrictive, while proving a restricted 
form of 'K-density does hold. In other words, we agree with the 
spirit of K-density but not with its exact statement. This disagree-
ment stems from Petri's formalisation of the idea of (global) state 
(taken to be a case - a maximal cut across the net) so it is quite 
fundamental. 
We now present some limitations of denotational semantics which 
are fairly well-defined. 
Denotational semantics does not, as yet, handle concurrent 
computations in a natural way. Successful treatments have depended on 
simulating concurrency by non-deterministic interleaving of 
uninterruptable actions often atomic events (see [PloJ and [Mill]). 
We call attention to Miler's book [Mill] which sets a paradigm for 
future work on concurrent computation because of the ideas it introduces 
and the "scientific approach" it adopts. Algebraic laws on the 
communication of computing agents are justified by notions of 
observational equivalence; even interleaving is shown appropriate once 
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observations are restricted to being serial. 	It is hoped that by 
using event structures, the ideas there can be brought closer in 
spirit to net theory, and concurrency treated more naturally. 
There is no uniform way in which to treat problems associated 
with "fairness". Particular fair implementations can generally be 
modelled; the problem is to find a denotation which is both an 
abstraction from all possible implementations and still expresses 
that certain events will occur eventually. Perhaps event 
structures are an appropriate framework in which to express ideas 
of abstraction and inevitability of occurence (see the relations 
of 5.3 and restless events in 6.4). 
Related to the fairness issue are technical problems associated 
with infinite non-determinism when generalising Plotkin's power-
domain construction based on finite non-determinism [Plo 2]. From 
the work of Park [Par] and Plotkin (unpublished) it appears that 
continuity should be generalised to model infinite non-determinism 
successfully. As continuous functions have been a basis for a 
successful theory, domains of information associated with infinite 
non-determinism should carry extra structure to distinguish them 
from those used formerly. Event-structure ideas may help here. 
Interestingly continuity can be. rescued for infinite non-determinism 
by "padding-out" denotations with extra operational detail (e.g. 
in [Bac] taking denotations built from sets of histories does this). 
This can be seen as part of a general trend to add details of a 
more operational nature to denotations in order to model situations 
correctly. 
The correctness of a denotational semantics with respect to 
operational ideas is determined by the criterion of full-abstractis; 
a semantics is fully-abstract if denotations are identified iff 
they are operationally equivalent. This notion enables one to 
home-in on inadequacies of denotational semantics, highlighting 
those operational features which it does not and should treat 
explicitly. For example the full-abstract,,ss problem for PCF 
(see chapter 8) led Berry to an important new ordering on domains 
of functions, the stable ordering. 	It is an ordering on 
behaviours of functions and viewed in an event-structure setting 
with functions regarded as configurations (chapter 9) it is 
associated with finiteness restrictions. This is new but back in 
'75 Kahn and Plotkin recognised the need for some kind of event-
structure representation of basic input and output domains in order 
to define the notion of sequential function, involved in the PCF-
problem. I was led to study event structures by the problem of 
injecting time into domains so that denotations also included the 
time complexity. 
It is hoped that event structures associated with domains by 
representation results will prove fruitful in semantics by capturing 
operational ideas. in a natural, intuitive way. 
A word on work outside the two main streams of net theory and 
denotational semantics: Hewitt's actor model of distributed 
computing [Hew] uses the concept of an event - r Hw1* ai 
ç -Ij r 	.e]2J 4 actor ;he presents some finiteness 
restrictions on a form of event structure. Lamport's paper [Lam] 
constructs an event structure from deterministic processes 
communicating; his ideas on logical clocks and time-stamps implicitly 
impose 	 finiteness restriction, 	ee41ts(see 5.6). 
1.3 	Summary 
We summarise the work, in the thesis. 
In chapter , 2 we introduce net theory. The manner of intro-
duction has been motivated by the future issues with which we shall 
be concerned; for this reason it is not unbiased or uncritical. 
Initially we show how nets, structures built-up from events 
and conditions (2.1) may be given a dynamic behaviour (the "token 
game" on transition nets) in terms of markings (subsets of 
conditions) changing according to the firing rule which determines 
those concurrent occurrences of events which are possible (2.2). 
In particular we define and illustrate the notions of concession 
(that situation in which an event may occur), conflict (when event 
occurrences are mutually exclusive) and confusion a phenomenon 
due to conflict not being localised. Starting from an initial 
marking repeated application of the firing rule yields the forwards
. - 
reachable markings. We then illustrate how transition nets with 
initial marking can be used to model computations such. as those 
described by Milner nets, Kahn-MacQueen networks and datatypes like 
the integers or infinite tapes (2.3). These illustrate how events 
may be interpreted as atomic actions and conditions as local states. 
For Milner nets and Kahn-MacQueen networks there are inadequacies 
in the modelling by nets. ThisGtraced to an ambiguity in the firing 
rule; occasionally one does not wish events to have concession 
forever - some events must occur or lose the ability to occur 
eventually (the idea of restless events). 
Petri defined causal nets (see 2.4) in order to formalise the 
idea of a course that a computation. may follow. Causal nets are 
the net-analogue of history or run and can be associated with 
particular plays of the token game. Petri has imposed a kind of 
finiteness restriction on them called K-density based on an idea of 
state for causal nets, formalised as a case. We present a precise 
though informal argument for K-density based on evidence in the 
literature ([Pet 11, [Bes]) and fair I hope,as using it we find a 
point to disagree; we take issue with Petri's formalisation of 
state as case. 	(Later, chiefly in chapter 5, we present more 
detailed evidence). 
Finally we introduce and..examine net morphisms a little (2.5), 
defining and. illustrating concepts such as subnet and folding 
inorphisms. 
Chapter 3 deals chiefly with the concrete domains [Kah and Plo]. 
They are, I believe, the first example where events came to be 
treated explicitly in denotational semantics. 
We start with a racy summary of the main definitions and ideas 
in denotational semantics, presenting such concepts as complete 
partial order, isolated element -algebraic domain and continuous 
function informally relating them to computations. 
Concrete domains are domains of basic input or output 
information which support a definition of sequential function. 
As part of the process of axiomatising the domains Kahn and Plotkin 
required a representation theorem for them. A concrete domain is 
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represented by an event structure in the form of a matrix (3.2.3) 
rather like a Petri net. The domains consist of information about 
what events have occurred. The events are localised to occur at 
places. When an appropriate set of events (not necessarily unique) 
has occured a place is allowed to be occupied by one of a set of 
mutually exclusive events. The representation theorem recovers 
events and places "hidden" in a concrete domain- they are recovered 
as equivalence classes of prime intervals (3.2.17) based on the 
covering relation (3.2.12). As a sort of appendix to chapter 3 
we present in section 3.3 an improvement of the proof of the 
representation theorem in [Kah and Plo]; the proof is also a little 
more general - it works for a broader class of event structures 
than matrices. 
One notable axiom of concrete domains is axiom F (3.2.11) 
saying that an isolated element only dominates a finite number of 
elements. In terms of the representation this means an occurrence 
of an event is only dependent on a finite number of events having 
occurred. Axiom F is a form of finiteness restriction.. (In 
section 5.6 we present an argument for it based. on Scott's thesis 
that computable functions are continuous). 
In chapter 4 we give the basic machinery for translating back-
and-forth between nets, event structures and domains. We generalise 
Petri's causal nets to yield. the class of occurrence nets, so- 
called because in an occurrence net events and conditions stand for 
unique occurrences -. not so for nets in general. The definition 
of case generalises easily too. However, surprisingly perhaps 
Petri's definition of-sequential process does not. We then define 
the unfolding of a transition net to be that occurrence net which 
describes all possible courses the token game may follow. We 
associate an event structure with an occurrence net essentially by 
forgetting the conditions but remembering the conflict they incur. 
Such event structures have the simple form (E, :5,'() where X is 
the conflict relation and :5, the causality relation, is a partial 
order, corresponding to the fact that an event can occur in a 
unique way. Consequently when we pass over to domains events 
manifest themselves in a particularly simple way, in fact as 
complete primes. Accordingly there is a very simple representation 
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theorem in terms of complete primes rather than equivalence 
classes of prime intervals. 
Chapter 5 provides event structures with a theory of states. 
We work chiefly with fairly general definitions chosen to reflect 
net-theoretic intuitions in order to extend the translation begun 
in chapter 4. 
Our definitions of state are based on the concept of an 
observer for an event structure; intuitively an observer stands 
for a run or history of a computation. The definition of observer 
(5.1.1) depends on two assumptions about the nature of the 
computations described which are called the initiality and 
discreteness restrictions. The definition allows an infinite set 
of causally unrelated events to occur within finite time. An 
observable state is defined to be the set of events some observer 
records in finite time while for a state time may be unbounded. 
It is observable states which capture those intuitions motivating 
Petri's definition of a case. We characterise both forms of state 
using a metric (5.2) closely allied to the idea of reachable 
markings of a net. The finiteness restriction of finite depth 
(5.2.11) on event structuresfollows from the definition of observer. 
Using the techniques of chapter i. the notions of state are 
transferred to nets (5.). 	Observable states transfer to a subset, 
generally proper, of cases of an occurrence net. We call them 
observable cases. In the situation where the occurrence net is an 
unfolding of a transition net, reachable markings are precisely the 
images of the observable cases under the folding map (5.4.4). 
Only in the situation where cases are observable would one 
expect K-density to apply and in fact restricting cases to being 
observable we prove a restricted form of K-density (5..7). Under 
certain conditions we prove a neat equivalent of K-density (5. 1 .8). 
The translation of the concept of confusion in nets is far 
more direct and less qualified. We show in section 5.5 how it 
connects with concrete domains. Confusion turns out to be a 
property of event structures; conditions play no role other than to 
express conflict. A major result of this chapter is that the 




We examine an idea of computationally feasible which induces 
a further finiteness restriction, that of finite width (5.3.2). 
This is intended to capture the idea that only a finite number of 
computing agents can be in operation at a finite time. It is 
based on the definition of observer which is determined solely by 
the causality and conflict relations :5 and . We introduce 
relations 	and 	between event structures to express ideas of 
implementation (5.3.12) particularly by finite-width event structures. 
Following how states go through the implementation relations suggests 
a more abstract definition of observer closer in spirit to denotational 
semantics (5.3.18). 	In short, section 5.3 shows how constructions 
based on ideas of abstraction, natural for net theory, yield a more 
abstract notion of state like that in semantics. 
The final section of chapter 5 deals with alternative finiteness 
restrictions and definitions of states as expressed by other authors. 
We briefly look at restrictions imposed by Hewitt's [Hew] and Lamport's 
[Lam] approaches and in a little more detail how the ideas of 
denotational semantics relate. We translate Scott's thesis 
("computable functions are continuous", [Sco])to a finiteness 
restriction on event structures (5.6.5). 
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with following-up our ideas in 
net theory. 
In chapter 6 we are concerned with conditions. When we pass 
from nets to event structures they are ignored;- many different 
occurrence nets may induce the same event structure. Here we are 
concerned with what, if anything, is lost in this process. This 
involves considering how conditions are to be interpreted; we regard 
them as local assertions having extents in time. 
The work begins by noting that with an extensionality principle 
on conditions one may recover the conditions of occurrence nets 
inducing an event structure from the event structure alone. Then 
using the simple machinery on states we have developed it is 
possible to define natural relations on the conditions of an event 
structure. One particularly useful relation formalises the situation 
where one condition holding implies thatc.h other holds (6.1.6). 
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Using such- relations given an event structure we may define a net 
which. is in some sense the minimum net inducing that event 
structure. We can also define the maximum net associated with an 
event structure (rather trivially this time). For such occurrence 
nets we show K-density results (6.1.32) which are close to Petri's 
original ideas. 
In section 6.2, regarding conditions as sets of assertions, 
we introduce a relation between nets which compares their degree of 
expressiveness. This relation enables us to characterise (6.3) the 
two constructions of nets from an event structure. - They will both 
be in the class of nets of maximum expressive power, one being included 
in and the other including all nets of this class. 
Finally in section 6.4 we look briefly at restless events of 
an event structure. They express an idea of inevitability. The 
topic appears to involve generalising Petri's conditions. 
In chapter 7 we take another look at observers for - an event 
structure. This time we do not insist on the initiality restriction 
- generally net theory does not. The results translate to causal 
nets.. We determine-when (countable) event structures have a total 
observer (7.1.7) - so all events are recorded at some time. 
Observers determine a reachability relation on observable states 
as in chapter 5.. However now there may be more than one 
equivalence class of reachable states. We characterise those 
(countable) event structures with one and only one (7.2.7). Then 
the event structure (or causal net inducing it) can alone be regarded 
as describing a course of computation (this is close to a remark 
by Petri motivating K-density in [Pet 2]). The mathematics involves 
such ideas as collapsing a convex subset of events to an "event", 
a kind of quotienting operation (7.1.10). As usual a restricted-
K-dens ity result applies (7.14.3). 
In chapter 8 we introduce an as yet open problem in 
d.enotational semantics, the full-abstractness problem forPCF. 
In chapter 9 we define higher-type event structures in which 
configurations represent functions. We produce a cartesian-closed 
category of event structures which is naturally equivalent to a full 
subcategory of Berry's bidomains,ha major step on the way to a 
solution of th.e PCF problem. Finally we indicate how by 
strengthening the axioms and restricting configurations a fully-
abstract model might be produced. 
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Chapter 2. 	Introduction to Petri nets 
In this chapter we introduce Petri nets and outline net theory 
in so far as it connects with our later work. A Petri net models a 
computation. Thus we shall be concerned with two aspects, the 
formal definitions and properties of the nets themselves, and, how 
they model computations. We use the word "computation" in a 
slightly vague way. We shall say more on this later. For the time 
being we note that what one thinks of as being a computation depends 
on what theory one has in mind. For instance one might sometimes 
think of a computation as inerelypartial function from input to out-
put. 	In net theory one is concerned with how computations proceed 
focussing on such properties as concurrency and conflict. Of course 
every theory automatically stakes out its own territory by virtue of 
what primitives it takes and what basic assumptions it makes thus 
determining what it can and cannot describe. Net theory takes events, 
conditions and causal dependency as its primitives and views the world 
accordingly. Nets have proved very useful as models of control. 
2.1 Basic definitions 
We shall take a slightly more general definition of a Petri 
net than is customary. 
Definition 2.1.1 
A Petri net N is a tuple (B,E,P) where: 
B is a set of conditions 
B is a set of events 
F ' (B x E) ,.j (B x B) is the causal dependency relation 
satisfying: N1.B ,-E = 
Notation 2.1.2 
Let N be a Petri net. 	If x € B LIE we write 'x (respectively 
x) for {y IyFxI (respectively {y Ixpy}). 	If x € Ewe call 'x the 
Preconditions and x' the postconditions of x. 	If x € B we call ° x 
the preevents and x' the postevents of x. 
The definition of a Petri net is more general than usual because 
we allow F to be null and do not insist that the field of F, 
{x € B E 13 y € B '-' B xFy or yFx}, is B LI B. Thus we allow a net 
to consist of a single condition or event. 	We recall the standard 
graphical representation of Petri nets in which events are 
represented by squares " s " and conditions by circles 11 0 and the 
relation F by oriented arcs "-*-". Note that with this represent-
ation we allow 
Later we shall sometimes impose a further axiom on nets which 
ensures conditions are extensional in the sense that two conditions 
with the same pre and post events are identical (N2 below). It is 
convenient to define another axiom (N3) too. We shall not use 
either till chapter 4. 
Definition 2.1.3 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a Petri net. 	N satisfies N2 if f 
N2.: Vb 1 ,'o 2 E B • b 1 = • b 2 & b 	= b => b 1 = b 2 . 
If N satisfies N2 it is condition-extensional 
N satisfies N3 iff 
N3:Ve €E eLd &et$. 
This net satisfies neither N2 nor N3: 
2.2 Tratisition nets 
Perhaps the most familiar part of Net theory is the "token 
game in which markings of conditions in the net change as events fire. 
We deal with this now. We should remark that within net theory there 
is a semiformal idea of level of net description, the higher the level 
of the net the more abstract is the net description. The token game 
occurs at the level of transition nets. Here the events are usually 
called transitions and the conditions places. At this level nets are 
endowed with a dynamic behaviour in which markings change according to 
the firing rule. A marking is a subset of conditions usually 
represented by a distribution of tokens on a graphical representation 
of the net. 	(Only a single token is allowed on each condition of the 
marking.) 
Definition 2.2.1 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net. A marking of N is a subset of B. 
The firing rule depends on two notions, concession and conflict. 
An event may fire only when it has concession. 
Definition 2.2.2 (concession) 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net. 	Suppose M is a marking of N and e € E. 
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Then e has concession at N iff,'e G N S. ea, N = 
Definition 2.2.3 (conflict) 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net. 	Suppose N is a marking of N and 
e0 ,e 1 are in E. Then e0 and e 1 are in forwards conflict at N iff 
they both have concession and e0 n e 1 95. They are in backwards 
conflict at N iff they both have concession and e p e 	95. 
They are in conflict at N if f they are in forwards or backwards 
conflict at N. 
Now we can give the firing rule which specifies when a subset of 
events may fire concurrently. 
Definition 2.2.4 (The firing rule) 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net. 	Suppose N and N' are markings of N 
and that X E. 	Define M[>M' if±' (i) each member of X has concession 
at N, (ii) no two members of X are in conflict at N, 
(i±±) N' = (M\UVeI e E x}) ¼1U{e e € x}. 
(Then events in X are said to fire concurrentl y.) 
Thus the firing rule gives a "one—step forwards" reachability relation 
between markings. Note if two events are in conflict one excludes the 
other from firing. 
Example 2.2.5 Thistrating concession) 
X X 
Here e has concession in 1 but not in 2 and 3. 
Example 2.2.6 (illustrating conflict) 
e0 	 C, 	 e0 
N 1 , Forwards conflict 
	
N2, Backwards conflict 
In the above net N 1 , e0 ,e 1 are in forwards conflict for the 
marking shown as they both have concession and share a common 
precondition. 	In N2 , e0 and e 1 are in backwards conflict for the 
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marking as they both have concession and share a common post-
condition. Referring to the firing rule note that in either case 
only one of the events e0 ,e 1 can fire. 	Thus implicit in the firing 
rule is:: 	The change in a condition-holding that takes place as a 
result of an event occurrence is associated uniquely with that 
occurrence. 
Example 2.2.7 
bO 	bQ 	bO 	b'Q 
e 	 e 	 e 	••• e 0 0 1 2 n 
b 	 b2 	b 
In this example the net is infinite. As the firing rule does 
not require that only one event fires at a time the marking 
ibli n € 4)} is reachable from the marking shown through the concurrent 
firing of {eI xi E 
So far we have only dealt with one application of the firing 
rule. Repeated applications of it give a forwards reachability 
relation between markings. The precise nature of this reachability 
relation depends on how fast one is allowed to play the token game 
(see gL4_.2 ). However the following-definition-seems to be accepted. 
Definition 2.2.8 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net. Suppose M and M' are markings. Write 
M -' M' 1ff 9 X E M{M'. 	Define -> to be the transitive closure 
of 	If M -> M' say M' is forwards reachable from M.. 
Net theory generally deals with a symmetric reachability relation 
(the symmetric closure of ->) so it is also concerned with backwards 
reachability. However in our work we shall generally assume 
transition nets have an initial marking from which the forwards 
reachable markings are obtained by the firing rule. 
Definition 2.2.9 
Define a transition net with initial marking to be a pair (N,M) 
consisting of a Petri net N together with a marking M. The 
(forwards) reachable markings of (N,M) are all markings M' such that 
1  
N - N'. 
Example 2.2.10 
Here the initial marking 1b0 ,b 1 } is marked. The events e0 ,e 1 are in 
conflict. 	Either e0 or e 1 can fire to yield the marking {b 1 ,b2 }. 
One of them may fire concurrently with e 2 to yield the marking 
{b2 ,b3 }. The further firing of e 3 would then return us to the initial 
marking and the cycle could be repeated. 
Later we shall be concerned with contact-free transition nets 
with initial marking. 
Definition 2.2.11 
Let (N,M) be a transition net with initial marking. 	The (N,M) 
is contact-free 1ff for any reachable marking M and event e we have 
'e.M=> ecM=$. 
Example 2.2.12 (nets which are not contact-free) 
X0 
We shall also be concerned with the concept of confusion in 
transition nets. Confusion can occur in two forms, symmetric and 
asymmetric. We illustrate these below deferring tIE formal 
definition until after. 
WAI 
Example 2.2.13 (confusion) 
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Symmetric confusion 	 Asymmetric confusion 
In the case of symmetric confusion at a marking two events e 1 
and e3 can occur concurrently. Through the occurrence of e 1 ,e3 is 
brought out of conflict with e 2 ; through the occurrence of e 3 , 
e 1 is brought out of conflict with e 2 . 
In the case of asymmetric confusion at a marking e 1 and e3 can 
occur concurrently. Through the occurrence of e 1 , e3 is brought into 
conflict with e 2 . 
For simplicity we define confusion for a contact-free transition 
net with initial marking. 	 - 
Definition 2.2.14 (confusion) 
Let (N,M0) be a contact-free transition net with. initial marking. 
Let M be a reachable marking. 
Say N is symmetrically confused at N if f there are events e 1 ,e2 , 
e3 such that e 1 and e2 are in conflict and e2 and e3 are in conflict 
at N but e 1 and e3 are not in conflict at M. 
Say N is asymmetrically confused at N iff there are events e 1 ,e 2 , 
e3 such that e 1 ,e3 but not e2 have concession at N and M[e1'>M' so that 
and e3 are in conflict at N. 
Say (N,N0) is symmetrically (asetrically) confused iff for 
some reachable marking N we have N is symmetrically (asymmetrically) 
confused at N. 
Say (N,M0) is confused iff it is symmetrically or asymmetrically 
confused. 
In net theory it is said that "resolution of conflict is not 
objective" when confusion occurs. The following informal argument 
is used. It uses the idea of an observer - we shall make the 
explanation more solid in the next section where we discuss one 
possible notion of observer. We sketch the argument: In the case 
of symmetric confusion in example 2.2.13 if e 1 and e3 occur concur-
rently one regards this as meaning they can occur at any time 
relative to each other according to an observer. Thus it depends on 
the observer whether conflict has been resolved between e 2 and e3 . 
Similarly for asymmetric confusion it will depend on the observer 
whether or not conflict is resolved between e 2 and e3 [I.prvp.4J. 
2.3 Examples of modelling computations by transition nets 
In the previous section we have outlined the dynamic 
behaviour of transition nets (the token game) and illustrated some of 
the basic concepts such as concession, conflict and the more obscure 
notion of confusion. This was discussed purely within the theory of 
transition nets. In this section we illustrate how transition nets 
may be used. to model situations in computer science. The examples 
will necessarily be limited; we refer the interested reader to the 
literature 	por&cuIr see 	 pointing out that net theory is a 
growing subject consisting of far more than will be mentioned in this 
thesis. Nevertheless we see the theory of transition nets as a. 
keystone of net theory, from which more recent work has been done in 
securing it by examining assumptions to be made on lower level nets 
[Pet I ] and also extending it to higher levels as in the work of 
Genrich and Lautenbach, and Jensen ([Ten], CGenl). 
Thus the examples will illustrate some basic issues. 
A. Modelling Milner nets by transition nets 
We first dwell a little on Milner nets. These are fairly easy 
to understand intuitively as computations although there are many 
subt2ies which we shall gloss over. Our use of them here is the 
modest one of providing a (for us) semiformal description of some 
computations which we can model by transition nets. The interested 
reader is referred to the fast-growing literature on Milner nets 
(e.g. [Mill)). Milner nets are constructed by "wiring together" a 
collection of computing agents each with its own internal program 
determining its behaviour following the communications it makes with 
its fellow agents. An agent has ports at which it may communicate. 




The label 	o( indicates that Avi7a, f. make an 0<-communication 
with another agent with port labelled by & (called the Co-label of o). 
(Thus A above could make a fi -communication with another agent 
labelled with 	.) Here we shall assume that the communication 
is purely one of synchronisation (a "handshake" between agents). 
After making a communication an agent will move into a new state 
determining whether and how it is prepared to communicate. At any 
stage an agent may be prepared to make several communications. 
However, significantly, it is only allowed to make at most one; thus 
an agent is not allowed to make two communications concurrently. 
Given these constraints the internal program of an agent may be cast 
in algebraic form as a synchronisation tree or its equivalent algebraic 
expression. For the agent A above an example program p would be: 
P = oc::NIL + : (':NIL + :NIL) 
or drawn as a synchronisation tree, p 
=oe - 
0< 	i2 
Thinking of a program as a. tree the nodes of the tree determine 
states, the future behaviour from a node being given by the subtree 
with itas root. The program NIL, represented as a. tree with one node 
ft WIt, says no future communication will occur. The program p above 
means that the agent is prepared to make either an 0< or a iscommun-
ication. If the external world of other agents is such that it 
performs an cK -communication then it may do a 1'3-communication 
whereupon it loses interest in future interaction with any other 
agents there may be. On the other hand the external world may 
provide a ts-communication.. Then it is prepared to do an or a 
communication, not both, before losing interest. 
It remains to describe the operatinns on agents. For Mil ner 
et al these operations yield agents - remember an agent has a 
particularly simple internal program. This is achieved by 
simulating parallelism by interleaving so a compound agent formed 
by setting two agents in parallel still possesses an internal program 
of this simple form. 	In fact congruence classes of programs then 
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form a natural domain of denotations once one has settled on a 
suitable tion of equivalence of behaviours. However our concern 
is different; we wish to associate a transition net with the 
compound agent to exhibit any concurrency it may possess. We will 
have two operations derived from Miler's: one will take a set of 
agents and link them together in parallel; the other will screen-
off certain labelled ports. Both these operations use the labelling 
on ports. 
Think of the operations as being done physically on the agents. 
Picture three agents: 
1' 
Conbining them in parallel yields the following picture of a compound 
agent; call it par{s,t,r}. 
The link between 	and ? for instance shows that s and t may 
communicate via their respective 7 and ' ports. Of course, how the 
compound agent behaves depends on the internal programs of s,t and r.. 
Having set up such an agent one may wish to screen-off certain ports. 
For example at present s can still make a communication with the 
external world via its 	port. If we wish to prevent this we can 
remove the labels r1  and 7 to form the new compound agent 
parfs,t,rl\ fyj, which has j',y' ports hidden from view. We can 
Z4. 
picture this as 
Z5 
Similarly we can screen-off any set of labels. 
Well, how do we associate a transition net with such compound 
agents? It is natural to take the communications as events. For 
the conditions we take states of the agents; thus we interpret 
conditions as local elements of a global state. The state of an 
agent is altered by the occurrence of a communication; this induces 
the causal dependency relation. A little cars is needed to ensure 
that the token game is correct. For example suppose we have an 
agent which starts in some state from which it may communicate to 
return immediately to the sane state. In some appropriate compound 
agent this will yield an event with a precondition and postcondition 
in common which will be marked initially. According to the token 
game the event will not have concession whereas from the Milner net 
point of view we would like it to be able to fire. I see three ways 
out. One is to change the definition of concession so that it 
differs from the usual one (say an event e has concession for a 
marking M iff • e q M and (e 'e) f\ M = $). Another is to ditiguish 
different occurrences of holdings of the same place.. Finally (a sly 
trick'-) we could choose our agents so this can never occur. We pick 
the latter by assuming in examples that our agents have finite internal 
programs. 
We give some examples showing how a transition net with initial 
marking is associated with a Milner net. In fact the transition nets 
have a bit of extra structure due to labelling the events.. This is 
because there are essentially two different kinds of event. There 
are "external events" (which we label by o( or  for example) corres-
ponding to possible communication with an external agent (ports 
labelled(R or o) not in the Milner net. There are "internal events" 
which we label by ' (as in [Mu 1 ]) corresponding to internal 
communications between agents in the Milner net. 
Example 2.3. 1 
For the single agent 0 with internal program 
PO = o<:Nil + ê:NIL the corresponding transition net 
Note the conditions are associated with the states of the agent 0 - 
they are pairs consisting of the agent and one of its possible states. 
The initial state of 0 is marked. The agent is initially prepared to 
make an 0< or a 	communication. 
When the agent 0 above is set-up in parallel with other agents 
we may get internal communications as the next example illustrates. 
Example 2.3.2 
Suppose the agent of 2.3.1 is set in parallel with. two other 
agents, 1 and 2 with programs p 1 and 2 as shown: 




The transition net associated with par{0,1,2} is: 
This time 0 may make a communication with 1 or 2. The corres-
ponding events are labelled 	- they are internal to the Milner net 
above. 
If o( and /I 
ports were screened-off from external communication 
those events labelled by c><,c,<,,6 could never occur. 	This is 
reflected by omitting these events from the net. Thus the tran-
sition net associated with par{0,1,2}\ {o,} is: 
In the next example we show how confusion can arise from Milner 
nets. To make the drawings simple we only consider internal 
communications.. 
Example 2.3.3 (How symmetric confusion can arise from Milner nets) 
Consider the above compound, agent consisting of four agents 
0,1,2,3 linked in parallel. We can write it as par{o,1,2,3}\ 
The respective programs are: 
PO =oltET 
p 1 =.:NIL + 	:NIL 
P2 
=:NIL + )':NIL 
P3 
NIL 
The corresponding transition net below is an example of 
symmetric confusion 
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From left to right the three eventq a,b,c labelled '' , correspond 
to 0 and 1, 1 and 2, 2 and 3 communicating. 
Example 2.3.4 (How asymmetric confusion can arise from Miler nets) 
This time the compound agent par{0,1,2,3}\ {o,1ô,} is formed 
from four agents 0,1,2,3 with respective internal programs: 
P0 = :NIL 
P1 = c:ê:NIL 
P2 - :NIL + 7:NTL 
P3 = 7:NIL 
Our associated transition net is now an example of asymmetric 





7 	 The three events a,b,c labelled 
1 and 2, and 2 and 3 commun- 
/17 \ 	 by '2 correspond to 0 and. 1, 
4 
Oip) 	 icating respectively. 
Recall that in the previous section we gave the traditional net 
theoretic analysis of confusion in which it is said that confusion 
occurs when conflict resolution is not objective i.e.. it depends on 
the observer if and between what events conflict is resolved. We 
left, somewhat up in the air, the idea of what an observer is. One 
possible idea is that of a run or history of the computation by which 
is meant a record of what events happened and when they happened. In 
a particular run of the Milner nets in examples 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, 
because we know nothing of the relative speeds, conflict between b and 
c may or may not occur even when certainly occurs sometimes during 
the rim. 
A Petri net can be regarded as determining a set of possible 
runs or histories, as above. However this intrudes on another 
issue, one which we have deliberately left ambiguous till now and 
which we shall only mention here. In the Milner nets of examples 
2.3.3 and 2.3.4 a,b,c the events labelled 't' have been screened-off 
from interruption by the outside world. For this reason (see 
[Mu 1 ]) in the Milner net of 2.3.3 either b or a and c commun-
ications will eventually occur and in the net of 2.3.4 either a and 
c or a and b will eventually occur. The Petri nets modelling Milner 
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nets do not express this. In examples 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 all the 
events are internalised so one could make the token game behave 
correctly for these examples by appending another rule which ensures 
a kind of fairness: 
ito event can have concession forever; it must either eventually fire 
or lose its concession through a conflicting event firing. 
Of course in general a Milner net will include a mixture of internal 
and external communications. To reflect this the associated 
transition net must bear extra structure. One idea is to distinguish 
a subset of events, perhaps called restless events, such that no event 
in the subset can have concession forever; it must either eventually 
fire or lose its concession through a conlicting event firing. 
Our chief aim was to illustrate how transition nets can model 
the computations associated with Milner nets. For this reason our 
approach was very informal. Undoubtedly it could be made more 
systematic and general. For example Mogens Nielsen has given a 
formal semantics for Milner nets (like the ones we have used) in terms 
of labelled event structures. Importantly then an agent can commun-
icate concurrently. 
B. Transition nets as datatypes 
The issue of restless events above suggest another class of 
computations described by transition nets, namely those in which no 
events are restless. Such computations correspond naturally to data-
types. A dataty-pe is a possible set of values associated with a 
computation (the set may have a lot of structure of course). 
Typical datatypes are the Booleans, the integers, finite and infinite 
strings or tapes and,if we are prepared to go to higher types, partial 
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functions and functionals. 	(It night be thought that causality 
structures such as transition nets are so inherently "low-type" 
that the latter are beyond their range; however see chapter 9 on 
event-structures of higher type.) 
Example 2.3.5 (The integers) 
.. 	. 
. . 
Here at most one value, an integer, can appear. Thinking of this as 
occurring at some place, such as a square on a tape, one can give a 
physical interpretation of the conditions. The bottom condition 
corresponds to no value having occurred there and the upper conditions 
to particular values having occurred. Imagining this net to occur 
as part of a computation which may yield an integer value,it is 
possible that no integer is ever produced through the computation 
diverging; then the bottom condition would hold forever. 
Example 2.3.6 (Possibly-infinite tapes or strings over io,i}) 
or 
folded version 
Looking at the figure on the left it is easy to see how 
arbitrary tapes over {o,i}. including the null tape can be generated 
by playing the token game; the null tape corresponds to the token 
getting stuck forever in the initial place and infinite tapes to 
infinite games. Regarded as part of a computation yielding tapes as 
output the token getting stuck forever at some place corresponds to 
the computation diverging at this stage. To the right we have 
drawn a folded version of this net in which even occurrences and odd 
occurrences have been collapsed together. Note we could not take 
as a folded version and keep the 
standard notion of concession (another 
reason for changing the definition of 
concession?) 
Frequently datatypes will be associated with possible input or 
output values for a computation. As such they may be represented by 
"subriets" (we give a precise definition in 2.5) of the net associated 
with the entire computation. Again in general this will give rise to 
a transition net where some events will be restless and some not. The 
events associated with input will not be restless; the choice of 
input and whether or not there is to be any is decided by the outside 
environment. The remaining events may well be restless in the net 




Regard N 1 as the input datatype and N2 as the output datatype in the 
following computation in which one event e 3 is restless so marked by 
an "R". When e 1 and e2 occur as input e3 eventually occurs as output. 
ec &) 
C.. Modelling Kahn-MacQueen networks by transition nets 
We now sketch how to model Kahn-MacQueen networks [Kah and Mac] by 
Petri nets. They provide examples of a process interacting with data-
types. Kahn-MacQueen networks consist of processes which may 
communicate through channels able to queue arbitrarily long sequences 
of values. The processes are deterministic and the states of the 
channels can be regarded as forming a datatype. For simplicity we 
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assume that in a network distinct processes cannot share a common 
channel to output or input to, and that the values exchanged are 
always from a set V. The act of outputting a value to a channel we 
call writing, the act of inputting from a channel reading. Then our 
assumption implies each channel c has at most one process writing to 
it; call it w(c) if it exists in the network. 	Similarly each 
channel c has at most one process reaching from it; call it r(c) if 
it exists in the network. It is customary to draw diagrams like the 




This diagram represents a network consisting of three processes p 1 , 
connected to six channels marked as arcs directed to show how 
information flows. We have w(c 4) p2 and r( C4) = p3 . Note we 
do not insist on each channel having both a writer and a reader - the 
ttprocessesv? w(c 1 ) and r(c3) are in the external environment. 
Rather than describing a programming language to determine the 
internal programs of the processes we give them an informal semantics. 
Call the semantic denotation of a process a behaviour. As with 
Milner nets we have the behaviour of doing nothing-evermore which we 
call "NIL". Otherwise a process may be in a reading state, when it 
is about to read from a definite channel if it can, or in a writing 
state, when it is about to output to a definite channel. After 
accomplishing these actions it will follow some subsequent behaviour. 
Of course, if the action is that of reading a value its subsequent 
behaviour will depend on the value in general. Thus a behaviour If 
of a process p has three forms according to p's state: 
(reading state) b 	(c,f) where c is a channel s.t. r(c) = p 
and f is a function from V to behaviours. 
riting state) b = (c,(v,b')) where c is a channel s.t. w(c) = p, v € V 
and b' is a behaviour. 
(null state) b = NIL 
(This can be regarded as an inductive definition of a set of finite 
behaviours or alternatively behaviours may be thought of as elements 
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of a recursively defined domain. Here we do not care, though the 
latter would be necessary for infinite or non-terminating behaviours.) 
Now we show how to construct a transition net with initial 
marking modelling a network satisfying our assumptions. The events 
will be actions of reading or writing. Conditions will correspond 
to states of processes and local states of the channels. 
Process-conditions will be of the form: 
D p, b where p is a process and b is a behaviour. 
Of these conditions those in which b is the initial behaviour of p 
will be marked initially. 
Essentially a channel i$ a queue of values. A process writes 
the latest value onto the queue and reads (and removes) the earliest. 
Roughly we shall represent the queue as the (temporal) sequence of 
values written to the channel (the temporal order is indexed by t in 
CO below) with additional constraints. The constraints ensure that 
the sequence behaves like a queue in that a process may only read in 
order from the beginning and write in order onto the end.- 
Associated with a channel c we have three kinds of place.. The 
temporal position of a value writtis represented by places 
where t E ). 
th This means the t value has not yet been written to c but all 
previous values have been written to c. Accordingly the place 
9c,O,- is marked initially. To keep track of what values have been written to c,- for future 
reading we have places 
(EiE) 
This means the tth value has been written to c, it is v, and it has 
not yet been read from c. 
Lastly, we have a further set of places to guarantee a process 
reads in order from the beginning of the queue. These are 
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Writing 
A process can write to 
at 
th  value vtoa 
channel c only if the 
channel has had the 
previous value written 
to it. 
Initial reading 
A process can read the 
initial value provided 
it has not yet been read 
off. 
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9 	where t €A). 
This means the t 
th value has been written to c and read from c. 
The events will be of two forms. We have, for c a channel, 
t E CO and v € V, 
r 
c,t,v 	 and 
	 c,t,v 
corresponding to the actions of writing and reading value v as the tth 
value of c. 
The transition net with initial marking is determined by the pre 
and post conditions of the events. We draw these now, but only for 
those channels c such that w(c) and r(c) exist; otherwise simply omit 
places referring to the non-existent process. The variables used are 
understood to range over the obvious sets. 
Further reading 
A process can read off 
the t+ith  value once 
the t+ith  value has k, 
written to c and the t th 
value has been read off C. 
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Again, as with our transition net models of Milner nets,. we 
have problems with the standard definition of concession. It is 
possible for an event, which we would like to be able to fire, to 
have a place which is both a pre and post condition. This occurs 
for example if a process has behaviour f with f(v) = f for some 
value v. (Then f will be an infinite behaviour.) Here again the 
revised, definition of concession is appropriate. Recall this says 
an event e has concession for a marking M iff • e M and 	- 
(e \e) ( N = 95. In the following example, where the process has 
finite behaviour, the standard definition of concession works. 
Example 2.3.9 
In this example a process p reads,- outputs, reads again then 
outputs again before going into the null state. The network is 
c 1 	a2 
where c 1 takes values 0 or 1 and c 2 takes only 0's as values.. We 
draw the associated transition net derived from our construction, 
marking those conditions which represent the states of p and whether 
events are reading (r) or writing (w) actions. We first draw the 
net so as to exhibit the subnets corresponding to c 1 , p and c2 . We 
also draw the subnet of c 1 so as to separate the writing-part and 
reading-part. The reading-events of c 1 are identified with reading 
transitions of p and the writing-events of p are identified with 
writing-events of c 2 . The identification is marked by a dotted 
line. Note the writing events of c 1 depend on the external environ- 
ment. 
3' 
writing to channel c 1 	reading to channel c 1 	the process p writing 
to chan-
nelc2 
One can, of course, draw the net so appropriate events are 
identified; then it looks more like a heap of spaghetti, thus: 
channel c 1 	 process P 	 channel 
The above example illustrates a. computation which can be viewed 
more abstractly-as determining a function from an input d.atatype 
(associated with c 1 ) to an output datatype (associated with c 2 ). 
The process will read a value if it is in a read—state and there is 
a value to read. Also it will write a value if it is a write—
state. The corresponding transitions are thus restless. However 
the write—transitions of c 1 are not; they depend on the outside 
world. 
In the examples we have given particular constructions of 
transition nets modelling computations. In example 2.3.9 many 
other transition net descriptions are possible even once the inter-
pretation of transitions has been fixed. One would like a means 
of expressing the relationship between net descriptions which in 
particular induces notions of equivalence (the latter corresponding 
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to "are essentially the same description of a computation"). 
2.4 Causal nets, cases and K-density  
Historically transition nets came first in the development 
of net theory. Later Petri, in particular, has attempted to 
develop the foundations of net theory by analysing the assumptions 
to be made at "lower conceptual levels" [Pet I ]. 	It is hoped 
that a theory of morphisms (see section 2.5) will make this precise. 
Causal nets [Pet I ] appear at the "first conceptual level". 
A transition net description of a computation determines a set of 
possible courses (called "processes" by Petri in [Pet 1 ]) the 
computation may take. 	(We avoid the words "history" or-"run" as 
for us they invoke a time-scale.) Petri requires a type of net to 
formalise the idea ofcourse of computation. At the very least 
he requires such nets to be causal nets. In addition he also 
requires them to be K-dense. Petri has said that the set of causal 
nets associated with a transition net constitutes its semantics 
[Pet. 2 ]. 
There are difficulties with the formalisation of the idea. of 
course of a computation by causal nets.. A causal net is being used 
as a net-analogue of history.. As such the events are regarded as 
eventually occurring so we encounter the restless events issue again. 
It appears courses are allowed to have infinite pasts which introduces 
some subtleties (see chapter 7). Also, importantly, K-density seems 
far too restrictive an axiom.. As we shall argue against it later 
(see chapter 5) we shall spell out the arguments given for K-density 
in [Pet I ] and CBes] 	. The axiom of K-density involves the net- 
theoretic idea of state of a causal net, called a case. 
As we mentioned, the courses of a computation must at least be 
representable by causal nets. As net analogues of histories they do 
not possess conflict. However causal nets are not marked so this 
is banned in a formal way by the axioms N4. and N 	•. In order 
that the events and conditions of a causal net correspond to occur- 
rences loops in F are also disallowed (axiom Nt). 	(Note as our 
definition of a Petri net is a little more general than usual so too 
is our definition of a causal net.) 
NO 
Definition 2.4.1 
A Petri—net N = (B,E,P) is a causal net iff 
V  E B 	< 1 
V b E B l'bI <1 
is irreflexive. 
























a e., 	a 
C 
Note in example 2.4.5 an event e is dependent on an infinite 
chain of events e0 ,e 1 ,... . 	In examples 2.4.6 and 2.4.7 the event 
is dependent on an infinite chain of events e 19 e29
... stretching 
into the past. In example 2.4.8 the event e depends on chains of 
events of unbounded length. 
For a causal net it is easy to define a concurrency relation, 
representing causal independence between events and conditions; it 
is simply the complement of the causal dependency FL)F 
Definition 2.4.9 
For a causal net N = (B,E,F) the concurrency relation 
CON c (B U B) x (B j E) is defined by 
= (B u B) x (B o B) 	(F 	()-1 ) 
From our axioms on causal nets it follows that co 1 is symmetric 
and. reflexive and that any two elements of B .J B are either causally 
dependent or concurrent. 
The concurrency relation is used in defining the net—theoretic 
notion of state. This is taken to be a maximal subset of B '..) B 
pairwise related under CON,  and is called a case. This form of 
definition occurs frequently in dealing with nets so we spend a 
little time on notation. 
Proposition 2.4.10 
Let X be a set with binary relation R s.t. R 2 l (the 
identity on x). 	Then a ken of P. in X is defined to be a maximal 
subset of pairwise R—related elements of X. Note, for Y ç  X, Y is 
a ken of R in X iff the following holds: 
V  E  X(Vy £ Y xRy <=> x E 
Definition 2.4.11 
Let N be a causal net (B,E,F) with concurrency relation CON. 
A case of N is defined to be a ken of CON  in B o B. 
The definition of case (only defined for causal nets) is 
intended to formalise some notion of global state. 	In example 2.4.2 
{e41, {b2 ,b3 1 and {e2 ,b2 } are some of the cases. In examples 2.4.4 
and 2.4.5 {b0 }, {b 1 ,b1, {e 1 ,b}, 	 as well as the 
infinite set {btn = 1,2...} are cases. 
To state the axiom of K-density we need a further definition. 
Definition 2.4.12 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a causal net. A sequential process of N is 
a ken of (Ftj p*1)  in B v B. 
The name "sequential process" is apt for the 'tsubnets" corres-
ponding to Miler's agents or Kahn-MacQueen processes when there is 
no conflict. Note sequential processes may possess a variety of 
order-types. In examples 2.4.6 and 2.4.7 the sequential process 
({e. \ i E C0 1 U lb. I i £ c)}) has order-type w. 	In example 2.4.5 the 
sequential process ({b1 1 i EU)} j {e./ i €w} ç leD has order-type 
C*)+ 1. 
Now we state the axiom of K-density giving our' intuitive inter-
pretation of it later. It says any case determines a unique "local 
state" of a sequential process. 
Definition 2.4.13 (The axiom of K-density) 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a causal net. - The net N is said to be 
K-dense iff every case intersects every sequential process. 
Notice that because of the properties of co any non-null 
intersection of a case and a sequential process is a singleton. As 
Petri noted, any finite net is K-dense. Also the nets in examples 
2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.6 and 2.4.8 are K-dense. 	However the nets of 
examples 2.4.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.7 are not. In examples 2.4.4 and 
2.4.5 the cases described by {b'n = 1,2...} do not meet the 
sequential processes (lb .J I (ic,..} J {e. i €w}) and 
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({b. ( i Ewl j {eJ i E co} j{eI) respectively. 	In example 2.4.7 
the case {b i € wi does not meet the sequential process 
i €wI Q JbJ j 
In [Pet I ] K-density is announced as a thesis; there it is 
stated that a causal net representing a course of computation is 
K-dense. 	Thus the nets of 2.4.5 and 2.4.7 and the seemingly 
inoffensive net of 2.4.4 are banned from representing courses of a 
computation. Examples 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 show that the property of 
being K-dense or not depends crucially on what conditions are 
included. As later we shall deal with event structures, essentially 
nets without conditions, it is important we understand at least the 
intuition behind K-density. In fact we shall disagree with it. To 
us the net of 2.4.4 seems reasonable even though, incidentally it 
cannot be associated with the course of a finite transition net. For 
instance the conditions bl of 2.4.4 might correspond to resource n 
being made available by an agent on transition e 1 from state b 1 
to b. Thus we must find a point on which to disagree. 
It is hard to argue directly with the thesis in [Pet I ] or 
the "simplicity" - and-'attractiveness" argument in [Bes] 	. 	in 
contrast we sketch how K-density may be deduced once certain 
assumptions are made. The assumptions are based on discussion of 
examples in [Pet I ] and [Bes 	]. 	In representing a course of 
computation by a causal net we assume all conditions and events occur 
sometime. This can be made precise using the idea of an observer 
(see 5.1 and 7 for formal uses of this concept). An observer is a 
projection of the entire course of computation onto a time-scale; 
accordingly all the events and conditions of the associated causal 
net are ascribed extents of time consistent with the causal 
dependency relation. Our first assumption can be replaced by:there 
is an observer for the causal net. An observable state can now be 
defined as the set of conditions which hold and events whiCh fire at 
one time according to some observer. We mentioned that cases 
represented a notion of global state. From [Pet I ] and [Bes 
it seems that cases are observable states, our next assumption. 
Our final assumption may be summarised as infinite secuential 
processes take infinite time according to observers. By this we 
mean an infinite chain x0Fx 1 Fx2 ...PxF... is never completed at any 
finite future time according to an observer. Also an infinite 
chain x F 1 x 1 F 1 ... 	 never begins at a finite time in the 
past according to an observer. 
We examine the examples to see if they are consistent with the 
assumptions, before deriving K-density from them. In example 
2.4.4the sequential process ({el i ec} j {b. i € wI) can never 
be observed completed at finite time. Thus the case {b' n = 
is not an observable state contradicting our second assumption. 
Thus the net of example 2.4.4 cannot represent courses of computation 
according to the assumptions. We have already seen that it. is not 
K-dense. Similarly the net of 2.4.5 fails the assumptions. 	(In 
addition the event e could never be observed.) The non-K-dense net 
of example 2.4.7 has a case which can only hold in the infinite past, 
again contradicting the assumptions. The remaining examples of 
causal nets do not contradict any assumptions. 
We now outline the argument for K-density. Suppose a causal 
net were not K-dense. That is, suppose some sequential process did 
not meet some case for N. Eike Best has shown that this implies one 
or other of the following situations [Bes 	J. 	Either there is a 
case C above an infinite F-chain i.e. there is x O x 1 x 	n 
P F ...Fx F... 
in  with Vx. c € qx.F
± 
 c or there is a case C below an infinite 
F1* -chain i.e. there is x 0 	1 	2 F x F x 
... 	
n 
F x F-1 ... with 
V x 3 c € qcF+x. 
The two situations can be seen in examples 2.4.4 and 2.4.7 
respectively. In the first situation the case can only be seen by 
an observer in the infinite future while, for the second, it can only 
be seen in the infinite past. In both situations we contradict at 
least one of our assumptions. 
Whether or not the above assumptions are acceptable to net-
theorists, in rejecting K-density we must reject at least one 
assumption. In future we shall not assume cases are observable 
states. If our analysis is correct our disagreement with Petri's 
foundational work on net theory is as fundamental as the notion of 
state. Of course, there is something correct in the spirit of 
K-density; for the most part one does rule out courses of 
computation like that described by 2.4.5..in which an event depends 
on an infinite chain. 	(Such computations represent Zeno machines 
[Hew 	].) Also note we expect a revised form of K-density to 
hold when cases are restricted to being observable. 
2.5 Net morphisms  
Net morphisms are intended to provide a framework for 
operations on nets like refinement, contraction, extension, 
restriction and completion (see [W.Prc] - we shall illustrate some of 
I 
them). The current definition of net morphism ir 
	
--i" 10O ' 
does not take into account markings, cases or any other represent-
ation of the idea of state. Roughly it is a local definition based 
on the idea that conditions and events are generalisations of 
respectively open and closed connected intervals of time. We try to 
explain the idea of it before giving the formal definition. Firstly 
assume a morphism from a net N0 to N 1 is a function f from the 
elements of N0 to the elements of N i . 	It is reasonable that it 
should be F-respecting that is: 
xF0 y=> f(x)F1 IJ1 f(y) 
Thus maps like these are allowed so far: 
The first two "collapse" part of the net while the third "identifies" 
elements of the net. However note at present the following maps are 
allowed too: 
Taking composition as the usual function composition gives the nets 
and 	are isomorphic. In this sense we fail to account 
for the different nature of events and conditions. The net-
topology is intended to do this. 	In the topology singletons of 
conditions are open and 	singletons of events closed. 
Proposition 2.5.1 
Let N = (B,E,P) be a net. Taking as open sets those subsets 
X of B ,.i E satisfying V e € X n B e X L e S X gives a topology 
(the net topology). Closed sets are characterised as being subsets 
X sucL that VbØ,,Xb SX & b S X. 
Thus if an open set contains an event it must include its pre and 
post conditions. 	If a closed set contains a condition it must also 
include its pre and post events. (Note the symmetry in the 
definitions of open and closed - the closed sets also form a 
topology.) 
Currently a.morphism is defined to be a map which is 
F-representing and continuous with respect to the topology. 
Definition 2.5.2 
Let N.
1 	1 1 1 
(B.,E.,F.) for i = 0,1 be two Petri nets. 	Then a net 
- 
morphism from N0 to N is defined to be a map f: B 0 E0 -> B 1 .j B 1 
which is such that (i) xF0y => f(x)F 1 	I f(y) 
(ii) f is continuous with respect to the net 
topology. 
Diagrammatically, continuity implies the dotted arrows follow from 
the solid arrows in "building-up" the two morphisms below: 
4-'; 
9im 
The further property of respecting F guarantees that the causal 
dependency relation cannot switch direction under a morphism. 
In fact morphisms may be defined in an alternative way as those 
maps respecting the F-relation and an adjacency relation (generally 
denoted P) which we now define. 
Definition 2.5.3 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net. 	Define the adjacency relation P to 
be the relation B x  ,i (F LiF). 
Lemma 2.5.4 
Let N. = (B.1
,E.
1
,P.) for i = 0,1 be two Petri nets with 
1 	1 
adjacency relations P 0 and P 1 as defined above. Then a map 
f: B0 J E0 -> B 1 .J E 1 is a net morphism iff 
xP0y => f(x)F 1 j 11(y) and 
xP0y => f(x)P1 ij if(y). 
Proof 
Suppose f is a net morphism N0 -> N 1 .- We require I to be 
P-respecting. 	Suppose xP0y. 	Then for some b € B0 a: -..d e E 
either bP0e or eF0b if bF0e then f(b)F 1 j 11(e). Thus if 
f(b) € B 1 we have f(b)P 1 t.., 1f(e) as required. 	Otherwise f(b) € B 1 . 
Then as f is continuous closed sets pull back to closed sets under 
f •1 	This means as b € f {f(b)} we must have e € f {f(b)J i.e.. 
f(e) = 1(b). Thus f(b)P 1 U 11(e) as required. 	Similarly if eF0b. 
Suppose f is a map B0 k./ B0 -.> B 1 i B 1 such that (i) and (ii) 
above hold. We check 1 is continuous.. Suppose e 6 f X i.e. 
f(e) E I. If eF0b then f(e)P 1 j if(b). Thus assuming f(e) € 
gives f(b) € X i.e. b € f 1 X. 	Otherwise 1(e) E B 1 in which case 
CS P  w 	-çC) u f$'&) o ' (Li€ 'B 	o•. 	tnz dcfti . 4 P 
f 1 X. Thus e E f- 
1 
 X implies e 	f- 
1 
 X. Similarly 
e f 1 X => e 9 X. This means f 1 X is open as required for I to 
be continuous.5 
Example 2.5.5 (Some morphisms) 
Recall we allow nets to be singletons so f 1 : 01 	E] and 
f : Dt 	>o are morphisms. So are these: 
> I 
	
The maps 13 and 14 pinch 
together" the encircled 
> 	conditions. 
4- -7 
The map f5 introduces a 
loop by ident top and 
bottom conditions. 
o 	-c 
The map f6 "collapses" the 
small net on the left to a condition. 
It is hard to see a uniform intuitive interpretation of the above 
morphisms. 	(For example the obvious maps induced on markings by 
and f6 are in opposite directions.) 
There are possible criticisms of the above definition of 
morphism. There may not be an intuitively acceptable ttmorphism t 
which fails either of the properties (i) or (ii) in 2.5.2. However 
the definition is perhaps too general in that it allows morphisms 
which are hard to justify intuitively. As remarked a mor:phism as 
defined, in 2.5.2 takes no account of markings and markings are crucial 
to the dynamic behaviour of the token game. 
We look at some specific intended uses of net morphisms. 
According to their use we expect further restrictions in their 
definition. Recall that certain types of causal net are the net-
theoretic representation of the possible courses of a computation 
described by a transition-net (section 2.4). The fact that a causal 
net N is the course of a computation described by a transition net 
N2 is represented by a special form of morphism from N 1 to N2 called 
a folding. Example 2.3.6 showed a folding. Before the formal 
definition of a folding we give a further example where the net 
folded is a causal net. Petri has said that the class of causal 




N 1 N2 
Here the net N 1 corresponds to an infinite tape of 0's while 
the net N2 represents the datatype consisting of possibly infinite 
tapes of 0 1 s and l's. The net N 1 might be the output from a 
computation with possible outputs represented by N 2 . The map f is 
defined by: 
f(b.) = p0 if i is even, p 1 otherwise 
f(e. 
1 	0 	 1 
) = t if i is even, t otherwise. 
The map f is an example of a folding. We have ignored initial 
markings and the fact that all the events of N 1,are supposed to occur 
eventually (they are restless). 
Definition 2.5.7 
Let N0 and N 1 be nets. Then a map f: B0 j E0 -> B 1 j E is a 
folding iff 
(i) xF0y => f(i)F 1 f(y) 
(±) fB0 ç. B 1  9, fE0 
This differs from the definition in [Pet] where instead of (ii) 
there is the property f preserves P. However when the field of P 
is B J E, an assumption generally made on nets, (i) gives that (ii) 
above is equivalent to £ being P-preserving. 
In modelling Kahn-MacQtieen networks by transition nets we saw 
how nets representing datatypes were, in some sere, subnets of nets 
giving a more complete description of the computation. We give a 
formal definition of the idea of subnet now. 
Definition 2.5.8 
Let N. = (B.,E.,P) be nets, for i = 0,1. 	Then a map 
3. 
f: B0 J E0 -> B1 '-'1 
 is a subnet morphism iff f is a 1-1 net 
morphism sending conditions to conditions, events to events and such 
that f(x)F 1 f(y) => xF0y. 
If f is the inclusion ma then N 1 is a subnet of N. 
We confess that the extra restriction of preserving events and 
conditions is redundant in the presence of the assumption generally 
made on nets N = (B,E,F) that B c. E equals the field of F i.e. 
B cj3y E 3 k B iF7 or yFx. 
Then the assumption of £ being a 1-1 morphism implies f preserves 
events and conditions; it does not. imply f is a subnet morphism, 
however. 
We illustrate another type of morph-ism which seems important 
though we shall not give it a formal definition because there appear 
to be difficulties. 
Example 2.5.9 (Contraction) 
I ) 
The map f drawn schematically above contracts the "boxed-off" 
part of N to a single event of N2 . 
The map f of the above example is certainly a morphism. It has 
a seemingly natural interpretation: N 2 is a more coarsely grained 
description than N with event a standing for the subcomputation 
described by eFbPe 1 . With this interpretation there is a problem 0 1 
if e occurs but e 1 never occurs. 
would begin but never end firing. 
about events namely that occurrences of events should take up extents 
of time which are compact connected intervals. The situation can be 
remedied for example 2.5.9 by ensuring that e 1 will occur once e0 has 
occurred. However the extra structure is necessary to reflect this 
fact and ensure f does not violate our intuitions about events. 
Of course, for another interpretation of f the above argument 
may not even make sense. For instance one could think of f as 
standing for a computation from an input datatype described by N 1 to 
an output datatype described by N 2 ; the map f then determines the 
output values produced by input values (cf. examples 2.3.7 and 2.3.9). 
This points out the danger of not having a precise interpretation in 
mind; non-commitment to a particular interpretation can lead to at 
best vaguenessworst error and rarely to a theorem. 
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Then correspondingly the event 
This contradicts one intuition 
Chapter 3. Introduction to concrete domains and seguentiality 
In this chapter we see how the idea of events came to be treated 
formally and explicitly within denotational semantics. This arose 
through the collaborative work of Gilles Kahn and Gordon Plotkin in 
formalising the idea of concrete datatypes (or domains) and 
sequential functions in the autumn of 1975 ([Kah and Plo]). 	Concrete 
domains are domains of information about "basic" input or output 
which also support a general and natural notion of sequential function. 
Kahn and Plotkin discovered that their concrete domains were 
represented by matrices, objects similar in form to Petri nets. 
In the first section we give some background results from 
denotational semantics with some illustrations of Dana Scott's idea 
of information ([Sco]). 	The presentation is inevitably rather "racy- 11 ; 
for further background see [c.or] for applications and [Wad] for theory 
and practice. 
In the second section we outline in fair detail the fundamental 
results on concrete domains, how they are represented by matrices (the 
representation theorem) and the definition of sequential function. 
The relevant work here is [Kah and Plo], [cur] and [B€.r and C4r]. 
In the latter, Gerard Berry and Pierre—Louis Curien produce a 
cartesian closed category of concrete domains taking algorithms (an 
abstract form of deterministic program) as moiplisms. They show 
sequential functions are precisely those functions realised by 
algorithms. We omit the category theoretic aspects of concrete 
domains, in particular rigid embeddingwhich enable concrete-domain 
solutions to a restricted form of recursive domain equation. 
In the final section, a kind of appendix, we prove the 
representation theorem in detail. 	(In fact we prove a more general 
result for a kind of event structure.) 
3.1 Background material 
In denotational semantics the meaning of a programming 
construct such as a procedure or command is denoted by an element of 
a particular form of partial order called a domain. The partial 
ordering reflects an idea of information. 
Definition 3.1.1 




relation 9 on D that is a binary relation g satisfying 
(i) 
	
€ D x x 	(reflexivity) 
V x,y ED x y .Z y x => x = y 
	
(antisymmetry) 
V x,y,z E D x 9 yS.- y z => x (transitivity) 
We write x y for x y& x / Y. We sometimes write x 2 y for 
yx. Two elements x and  are comparable when x Qy or yx; 
otherwise they are incomparable. If x y we sometimes say y 
dominates x. 
Notation 
Let (D,) be a partial order, X a subset of D and y a member of 
D. Then y is an upper bound of X iff V x E X x y (we abbreviate 
this to Xc); similarly y is a lower bound of X iff Vx € X y x 
(abbreviated to y X). The supremum of I, written Ux, is an upper 
bound. which is dominated by all upper bounds of X. 	inflsnum of X, 
written fix, is a lower bound which dominates all lower bounds of X. 
If X is {a,'o} we write a t.-i b and an b for Lix and [lx respectively. 
If X possesses an upper bound we say X is compatible (and write XT 
incompatible (and write x-). 	If X is fxtyl  we write X  as xl y 
and X4_ asxy. 
Definition 3.1.2 
In a particular order (D, ) a subset S of D is directed iff S 
is non-null and 	2 S 
3 53 € 	 53 1 
For example an 60 -chain x 1 	x2 	 ... 	 ... is directed. 
Definition 3.1.3 
A partial order (D,9 ) is a complete partial order (cpo) iff 
D has a minimum element L 
All directed subsets of D have a supremum in D. 
Cpos are the objects in which denotations are taken. They are often 
called (semantic) domains. 	In a cpo the elements of a directed set 
S can be thought of as earlier approximations to the element U 
which the directed set eventually determines. There is another 
possible definition of cpo in terms of (.--) -chains which is perhaps 
more intuitive. In the presence of natural restrictions the two 
notions coincide. 	We choose to work with directed sets simply 
because this is the most common approach in the literature. 
Example 3.1.4 ('D) 
43 is a very useful little domain consisting of 2 elements 
land T with J-9 T. It looks like this: 
Exanrple 3.1.5 (T -:.the domain of truth values or Booleans) 
The domain I is represented above; it consists of a set LL,tt,ff I 
with ±ctt and _L 	ff.. The symbol tt denotes true and ff false. 
The set of tt and ff is incompatible. We give an idea of the 
intuition behind the ordering. Suppose a computation may give a 
single truth value as output. Before it has terminated with a value 
we have information .1 about the output i.e.. no information at all. 
Once it terminates with value true we have information tt and similarly 
if it terminates with false we have information ff. If it should 
diverge (never terminate) we always have information .J_ about the 
output. The information J_ may grow into the information tt or the 
information ff. 
Example 3.1.6 ( !W - the domain of integers) 
I 	. 
consists of _L'u 	(where (Afl) denotes the natural numbers) 
ordered by J_ 9 n for all n in 0) . The intuition of the ordering 
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is like that for 91' . All the domains (1) , T and N  are examples 
of discrete (or flat) cpos. 	They are formed by adjoining the 
below a set. In them information has an all-or-nothing character; 
in t711 for example the information is either a truth value or nothing 
at all J • JThese two properties of domains crop up frequently: 
Definition 3.1.7 
Let (D, Q) be a cpo. 
It is consistently complete iff for all compatible subsets X we 
have the supremum U X exists in D. 
Say X a subset of D is pairwise-compatible iff for all x,y in X 
we have x and y are compatible. The cpo (D,.) is coherent iff every 
pairwise-compatible subset X has a supremum U X in D. 
Example 3.1.8 
zi: 
The first domain is not consistently complete while the second is but 
is not coherent. Thus coherence is strictly stronger than consistent 
completeness.. 
Consistent completeness has this characterisation: 
Lemma 3.1.9 
A cpo (D,) is consistently complete iff all compatible pairs 
x'y have a supremum xl-J y. 
Proof Suppose all compatible pairs of D have suprema. 
• Suppose X D. If X = $ then Ux = .L. If X is non-null take 
S to consist of elements x 1 i.j x2 ...0 x for x 1 ,...,x in X. 	(We get 
U. .... Li x exist in D by a simple induction.) 	Then S is directed 
so Us exists and is easily checked to beLjX. The converse is 
trivial. Z 
Consistent completeness implies infina always exist-for non-null subsets. 
Lemma 3.1.10 
Let D be a consistently complete cpo. Then for all non-null 
subsets X of D, flx exists in D. 
Proof 
Let X be a non-null subset of D. Define Y = {y € DI y 	xI. 
Then 	U Y exists and may be checked to be fl X. 
We now look at functions between partial orders. 
Definition 3.1.11 
Let (D., .) for i = 0,1 be two partial orders. 	A function 
D0 -> D1 is monotonic 1ff Vx, y  E D x 	=> fx) 1 f(y). 	The 
function f is an order isomorphism 1ff there is a monotonic 
D1 -> D0 such that gof = 1D and fog = 1D • 	(This is equivalent 
to f being 1-1, monotonic and 9(x) Q 1 f(y) =>1 x ç0y for x,y  in D0 .) 
Then D0 and D1 are (order-) isomorphlc.5We are interested in 
computable functions. Suppose a computation gives output according 
to input. For more input information it will give more output 
information. Thus it will correspond to a function f between the 
domains of information which is monotonic. The input information 
may be presented over time (possibly unbounded) as a chain 
x 1 	... ax 	which has supremum U {x n E 	 The corres- 
ponding output information will be f(x 0)f(x1 )... f(x) 
with supremum U f(x) n E c,I. We expect the eventual output for 
the eventual input LJIX n  I n € w) to be no more than the supremum 
\J {(')l n ECt)}. 	This means we require f(U{xt n €u}) = 
[J {r(x) n € W}. It is this intuition which the continuity 
restriction on functions expresses. 	(See [c°1,ti.iJA3)- 
We give the definition in terms of directed sets rather than W -chains 
because this is the most common approach. 	(For 60 -algebraic 
domains for instance the two definitions agree.) 
Definition 3.1.12 
Let (D0 , 	and (D 1 , 	) be two epos. 	A function f: D0 -> D 1 
is continuous 1ff it is monotonic and for all directed sets S of D0 
f(LJ0S) = LJ1 {f(s) J s € S. 
ProDosition 3.1.1 
The continuity property is preserved by the usual function 
composition. 	If D is a cpo the identity function 1D is continuous. 
This means epos and continuous functions form a category. In 
fact it is a cartesian closed category with product and exponentiation 











Let (D0 , 0), (D 1 , 1 ) be two epos. 	Define their product 
Do X D 1 to be all pairs D0 X D1 ordered co-ordinatewise by 
(x0 ,x 1 ) 9 ( y0 , y1 ) 1ff x0 Q0yO & x. 	1 y1 . 	Define their 
function space IDO -> D 1 ] to consist of all continuous functions 
-> ordered pointwise by f f' iff V x € D0 f(x) f'(x). f: D0 
(The definition of product generalises to arbitrary sets of cpos.) 
Proposition 3.1.15 
The product D0 x D1 of two cpos D0 and D 1 is a cpo with minimum 
element J_= (L0 ,J); the supremum of a directed set S of D 0 x D 1 is 
(U0s0 , U 1 s 1 ) where S0 = {X01 3 x 1 (x0 ,x 1 ) € S} and S 1 = 	- 
s}.. 	 - 
The function space ED0 -> D 1 ] of two cpos D0 and D1 is a cpo 
with minimum element : ' 
	 the supremum of  directed set 
S of [D0 -> D 1 ] is the function x J—' U 1 {f(x) ( f € s}. 
A function f from D0 x D 1 is continuous 1ff it is continuous in 
each argument separately (i.e. the function x0 .f(x0 ,x 1 ) is 
continuous for all x 1 and \x 1 .f(x0 ,x 1 ) is continuous for all x0 ). 
Of course, the function space generally includes far more 
functions than the computable ones. To see how the theory of 
computability can be grafted onto domains see [Smy] for example. 
ro 
Example 3.1.17 ([ jJ -> i ]) 
The continuous functions j ->(\J form the domain E N -> J J. 
Here all monotonic functions -> are continuous and the point-
wise ordering gives f Q f' 1ff 
Vx € J f(x) = n €Q => f'(x) = n. 
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Thus f f' means "less defined thai". 	Some maximal functions of 
IN -> J ] are of the form f: x i—' n for all x in (jJ and some 
fixed n E(.iJ; then f(_L) = n so the function "disregards" the input 
and always outputs n. The other maximal functions induce total 
functions W -> t) and must act so -L!->-L to guarantee monotonicity. 
Clearly there are many more continuous functions N -> N than there 
are computable functions. 
The least-fixed-point operator is used to give a denotation to 
recursively defined functions or procedures and iterative constructs 
like while loops. 	If D is a domain and f is a function in ED -> D] 
then the least-fixed-point operator acts on f to give its least fixed 
point. 
Proposition 3.1.18 
Let D be a opo. 




The function Y: ED -.> D] -> D given above is continuous. 
Proof 
We shall only prove (i). For f in ED ->• D] it is clear that 
= f° (J_) 	f(.L) 	•. 	f"(-L) 	... is an cJ -chain and so forms a 
directed set. Continuity of f gives f 	 so '{(f) is a 
fixed. point. 	Suppose x is another fixed point of f i.e.. f(x) = X. 
Then as 	x we get 
fn(1) q f11(x) = x by repeated application of 
the monotonic function f. Thus 	(f) = Li {fn(L) n 	x so 
is the least fixed. point. 
Example 3.1.19 
We indicate how the fixed point operator is used to give 
denotations of recursive procedures. In a programming language a 
procedure giving the factorial function might be defined by: 
f(x) = if x=1 then 1 else x X f(x-1). 
Assume for definiteness that evaluation of f is. call-by-name and 
that x-y is 0 if x<y. 	If f is called for argument an expression t, 
then the expression is passed to the defining body of f. The test 
("if x=1") attempts to evaluate t. 	If and only if this terminates 
the appropriate branch of the conditional is selected. In 
general this will lead to f being called again and if t evaluates to 
0 to f being called an infinite number of times. Define semantic 






cond(tt,n,m) = n,cond(ff,n,m) = m 
2 eq: 	uJ 
,j1 
	-> 
eq(n,m) = .1. if n = j. or m = 
=ttifn,mIJ_ £- n = m 
= ff otherwise 
P: N 2 > ft) 
p(n,m) = J_.if n =_L or m = I 
= n X m otherwise. 
Subtraction s is similar. 
Then the recursive definition determines a continuous function 
U: [J -> N  ] -> E 	 > 	 )\ • 	 = 	x.cond(eq(x, 1) 9 1, 
p(x,f(s(x,1)))). 	Each iterate [1n (1.) agrees with the factorial 
function on 1,2,...,n in I)V and is J.... elsewhere. 	Roughly an iterate 
gives the information about f which may be got in a certain finite 
time.. The procedure f is denoted by the least fixed point (f7) 
in [ W -> tlJ] which is all the information which may begot ever. 
Algebraic domains are those domains of chief importance in 
d.enotational semantics at the moment. They are determined by their 
isolated elements which form a basis. 
Definition 3.1.20 
Let D be a cpo. Say x in D is isolated iff for all directed 
sets S in D 
x 	lJs=> 3s €Sxs. 
Denote the set of isolated elements by D° . 
Definition 3.1.21 
Let D be a cpo. Then D is algebraic if for all x in D we have 
{y € Do  yx} is directed and  = 	€ Do  yx}. 	D is 
&j-algebraic iff it is algebraic and D° is countable. 
Lemma 3.1.22 
Let D be a cpo. Then J_ £ D°. Suppose x,y E D° . Then if 
x LI y exists x Li y € D0  
Proof 
We have _L € D° as directed sets are non-null. Suppose 
x,y £ D° with x Li yin D. Let S be a directed set with xLI y 	uS. 
Then x s and y 9 t for some s and t in S. Thus x Li y Q u for some 
u in S by the definition of directed. Thus x Li y € D0.I 
Proposition 3.1.23 
Let (D, ) be an algebraic cpo. 	Define 	(D0) to consist of 
-left closed directed subsets of D° ordered by inclusion. 
(S 	is c-left- closed if  Vx,y E D° x Q y € s => x € s). Then 
D (D°) under the map x 1-4 {y E D°  ySE x}. Thus D is determined 
by (D0 ,) to within isomorphism. 
Provided domains are consistently complete algebraicity is 
preserved by the function space and product constructions. The 
isolated elements of the function space are step-functions. 
Definition 3.1.24 
Let (D0 , 	(D1 , 	) be algebraic cpos. 	Define the function 
e[x,yJ for x E D and y € Dby e[x,y](z) = y if x 9 z 
= J_.otherwise. 
A step-function in [D0 -> D 1 ] is a function of the form e[x0 ,y0]u... 
LI e[x,.y] for x. in Dg and yi in D. 
Step functions can be drawn to look like steps. The vertical 
direction represents increasing information in the range D1 and in 
the horizontal direction (right to left) increasing information in 
the domain D0. 
5.s 
Proposition 3.1.25 
Suppose (DO , 90) and (D 1 , 1 ) are consistently complete 
(w-) algebraic epos. Then 
(i) D0 x D1 is consistently complete and ()) algebraic; 
D0 x D1 ) ° = Dg x D. 
(2) [D0 -> D1 ] is consistently complete and (6-) algebraic, 
r 	i 
LD0 -> D1 j
O  is precisely the set of step functions. 
The domains 11P , and - [ tU -> fJ] are (A) -algebraic and 
consistently complete. We have 
To ='P 
[fJ -> J ]O = I f E I N -> N I I fU_) E C) or fl:A) is finite}. 
Intuitively an isolated element of an algebraic domain corresponds to 
the information a computing agent may extract or produce in finite 
time through performing - a finite number of actions. 
The following types of function are of particular importance. 
We shall use them later. 
Definition 3.1.26 
- Let D0 and D1 be epos. Suppose 	't'E [Do -> D1]. Then 	'is 
strict iff ')t, ( 1 ) _J... 
Ilk 
is a projection if 	[D -> D0 ] 
ø= 1 D& ,0&Y 
(then 0' is called an embedding). 
Embedding-projection pairs are used in solving recursive domain 
equations. Roughly they give the relation of one domain approximating" 
another. Strict functions are necessary to give semantics for call-
by-value evaluation. 
We shall often be concerned with distributive domains. 
Definition 3.1.27 
Let D be a consistently complete cpo. Then D is distributive 
if 
y 'f' z=> xfl(yLJz) = (xrly)u (xflz). 
0 
3.2 Concrete domains, matr'ices and sequential functions 
Continuity is a general restriction on functions between 
domains which have a chance of being computable. It is natural to 
ask for a general restriction on functions which have a chance of 
being computable in "a deterministic way", that are in this intuitive 
sense sequential. 	(Note all the functions are determinate; they 
can only yield one value for one argument. We are concerned with 
whether or not such functions can be realised by a deterministic 
computation.) Some care is needed with the idea of deterministic. 
For example we would not allow the computation to depend on information 
about time not present in the domains; if this were allowed we could 
simulate parallel evaluation of the arguments. We wish any current 
(single) activity of the computation (its "flow of control") to be 
determined solely by information in the domains. 	(The algorithms 
of Pierre-Louis Curien ([Cur], [Ber and Cur]) provide one may of 




(T) _L) ,T) 
(J!J 
Regard the functions in 
[2  -> 	] as being on two arguments 
(x,y) in 0 2 	i deterministic computation from input 	to out- 
put 0  should proceed according to the following general scheme 
(borrowing ideas from [cur]). 





(Horizontal lines correspond 
to output activity, slanting 
lines to input activity.) 
A deterministic computation will determine any partial branch 
beginning at start. Thus initially at its start the computation 
either examines a particular argument or ignores the arguments and 
perhaps, but not necessarily, outputs. Any completely slanting 
branch (including the single node "start") realises the function j.. 
in 	—> ]. The two maximal branches 
both correspond to the least monotonic function giving (T,T)t—T, 
which we can draw on 
(j)2  as: 
Consider the least monotonic function giving (T,±) i— T and 
(.i.., T) I— T drawn on p 2 as: 
This cannot be realised according to the scheme above; it examines 
its two arguments in parallel. 	It should not be a sequential 
function. 
We seek a definition of sequential function between domains 
based solely on the structure of the domains themselves. Two early 
definitions of sequential function were proposed independently by 
Robin Milner and Jean Vuillemin. These depend on viewing a function 
f: XD. -> E as being of n arguments (viewed as being more or less 
arguments may change its character according to these definitions) 
Definition 3.2.2 
Let D0 ,...,D 1 ,E be cpos. 	Let f be a continuous function: 
X D. -> E. Then f is M-sequential (Milner) iff either it is constant 
or there is an integer i (with Oi<n) such that f is strict in its 
argument ((x). =1 => f(x) =L) and the function obtained by 
fixing its 
1th  argument (\x0 , ...xi1 ,1j± 1 , ...1n 1.f(x0 , ...xji , xj , xj+11 xn_i)) 
is M-sequential. 
Also f is V-sequential (Vuillemin) 1ff it is a constant or there 
is an integer i (with OIi<n)  such that y2 x and () = (x). implies 
f(y) = f(x). 
The-two above definitions of sequential do not agree in general. 
However importantly they do coincide and appear correct in the 
situation where 	 and E are flat cpos. Note their 
dependence on argument places. 
Gilles Kahn and Gordon Plotkin sought a very geneil definition 
of sequential function which unlike M and V-sequentiality was 
independent of the way- that the function was viewed as having 
arguments. Reasonably, the definition should agree with M and 
V-sequentiality in the case where the donain and codomain were of 
the form XD. and E respectively for flat domains D. and E. They 
achieved 1this by axiomatising a wide class of domains for which 
there was a natural definition of places accessible from a point. 
Places are a generalisation of argument-places which can take values 
from a flat cpo. Unlike argument places, however, places are 
defined independently of the way the domain is viewed as a product. 
Their definition of sequential then agrees locally with M or 
V-sequentiality. Recognising that the notion of sequential depended 
on the nature of the objects denoted in the domains they chose to 
axiomatise only those domains corresponding to basic input or output 
values. Certainly integers, truth values, tapes and trees are basic 
and almost physical (their names often suggest it too!) whereas 
functions are not. In a computation a function must be represented 
for instance by the text of a procedure whereas basic values present 
themselves directly and concretely. Concrete domains are domains 
representing basic values and supporting Kahn and Plotkin's 
definition of sequential function. There are domains of basic values 
which are not concrete (any confused Petri net provides an example - 
see chapter 5). 
Kahn and Plotkin first axiomatised the concrete domains and then 
discovered they could be represented by matr(rather like Petri 
ne. Our presentation is the other way round. A matrix consists 
of places which can be occupied by at most one of a set of decisions 
or events. In general a place may not be occupied immediately but 
must wait until this is enabled by certain events. A place may be 
thus enabled by several different sets of events. (As an example 
the nth place of a list is enabled by the event of making the (n-1)th 
entry.) We now give the formal definition of a matrix M and its 
configurations ordered by inclusion I'(M).. Note _.L in P (M) 
corresponds to nothing has happened. 
Definition 3.2.3 
A matrix M is a quadruple (P,E,l,(—) where: 
1 • P is a set of places 
E is a countable set of events 
1 is a function from E onto P locating events at places. 
F- is a subset of (E) x P called the enabling relation. 
( f4(4-denotes the finite subsets of E.) 
We say M is strongly—deterministic iff A !—?&A' t— p => A = A'. 
Let X be a subset of E. 
Say X is consistent iff \7'e,e' E X 1(e) = l(e') => e = e'. 
Suppose e € X. Say e is secured in X iff e 0 ,..,e E x 
e = e & 'v"i<n 3 A 9 1 e0 ,.0 ,e. I A l-1(e.). 
Say X is secured iff all elements of X are secured in X. 
Say X is a configuration of N iff X is consistent and secured. 
'4: 
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Denote the set of configurations ordered by inclusion by 
Say N generates f1 (M). 
For a matrix N the partial ordering C (N) will be an 
)-algebraic domain satisfying certain axioms F,C,R and Q which 
determine the concrete domains. Conversely a concrete domain will 
be generated to within isomorphism by a matrix. 	(The represent- 
ation theorem for concrete domains.) 
The following definitions are important in defining sequential 
functions. 
Definition 3.2.4 
Let M be a matrix. Suppose x E 
(1 
(N) and p is a place of M. 
Say x fills p 1ff 	e E x 1(e) = p. 
Say p is accessible at x iff x does not fill p and Je 0 , ... ,e € x 
B 	 f— p 
Vi—<n 3A 	{e0 ,...,e1 1 1,A t— 1(e1 ). 
Write p(x) for the set of places accessible at x. 
For x,y in r (N) write x 4.y iff x y and p is accessible at x and 
y fills P. 
Thus we can tentatively define a function f: ('(rI) -> ('(MI) to be 
sequential if it is sequential at all x in P(M) where this means 
'c/pt p(f(x)'),(3z3 i,f(x)3 f(z)) => 3 p € p(x) V:1,(f() 4 f(y) => 
This says to fill p' accessible from f(x) there is some p accessible 
from z which must be filled; it generalises V-sequential. Of 
course, it is not yet clear that this definition gives the same notion 
of sequential for different ways of generating isomorphic domains. 
This will fall out of the representation theorem. We give the main 
ideas in this section and the detailed proof in the next. 
We give some examples of matrices (and thus concrete domains). 
The first example illustrates a convenient way of drawing matrices. 
Example 3.2.5 
Let N be the matrix given by: 
P = {p,q,r} 
E = {o,1,2,3} 
i(o) = i(i) = p, 1(2) = q, 1(3) = r. 
J0,3 
{o}ffr, {1,2}I— r, 0 f— p, Ø — q. 




Boxes represent places, their contents the events which are located 
there, "fused" arrows 	 the enabling relation. 
fl (x) has the form: 
M. 
ES 
Represented by an aerial view labelling arcs by the additional 
events this is : 
r) 
I 	I 
2. 	2 	 2 iz 
This is often a more 
U 	 I 
	 convenient form. 














Sometimes two domains are isomorphic even though one is 




Some matrices which are not strongly-deterministic represent 
physical things. 
£s11'J73 
• Example 3.2.8 






The bulb b is turned on by either of the switches s 1 or s which 
are not mutually exclusive. 	P (M) is not generated by any 
strongly-deterministic matrix. 
Example 3.2.9 
Every place has one event. 
A place is enabled by any adjacent 
event.. 
"Blobs't (a discrete approximation to the quarterplane) 
A matrix is physically realisable in this sense 	Interpret each 
place as a computer capable of not terminating or outputting a set in 
1-1 correspondence with the events located at the place. Assume all 
computers are switched-off initially but are switched on according to 
the enabling relation. 
From the definition of a matrix N and its configurations r(M) 
the following properties are easily established. 
Proposition 3.2.10 
Let N be a matrix (P,E,l,1- ). 	Then: 
Two configurations x,x' in fl (N) are compatible if f Ve 
e' € x' 1(e) = l(el) => e = e'... 	If 'x, and x' are compatible ther 
supremum in r, (M) is x u x'. 
The- poset P (N) is coherentIf X a subset of P(M) is pairwise 
compatible then U X is the supremum of X in P (N). 
3.. The poset r(M) form an W-algebraic domain. Its minimum 
element is 	(so_I_ = ?S). The isolated elements of r(N) are 
precisely the finite configurations.. An isolated element dominates 
only finitely many elements in r (N). 
Proof 
1. and 2., follow obviously. 
Clearly 0 is the minimum element of P (N). :From 2. P(N) is a cpo. 
It is obvious that finite configurations are isolated in r(M).. To 
show the converse suppose X is isolated in r(M). For each e in X 
choose A. = {e0 ,...,e} 	X so that 
zJ 
7 
e & $ H 1(e0) g ViIn  3B c {'e0 ,..,e11 1 B(— 1(e.) - clearly 
possible as X is secured. Take S to be the directed set consisting 
of all configurations A .j ..* hA4 for e 1  , ... ,em in X.T1ei XU5 so some 
X = A u ... UAqm. As each Aei  is finite X is finite. As every 
i 	
C 	r1 I\ O 
corif igurati ai X s secured we have X = 	x E 	M) x - X 
Thus fl (M) is algebraic. As E is countable fl (M) is w -algebraic. 
As an isolated element is finite it can only dominate a finite number 
of elements. 
Kahn and Plotkin [Ka.h and Plo] showed that a cpo is generated by 
some matrix iff it is W -algebraic and satisfies four axioms 
F,C,R and Q. We now introduce the axioms and illustrate why they 
hold for domains of configurations. 
Definition 3.2.11 (Axiom F) 
Let D be an algebraic domain. Then D satisfies axiom F if f 
I vx € D0  I  ED1 yxç(<O°. 
Of course we have already proved this for configurations in 
proposition 3.2.10 part 3. 
Events of a matrix N show themselves in the domain ['(M)  as 
coverings. 
Definition 3.2.12 
Let (D,) be a partial order. Suppose x,x' 	€ D. 	Then Xt is 
said to cover x, written z—Cx 	iff x 	x' 	- x 
V z € D 	c z 	x' => (z = x or z = 
Let x,y € D. Then a covering chain from x to y is a sequence 
x= x0 ,x 1 ,...,x = y where x.Cx.1  for i<n. n 	 2. 
The next lemma follows easily.. 
Lemma 3.2.13 
Let D be an algebraic domain which satisfies axiom F. Suppose 
X E D and y E D° and x 9 y. Then x € D° and there is a covering 
chain from x to y. 
It is easy to characterise —C in domains Fl (M)  for a matrix N. 
Lemma 3.2.14 
Let N be a matrix. For x,y in P (N), x—Cy if  
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3 e E E e A x 	y = x {e}. 
Hence a covering in f (M) corresponds to an occurrence of an event 
at a configuration. Also note that any covering (an occurrence of 
an event at a configuration) is reflected by a covering in 
Lemma 3.2.15 
Let IVI be a matrix. For x,y in fl (N), x —Cy => 9 x' ,y' € fl (M) 0 
x ', y yx'_<yy'\x'=y\x. 
Proof 
Take e as the unique element of y x and use the ideas of 
proposition 3.2.10 (3). U 
Thus an event e of a matrix N manifests itself in (N), if at 
all, as a covering x —( y where y x = {e} and x may be assumed 
isolated. Of course the same event may occur at some other 
configuration. For example we may have x —C. 	x —'C z, y t z and 
y z. 	This means y = x i {e}, z = x u {e'} for two events e and e' 
such that 1(e) 4 l(et). 	Clearly yLJ z exists and is x kj {e 1 ,e'} so 
y-uz\z={eI. 	 Ui 
The covering z —C y Li z represents the same event e as the covering 
x—Cy. (Also the coverings x —Cz and y —( yU z represent the 
same event e'.) This suggests we can recover events from domains 
by a relation based on "little squares" like that above. Axiom C 
ensures there are enough "little squares". 
Definition 3.2.16 (Axiom C) 
Let D be an algebraic domain. Then D satisfies axiom C iff 
for all x,y,z in D° x --Cy 	x—Cz2 y'Iz& yz implies yLJ z 
exists and y —C y U z. 2 z -C y U z. 
We have seen above that r(N) satisfies axiom C. It expresses a 
form of orthogonality between compatible coverings of an element. 
In a picture it says 
Axiom C typically forbids 
11 
(In fact in the presence of axiom F it gives upper semimodularity 
which ensurec all covering chains between comparable isolated 
elements have the same length. See lemma 3.3.4 in our proof of the 
representation theorem for this and a lot more.) 
We now formalise how events are to be recovered from a domain. 
Definition 3.2.17 
Let D be an algebraic domain satisfying P and C. A prime 
interval of D is a pair 	where x---C Y. 	If [x 1 ,y 1 ] and Ix 29Y21 
are prime intervals with x1,r1 in D° write 
< [,y] iff x 1 —Cx2 and 
Define '-' to be the reflexive symmetric transitive closure of <'. 
A prime interval is no more than a pair of elements in the covering 
relation. 	The relation [x19y1] < [ 2 , 2 ] looks like 
2 
and the relation 1x 1 ,y 1 ]c..i[x2 ,y2] like 
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In a domain r(M) a prime interval has the form 	u {e}]. 
When x and y are isolated it is easy to see that u 
[y,y .jfell] implies e = e' so that a tv-equivalence class 
represents an occurrence of the same event at different isolated 
configurations. 	(It may not be all occurrences of this event 
because of examples like N0 in 3.2.7.) 
We extract events from domains by taking A) -equivalence classes. 
For this to be done safely we must guarantee that an "event" has at 
most one occurrence at any isolated configuration. -that is a 
,-., -equivalence class has at most one member [x,y] for any fixed 
isolated x. 	This property is clearly true of 1 1 (M). 	it is 
expressed by axiom R. 
Definition 3.2.18 (Axiom R) 
Let D be algebraic and satisfy F and C. Then D satisfies 
axiom R iff for x in D° and all prime intervals [,y], 
[x,y]rv[x,z] => y= z 
Axiom R forbids domains like the following in which all prime inter-
vals belong to the same r'.i -equivalence class: 
*<T>  
In a similar way we can extract places from domains. For 
this, notice if we consider a configuration x in fl(M)°  and two 
events e and e' such that x u {el and x j fell are configurations 
we have 1(e) = l(el) iff either x u {eI = x i{e' I or x j {e} tx j {e' 
in P(M). This suggests the following definition: 
Definition 3.2.19 
Let D be an algebraic domain satisfying F and C. 	Let lx,x 1 1 
and [x,x2 ] be two prime intervals of D with x in D° . Define çj by 
[, 1 ] s' [,x2 ] iff x 1  __x or x11 '2 	Define 	to be the 
symmetric transitive closure of ('v cv). in equivalence class of 
is called a direction of D. 
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Directions are to be the domain analbgue of places. For this the 
further axiom Q is required. 
Definition 3.2.20 (Axiom Q) 
Let D be an algebraic domain. Then D satisfies axiom Q iff for 
all x,y,z in D° 
Axiom Q has two parts, an existence part (got by ignoring uniqueness) 






We look at Q in a domain r  (M). Suppose y.x-C.z and yz in r(M) ° . 
Then z = x j Ie} for some event e. As 	there is an event et in 
y so that l(el) = 1(e) and e' e. Then taking t = x {e'} shows 
the-existence part of Q is satisfied. Suppose there were another 
t' y so x -C.t' Z. Then t' = x u ett> with l(e") = 1(e) and 
e. 	Then for events e',e in y we have l(el) = 1(e"). 	This 
must mean e' = e", establishing - uniqueness. 
We can now define concrete domains and state Kahn and Plotkints 
representation theorem. 
Definition 3.2.21 	 - 
A concrete domain is an 0) -algebraic domain satisfying axioms 
F,C,R and Q. 	 - 
Theorem 3.2.22 
Any (strongly deterministic) matrix generates a (distributive) 
concrete domain.. For any (distributive) concrete domain D there is 
a (strongly deterministic) matrix M such that r(M) D. 
Basic construction: 
We present a complete proof in section 3.3. 	Here we give the basic 
construction of a matrix from a concrete domain. Let D be a 
concrete domain. Define a matrix M in the following way: 
P is the set of directions of M ({[x,x'],( x € D° x.-cxtI) 
E is the set of-equivalence classes ({[,'] / x € D° 	i__Xt}) 
1 is the map [x,x'],j - 
A i— p iff there are 	€ p and a covering chain 
1.. = x 0 	 n 	 i~ l -< ... -Cx = x and A = {[x,x 	]tI__, O<i<n}  - 
(We show in § 3.3 that A is independent of the choice of covering 
chain.) 
We show in 3.3 that fl(M) D and that if D is distributive then 
A-p & A'- p=> A rA' -  p. Thus then we may define an enabling 
relation )._fr by taking fl{A I AI- p I __* p. 	This gives a strongly- 
deterministic matrix M* = (P,E,l, 1*) s.t. fl(M*)D. 
Using the representation theorem it is easy to show that 
concrete domains are closed under products. 	It is a consequence of 
the following observation. 
Proposition 3.2.23 
Let D0 and D1 be concrete domains. 	Then there are matrices,- 
M. = (P.,E.,l., J-) for i=0, 1 with P0 rt P 1 = E0 ,'\ E1 = 0 such that 
.: r(M.) 	D. for i=0,1. 	Define Mod)eM1 = (P0w p1,. 
E0 ç, E l , l0 jl 1 , 	-o V 	Then M0 M 1 isa matrix with 
r(Moo M 1 ) 	D0 x D 1 under x i- ' ((x r\ E0),ê1(x  t'E 1 )). 
Similarly concrete domains may be shown closed under6u-products. 
Early on in this section we indicated how sequentiality was to 
be defined. It was unclear whether or not the notion of sequential 
depended on the matrices generating the domains. We can follow the 
same idea on the canonical matrix produced by the representation 
theorem. 
Definition 32.24 
Let D be a concrete domain. Let ci be a direction of D. 
Suppose x € D. Say r fills d. if±' [x0 ,y] E d y 0 E x. Say 
ci. is accessible at x iff 10 , yo 
E D° x0 ç x 9, [x0 ,y0 ] € d 
YO T x 
Write d(x) for the set of directions accessible at x. 	For x,y in 
D, write x - y iff x y and ci. is accessible at x and y fills d. 
Fortunately a function being sequential with respect to the 
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definitions above is equivalent to it being sequential with respect 
to any other matrix generating an isomorphic domain. This is 
because of the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.2.25 
Let M be a matrix. Suppose x E 11 (M). Define 
j: () -> d(x) by i (p) = 	u e}],,, where e is any event s.t. 
1(e) = P. Then ix 
 is 1-1 and onto and is natural in the sense that 
if x1Z y and if p € p(x)p P( Y) then i(p) = 
Definition 3.2.26 
Let D,D' be concrete domains. Suppose f € ED -> D']. Then f 
is sequential at x iff Vd' E d(f(x))(-9 z _1 x f(x) 	f(z)) => 
3d € d(x) Vyx(f(x)f f(y) => xy). 
Say I is sequential iff it is sequential at all x in D. 
Such sequential functions in fact form a cpo (not generally 
concrete) when ordered pointwise. By virtue of proposition we have 
reassuringly that: 
Proposition 3.2.27 
Let,M,M' be matrices.. Suppose x E r(M) and 1€ { (' ( ii) -> 
Then I is sequential at x iff p' € p(f(x)) 	(z J x f(x) - 1(z)) => 
3p € p(x) V y i x(f(x) 	f(y) => 
Finally from the work of Curien and Berry ([Cur], [gr and C..tr]) 
the sequential functions between concrete domains are characterised 
as those functions which may be realized by a deterministic algorithm. 
3.3 The representation theorem 
Here we give a proof of the representation theorem for 
concrete domains. It improves the one in tKah and Plo].main1y 
because of the early lemmas and because it also gives a more 
general result. At first we work with a new axiom, axiom V, which 
is weaker-than axiom Q. We first prove a representation result 
between O)-algebraic domains satisfying F,C,R and V and event 
structures of the form (B, F,) now defined. 
Definition 3.3.1 
An event structure consists of a triple (E,H,) where B is a 
countable set of events B, /—C(E) x B is the enabling relation 
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and X is a binary relation on E called the conflict relation. 
Say E is strongly—deterministic ([Ber and Cur]) iff 
A Fe & A' He => A = A'. 
Let X be a subset of E. Then X is consistent iff 
V e,e' E X 7 (e 	e'). 	Assume- e € X. 	Say e is secured in X if±' 
3 eO,...,en € X e = e, A 2 } A - 
Then say X is secured 1ff all its elements are secured in X. 
Define a configuration of E to be a consistent secured subset of E. 
Let PE denote the set of configurations ordered by inclusion. 
Say E generates r (E). 
Clearly a matrix M = (P,E,1, F—) produces such an event 
structure (E, H,) by defining e 	e' iff 1(e) = (e) and 
A F- e iff A F— 1(e).. The structure r(E) for an event structure E 
will be L4 —algebraic and satisfy the axioms F,C,R and V. Here is 
the new axiom V: 
Dfinition 3.2 (Axiom v) 
Let D be an algebraic domain satisfying F and C. Then D 
satisfies axiom V iff for all x,x t  ,y,y t xIt ,y'I  in D 
Ix, x'] '-" ty,y'] 2( [1,xtt] ,[y,y"]  g x' t x" => y' 	yfl• 
For the domain of configurations it expresses that the conflict of 
two events is independent of what other events have occurred. We 
outline a proof that the configurations of an event structure satisfy 
the axioms. In addition note that strongly—deterministic event 
structures generate distributive domains - we include a converse to 
this in the representation theorem. 
Theorem 3.3.3 
Let (E,/—,.) be an event structure. 	Then r7 (E) is an AN 
& —algebraic domain satisfying P,C,R and V. If E is strongly—
deterministic r(E) is distributive. 
Proof 
Let (E,F,) be such an event structure. 	First it is easily 
seen that for S a directed subset of r(E) the supremum of S exists 
and is Us. Thus P(E) is a cpo. As in proposition 3.2. 10 
the isolated elements. of r(E) can be characterised as precisely 
the finite configurations (the proof is virtually identical). 
As eVry - event is secured by some finite subset inside a 
configuration and E is countable we get fl (E) is c.)-algebraic. 
The other axioms are easily shown because X —C X' for configurations 
X and X' means 	= X \) {e} for some e in E. To show axiom V for 
example: Suppose [x,f]"-'[y,y'] & [x,x"]c"[y,y"] 2 X , 	in 
1.1 (E) 0 . 	Then x' \ x = y' \ y = {e} say,and. x" ' x = y" \ y = {e'} 
say. As x' 1' x" we have i (e ' eO. 	Thus y' j y" is a 
configuration giving y' 1' y" as required. 
Now assume E is strongly-deterministic. Clearly now 
11 = (\ so the distributivity property y z => x n (y i_i z) = 
(x 11 y) L..j (x ii z) obviously holds for 
We remark that algebraicity can fail when the enabling relation is 
allowed to range over arbitrary subsets of events. 
We now begin a proof of the converse, that if D is an W -algebraic 
domain satisfying axioms F,C,R and V then D is isomorphic to the 
configurations of some event-structure. We initially work with 
W -algebraic domains satisfying - axioms F and C and impose R and V 
only when needed.- Throughout we let D denote an .zJ -algebraic domain 
satisfying axioms F and C. Note because of axiom F there is always a 
(finite) covering chain of isolated elements between comparable 
isolated elements of D. We work almost solely with the isolated 
elements of D viz. D° .. The first lemma extends the Jordan-Holder-
theorem a little bit [Bin. 
Lemma 3.3.4 
Suppose y ' E D° the isolated elements of D. 	If 
y=x0 _-< x 1 _<..._.x=yt and y=z0_Cz 1 __C..._czY t 
are two covering chains from y to y' then {[x1,x±1] 01i<n1 } = 
[z,z1+i]I 0<i<m}. Moreover the number of representatives of each 
v —equivalence class is the same in both chains i.e.-for a 
cv -equivalence class e 
I {[x1.,i±i x 	] I [. 1 1,x.+ 	 1 i+-i ] € e}J = I{[z.,z 	] I [zz+i E el 
Proof 
The proof is by induction on n taking as induction hypothesis 
the statement of the lemma. If n=i then m=1 and x 0=yz0 and 
by axiom C. 
Assume n>1 and the induction hypothesis for n-i. Suppose 
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W.-i 
Y =x0-...--CX 	= y' and Y = zO(•••_CZm = y'. 	If x 1 = 
we are home by induction so suppose x 1 	z 1 . 	By axiom C, x 1 u z 1 
exists and x 1 ,z 1 -Cx Li z 1 . 	By 
/ axiom F we can find a covering 
chain x 1 LI z 1 = wO -C... --Cwk = 
By the induction hypothesis 
• 	{[xx] 	 ,x] 	} = 
• [ 	 [ x 1 ,w0 ], w0 ,w 1 ],... wki , Wk]} 
Vol 
where the number of representatives 
r- of each event is the same in the 
chains x—Cx 	...-cx 	and 1 	2 n 
x 1—C w0-< ••s_Wk• 	Consequently 
k = n-2 so z 1 -Cw0--C . . . --c wk  is of length n-i, so applying the 
induction hypothesis again gives {[ 1 , 2 ] ,...[z 	1 ,z ] 	= 
[z 1 ,w0],[w0 ,w1],. ..[wkl ry Wki 	where the number of representatives 
of a particular event is the same in z1 -Cz2--C ..._czm 	and 
Combining these facts with [x 1 9,w0 ] r [y1,z1] 
and [z1,w0]'-'[y1x1] maintains the induction hypothesis. 
The lemma above justifies the following definitions. 
Definition 3.3.5 
Define B = {[,']J x,x' E D° 2 x-x'}. 	For un D° define 
S(x) = {[ ,x 1 ]) 0<i<n} for some covering chain 
= x0-C x. ... . -C x = X. 
and N(x,e) to be the number of representatives of e in such a 
covering chain. 
Using N above we can count representatives along chains like 
x0-C x -  X2)--x33---C 
... where the covering relation may "switch 
direction". Such chains occur when considering /'V . 
Lemma 3.3.6 
• 	0 
Let x ,x ,...x be a sequence in D such that x.—x. 	or 
01 	n 	 .1 	i±i 
Then N(x,e) = N(x0,e) + t{[x.,x. ~ i ] I 0<i<n& 
• 	 xi—(xi+1 £ [Xj Xjj] €  ell  
- t{[ +i ,x] / 0i<. £ 
x +1__x& [x.1,x.] € el( 
Proof 
By induction on n. 
If n=O it is obvious. 
Suppose n>O and the result holds for n-i. First suppose x 1 -Cx. 
XIi 
 
Then N(x',e).;'(,B) i.[x 	e l n 
N(x 1 ,e)+1 otherwise. 
t-f 
Now suppose x n--< x  n-i • This time 
N(x 1 ,e) =N(x,e) if OCO -' 
= N(x,e)+1 otherwise. 
Equivalently N(x,e) = N(xni,e) if Ex n Xn_i] A e 
= N(x n-1 e)-1 otherwise. 
In either case the induction hypothesis is maintained. 
Corollary 
(i) Suppose x-Cx' and x = 	 is a sequence in D
° such 
that x—Cx. or x. —Cx. and x' x • Then x.-Cx. for some 
1 	i+i 	i+i 	1 	 fl 	 1 	i+1• 
1j'1j+1 
so that 
If D satisfies axiom R too and in D ° —CX.' y—Cy t then 
[x ,xt]'t [y,y']. 
(iii) If D satisfies axiom R then for all x in D N(x,e) equals 0 
or 
Proof 
Immediate by 3.3.6. 
Suppose otherwise i.e. x-Cx' & y-.-.Cy' and [x,x t ]c*, [y,y t ]. 
Then we would have 	 with x0 X,X=X',X=y,XY' 
where (x.-.-Cx. l 	 i 
	
and z! 	x! ) or (x -Cr. and x! -Cx!). 	By 
1 	+i 1 i+l 	 +i 	1 	i+i 	1 
(i) for some i we have x_-Cx 1 and [x.,x+]t1 	 Considering 
the r,., -chain this would mean 
for some x!,x! 	such 




But this contradicts axiom R. 
Immediate by (ii). 




Suppose x,x',y £ D° such that f x—Cy and x' t Y. 
Then x' Li y exists, x'---'x' u y and s(z' u y) = s(x') LI {[x,y]j. 
Moreover if x'—x' ijy1en [',' u 
For x,y in D° , if x t y then x Li y exists and 
s(x u y) =S (x) 
For x,y in D° , if x 1 y then 
B z,z',z" £ D0[z,z']0%, € 	- [z,z"]€ (y) Z 
Proof 
Take a covering chain x = x0 --- C... -_.x = x'. 	We show 
(i) by induction on n. For n=O it is obvious. 	Suppose n>O and 
that (i) holds for n—i. 	If y-x i  it is obvious. 
Otherwise axiom C 
0; Lij 	gives x 1 Li y exists with 
- 	
U y and y -.--cx1 u Y. 
Clearly then x"—:3x 1—< x 1 U y with x 	x1 U y so we get 
x' ~ x' u y by induction. Also 
5(Xt u y) = s(x' u 	u y)) = s(x') L/ {[x 1 ,x 1 U y]) by induction 
= 5(1') i.j {[x0,y]}. 
Take a covering chain I = y0—c 	ym = y and form 
X tJy0 , iL-i Y1 = (z Lj y0 ) u y 1 ,... 	inductively showing 
y.) = s(x) '.j s(y.). 
Take a covering chain up to y viz. .1 = YO--C ... 	= Y. 
As x y there is i s.t. yt x and y 1 X. Form x U y. Then 
x u y.. Take another covering chain from y to x Uy i viz. 
yi
= w0—c ...-..w = x uy. 	(See the figure below.) 
We have [w.,w +1 ] 
E s(x) for all i<m. 	If 	1"wj we have the 
desired result. 	Otherwise, as y+ 1> x LI 7., repeated use of 
axiom C must eventually give some j s.t. w. '1' 	wJi.But+J€n 1jtf]r.J 
[,JaivJ . + 1. 	
Thus [w.,w. Li Yi+1 £ s(y) and as 
[w.w ±i],,.,E s(x) we have the required result. 
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Illustrating the proof 
Corollary 3.3.9 
The domain D is consistently complete. 
Proof 
This follows directly from 3.3.8 (ii) using 3.1.9. 
In constructing an event structure to represent the domain we 
take events to be the /V —equivalence classes E with conflict 
relation given by: e0 	e 1 if[x ,y0] € e0 ,[x ,y1 ] € e 1 
Lemma 3.3.8 (iii) showed incompatibility could always be traced to 
such a situation. The next lemma is a key result. Axiom R is 
necessary. It says if we have this picture with the relations on 




then somewhere we must also have 
/ 
Lemma 3.3.10 
Suppose D satisfies axiom R as well. 	Suppose for x,x',y,y', 
t,tt in Do that 
(i) xx',x" and 
(iii) [,']rv[y, y '] and [x,x"]v[t,t']. 
Then for some w,w',w" in D° we have w-Cw',w" and 	 [X,x] and 
it 
[w,w"] v[x,x"] and w' l'w. 
Proof 
As [y,y']c..'[x,x'l we get a sequence of prime intervals 
[z0,z],...tzn,z] where z y and z =x-and for all 
0 	n 
[zi  ,z!]fv'[x,x'] 
and (z i 
 - 1+1  Cz 	
with [z 1 ,z1+1 ]tEx, x'] 
or z i±1 	1 -Cz. with 
[z- 1+1 
 ,z 1 ]'[,']) 
This uses axiom R. 
As [t,t']c'[x,x'],identically we get a sequence of prime 
intervals 	 with x=-w0 , t=w where for all ± 




with [w.,wi+1 ]4[x,x"] 
or (w1._w1 with Ew j+1 ,wi  ]4[x,x lt ]) 
Now consider the sequence y=, z 1 . . . Z=I=W0 W 1 • • 
By 3.3.7 (i) for some iw-Cw1+1 and [w.,w. 1 ]/'[x,x']. 	Thus 
somewhere along the chain giving [x,x"]i..i[t,t'] we have: 
/ 
Taking ii., w '=w11 ,wtt=w! 
gives the required result. 
U 
Unfortunately in the proof of the next lemma we need axiom V. 
If it could be avoided then we could immediately prove CO-algebraic 
domains satisfying P,C,R were represented by event structures where 
conflict 	was now a C- -rightclosed predicate on events (or 
equivalently was replaced by the complement of such a predicate, a 




Suppose D in addition satisfies axioms R and V. Then for 
x,y in D 
0 
s(x)s(y) => xy. 
Proof 
Suppose •x,y are isolated elements of D with s(x) 	s(y). 
Take a covering chain J_= x0—C •••CXn = x. We show by induction 
on n that x n Q y. If n=O it is obvious. Suppose n>O and the 
result for n-i i.e. that 	y. Take a covering chain 
= y0-<y.. .—Cy = y. For some i we have ty,1] T'-' 
- 	 [xn i ,]. 	We have x 
as otherwise we would contra- 
'7 	 dict axiom V by 3.3..9 (iii) 




we get y.—<x1 U y. with 
EYj,mnu Yj](J[xyx]• 
Thus lyj x u y ]/ 1[y 	 so by axiom 	= xU y3 . 
Therefore certainly xL y as required to complete the induction step. 
We now give the main theorem. We have seen how event 
structures E give domains P(E) satisfying all our axioms. This 
theorem shows that if a domain D satisfies the axioms then there is 
an event structure B such that r(E) ' D; the event structures of 
3.3.1 represent domains satisfying the axioms. Moreover if D is 
distributive then there is a strongly-deterministic event structure 
B so that r(E) = D. 
Theorem 3.3.12 
Suppose D is an W-algebraic domain satisfying axioms F,C,R and 
V. Then there is an event structure (E,H,) as defined in 
3.3,1 such that r(E) ' D. 
Also if D is distributive the event structure B may be taken to 
be strongly-deterministic. 
Proof 
Let D be such a domain. 	Define 
23 
B= {[x,x'],(x,x' € D° 	x—x',AFe 1ff A E {s(x)f[x,x'] € e} 
e 	iff 3x,x',x" € D° [,x'] € e 2. [x,x"] C e' £ 
(Note by axiom V,e 	e' if  Vx,x',x" ED° [x,'] C eJ< [,"] Ce' 
£c x' 
To show D 	r(E) it is sufficient to show their :isolated elements 
are order isomorphic (see 3.1.23). 
Suppose x C D° . 	Clearly s(x) is a finite configuration as 
otherwise by 3.3.11 axiom V is contradicted. 	The map s: D
0  -> 
is monotonic by 3.3.4 and 1-1 by 3.3.1 1 . 	Also by 3.3.11 
s 1 :sD° -> Do is monotonic. Thus we only require that s is onto. 
To this end: 
Suppose A € r(E) ° . Then A is a finite configuration. Thus 
we have A = { a , ... ,a J so that 
	
a 1 and )Vi 3 B S {a 1 ,.....a1 1 }BHa. and IV i,j 	(a. 	a.). 
For some x 1 we have [.L,x1] C a 1 . We inductively construct a 
covering chain 	 s.t. 	 Ca.. Then 
= A as required. Suppose the chain has been constructed up to 
r 	1 
for i<n-i-1. 	Then for some y,y' in D 
0  we have Ly,y'j € a. with 
S(Y)j- a and s(y) s(x 1 ). 	Thus yx1. 1 (by 3.3.11)... By 
3.3.9 (iii) we have x. 1 tj y' exists. 	As [y,y'] A s(x. 1 ) we get 
y'. 	Take x. = x i-I  L-1 y'. 	
Then [x. 1 ,x.] € a., 
completing the induction step. 
Now assume D is distributive. Taking E as defined above let 
e E E. 	Choose x minimal so that [y,x] € e. We show by induction 
on the length of the t'-'-chain that if [',X'],[,X] then xx'. 
Suppose [y',x']'[y.x] and the hypothesis is true for all 
ç'.' -chains of lesser length - it is clearly true for chains of length 
0 and 1. The only difficulty occurs if wo have 
cc 
with x / x" and y y" where by induction x 9 x" • From distrib-
utivity as y 'j' x' we have 
xn(yUx') = (zn y)u (xrjx'). 
But xy LJx' as s(x) 	s(y) u s(z) and x f1y = y so the distrib- 
utivity equation becomes 
X = y tJ (x i-i 
- 	Because e E s(x) = 	i s(x n x') and e A 	we have e € s(x ri 
As x is minimal x 9j x' as required. 
Therefore if D is distributive we may define 	by 
A 1__ e iff A= () Is(x)( [,'] Eel. 
This gives a strongly-deterministic event structure (E, 
generating r(E) 	D. 
Of course now we may work either with domains satisfying the 
axioms or with their representation. As an illustration we show the 
domains are coherent and irreducible-algebraic, now defined. 
Definition 3.3.13 
Suppose (L, 	is a partial order. 	Suppose y € L. Then y is 
an. (irreducible) complete irreducible iff for-all (finite) subsets 
X of L with suprema y = Ux => x € X y = x.. If L is further an 
algebraic domain then L is irreducible-algebraic iff 
x € L x = U{ y x I y is a complete irreducible}. 
(Note for algebraic domains complete irreducibles are necessarily 
isolated; in general they need not be) 
Proposition 3.3.14 
If D is an W -algebraic domain satisfying axioms F,C,R and 
V then D is coherent and irreducible-algebraic. 
Proof 
By the representation theorem we may work with r (E) D for 
some event structure E. Coherence is then obvious. For an event 
e in B a 	-minimal configuration containing e is a complete 
irreducible. Conversely any complete irreducible of r (B) is such 
a configuration. Any configuration is clearly the union of these. 
Later, from chapter 4 on, we shall make considerable use of a 
particular kind of irreducible, the , complete primes. For example 
in the case where D may be represented by a strongly-deterministic 
event structure the complete irreducibles coincide with the 
complete primes. We remark that one can by-pass the use of prime 
intervals to represent events and instead use complete irreducibles 
with equivalence relation based on one irreducible replacing another 
in an irredimdant decomposition of an isolated element into 
irreducibles. 
Structures of the form (E,1-,* ) are interesting in themselves. 
They are a generalisation of the matrices of concrete domains. 
Later (from chapter 4 on) we shall consider a form of strongly-
deterministic event structure; then fr can be replaced by a partial 
order . Note we could relax the definition of securing H so 
that an event could be enabled by an infinite set. Such structures 
would generalise matrices and the event structures of chapter 4.. 
(Their configurations which were complete irreducibles need not be 
isolated and the configurations would no longer generally form an 
algebraic domain.) Structures like (E,H,) can be represented as 
Petri nets where an event may occur through several alternative sets 
of conditions holding; we can draw this as: 
The event e can fire when b 0 and b 1 hold or when b 2 and b3 hold. 
Such 'disjunctive"' causality relations occur naturally in physics 
(not just example 3.2.8! For example the post light-cone of a 
point p in space-time consists of all points at which events might 
occur to cause an event at p). 
We have done most of the work necessary to get the represent-
ation theorem for concrete domains. These differ from the domains 
above in that axiom V is replaced by axiom Q. We use the following 
lemma to show axiom Q implies axiom V, in the presence of the other 
axioms, so then we can use the above representation result. Recall 
axiom Q: 




Suppose D is 	algebraiCand satisfies axioms F,C,R and Q. 
Then for elements in D° 
If x—C xt ,x t 	x'Ry—C 3,1' & x, x11  < { t,ttt] 	then 
3 yt y—Cy' £ y i . Pytt 9, tx,x']i' 
If X—C x', x" £ x'5' x' t 4, y—Cy" £ [y,y'] <' [,"] then 
3yt Y --Cy , ' y'5y Y< ty,y'] < 
If x—x', Xtt 	X t 4X t & y—'y" £ y,ytt][x,xit] then 
3y 1 y ­C Y , 9< y'y" Z [y,y']-'[x,x']. 
Proof 
Take x,x',x",y,y in Do as shown: 
(I 
From the uniqueness part of axiom Q x' I y. Then by axiom C 
X 1 1-1 y exists and ',y—<X'LJ y. 
Take y' : X t U Y. 
Take X , X t, Xtt,y,ytt in D0 as shown: 
lDlZt" 
As Zt4  x" we have x' 	because x" is x LI y". Thus by the 
existence part of axiom Q By' = x y -•C y?)?/y?t. By axiom C 
{y,y'] <l {,x']. 
(iii) This follows by repeated use of (i) and (ii) along a sequence 
of < 1  or > steps connecting [,x"] and [y,ytt] by the N -relation. M 
In the representation theorem for concrete domains we use the 
above lemma to show concrete domains satisfy axiom V. Then we can 
certainly represent the domain by an event structure of the form 
(E rfr,) where E, fr and 	were defined in the proof of 3.3.12. 
The extra strength of axiom Q. gives ,Ul an equivalence relation 
(the equivalence classes are places) and that - respects IA\ V1 
(it enables places). 
Theorem 3.3.16 
The configurations of a matrix M ordered by inclusion f7 (M) 
form a concrete domain. 
If D is a (distributive) concrete domain then there is a 
(strongly-deterministic) matrix M such that 11 (M) ' D. 
Proof 
(1) As in 3.3.3. 
(ii) Let D be a concrete domain. Thus it is Cv-algebraic and 
satisfies axioms F,C,R and Q. 
We first show Q implies V. Suppose in Do we have 
x -Zx', x" le xx' £- y—cy',y t' R tx,x']tty,y'] Z: 
By 3.3.16 (iii) above and axiom R we get y' y" as required. 
Thus as in 3.3.12 we have D fl (E) where B = i[x,x'] x,xt E D°  X-C  xt 
A I- e iff A € {s(x)/ [,'] € e} 
e) e' ift x , x t,xtt ED° [x, x'] € e 9< [x ,x lt] E e' 
However now because of axiom Q the relation AV 1 is an equivalence 
relation: In showing this the only case of interest is when 
e 1 	e2)' e3 and e 1 	e3 where we require e 1 	' e3 . 	By 3.3.15 
K11
(iii) we obtain some x,x 1 ,x2 ,x3 so that 
'I' •x 
-j1 	 with [x,x 1 ] E e1,tx,x2] € e, 
Ex, 
X3] 
E e3 . 
By the uniqueness part of axiom Q,x 1 I> x3 thus e 1 	e3 as required. 
Also by lemma 3.3.15 (iii) the relation H respects >X j1-equivalence 
classes: Suppose e1) e and A F— e 1 . Then for some y,y' in D° 
A = (y), y —Cy' and [y,y'] E e 1 . 	Also for some x, x',x" in Do we 
have x—Cx'.x" and 	x', [x,x'] E e 1 , and [,"] € e,. 	By 
3.3.15 (iii) we get some y s.t. y—C y' t and yt.ytt  and[y,y"] € e. 
Thus A F- e2. 
T 
Now we get a matrix by taking places as 	V 1-equivalence 
classes and enabling relation from events to places induced by 
If D is distributive a strongly-deterministic matrix can be made 
as in 3.3. 12 .1 
We conclude with a little example to show that axiom V is not 
implied by coherence in the presence of the other axioms 
60 -algebraicity and axioms F,C and R. 
Example 3.3.17 	- 
We construct a domain which is finite, so certainly (-0-algebraic, 
also satisfies F,C,R, is coherent but does not satisfy axiom V. It 
is best seen as the configuration of a new kind of event structure in 
which the binary conflict relation has been replaced by an 
inconsistency predicate. We have four events E = 11 ,20,41. The 
enabling relation is $ i- 2,3,4,5 and 121 F-  1,{3} p- i,{41 i- 1 and 
{5} F-- 1. Thus 1 is enabled in 4 different ways. 
The inconsistency predicate 	contains {2,3}, 14,51 and {1,2,4}. 
The configurations are then the secured subsets which do not include 
an element of 	•. They give this domain pictured "aerially": 
3 
The points circled highlight where axiom V fails; the events 1 and 
2 can occur compatibly at one configuration but not at the other. 
However the domain does satisfy C and R (consider its representation) 
and is coherent: Let A be a subset of configurations which is rt 
compatible. 	This means (JA includes {2,3}, 14,5 or{1,2,4}. If 
it includes {2,3} or {4,5} then there are a 1 ,a2 in A such that either 
2 € a1 . 3 € a or 4 E a 1 £ 5 € a2 ; then in either case a 1 1a2 . 
Otherwise (IA includes {1,2,4} but does not contain 3 or 5. Then 
there are a ,a in A with (11,2152 a 1  2 4 € a ) or 
({i ,41 	a 1 £ 2 € a2 ); in either case a 1 ja2 . 	Thus AP implies 
there are a 1 ,a2 in A with a 1 a2 i.e. the domain is coherent. 
The form of event structure used in this example is a natural 
one. 	I conjecture that event structures of the form (E,k,) as 
in 3.3.1 but where 	ç(E) (so configurations are secured and do 
not include an element of 	) represent. domains which are 
() —algebraic and satisfy axioms F,C, and R. 
Chapter 4. Petri nets Rive Scott domains 
In this chapter we shall establish some basic, and essentially 
formal, connectinfls between Petri nets and domains using the inter-
mediate notion of an event structure. Here we shall see an 
example of a (very simple) representation theorem in which a domain 
of state-like elements is represented by a partial order. Initially 
we shall work with causal nets later extending the results to 
occurrence nets (defined below) which are argued to be a possible 
semantics for contact-free transition nets with initial marking. 
4.1 Causal nets 
Recall the 
and that for them the 
rences of holdings of 
Further each event is 






elementary event structures and lattices 
lefinition of a causal net (definition 2.4.1) 
conditions and events correspond to occur-
conditions and occurrences of events. 
"caused by" a unique subnet 
and "causes" a unique subnet 
a fact which may not be true for transition nets 
It is natural to focus on the pattern of occurrences of events 
of causal nets. The relation F specifies a certain dependency; 
if e F+ e' in the causal net then in. the course of the computation 
described by the net e' cannot occur without e having occurred 
already. This leads to the following definition of a "causality" 
structure on events: 
Definition 4.1.1 
An elementary event structura is a partial order (E,) where 
B is a set of events; and 
is the partial order over B called the causality relation. 
Thus here we choose to study the structure of events of a net 
rather than the structure of conditions. 	(One could explore the 
implications of dropping events) Our approach gives a neat 
translation of nets to domains but there are other reasons for 
focussing on events. Conditions can to some extent be recovered 
from the structure on events and, as will be seen in chapter 6 
have a far more complicated structure. It is natural to consider 
the easier events first. 
The relation between causal nets and elementary event 
structures is obvious. 
Theorem 4.1.2 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a causal net. 	Then 	(N) =d$(E,F* t\ E2 ) 
is an elementary event structure. 
P. Only asymmetry in non-trivial and this follows from N6 of 
definition 2.4.1. 
From an elementary event structure we can produce a causal net; 
in general there will be more than one. 
Theorem 4.1.3 
Let (E,<) be an elementary event structure. Then there is a 
causal net j(E) such that E = 0 QjV'( E). 
Pf. We take N(E) to be the net (B,E,F) formed from events E and 
B = {(e,e')f e,e' E E, e 	e'kJ 




) e,et E E & (e,e') E B} 
U{(e,(e,e') )I e,e' E E Z(e,e') EB} 
U 1((o,.e),e) 
	
e E E} tj {(e,(e,.1)) I e E El. 
Note if E is null th net )/' (E) consists of a single condition. 
The axioms on. causal nets follow trivially as does the fact that 
E = 
• Note that we have lost structure in passing from a causal net 
to its elementary event structure. Take the net N as example 
2.4.2. 	Its associated elementary event structure 	(N) is 
e 2<: > e3 
qz 
and .JVOE(N)  is (notice the isolated condition (0, 1)) 
q3 
which contains more conditions. It is fairly clear that many 
definitions of Iff  would work in theorem 4.1-3. The one we have 
chosen is maximal once we accept an extensionality restriction on 
conditions (I'T2) which identifies conditions with the same pre and 
post events. 	This is why the isolated condition, (o,i) in the 
construction, has been included. 
From our point of view it is reasonable to accept the 
following' euivalence relation on causal nets 
N 1 = N2 iff P, (i'r 1 ) = 
However it would seem undesirable from the view of traditional net 
theory; we lose track of too many conditions and the following 
K-dense and non-K-dense nets are identified. 
However as mentioned before we disagree with K-density and we shall 
spell out our case in the next chapter. 
We now use a little more computational intuition in answering: 
That is the natural domain of information points associated with an 
elementary event structure, and thus a causal net? In following a 
course of computation we are interested in what events have occurred 
and we also know that for one described by a causal net N, or its 
associated elementary event structure E, that an event having 
occurred implies its predecessors have occurred. Thus information 
points are certainly left-closed w.r.t. 	E or <. 
Definition 4.1.4 
Let (E,) be an elementary event structure. Then x ' E is 
left-closed iff 
e < 	x => e E x. 
We take 	to be the left-closed subsets of E ordered by 
inclusion. 
Ordering 	(E) by inclusion corresponds to the intuition that 
the more events that have occurred the more information we have. 
We can characterise the structures 	p(E) quite easily; we use the 
concept of a complete prime which will pop-up frequently. 
Definition 4.1.51 
Let (D,.) be a partial order. An element p E D is a complete 
prime (prime) iff for- every X D (every finite X D), if U X 
exists and p c Ux then there exists an x E X S-t. p !. x. The set 
of complete primes of D is denoted Pr(D). 
Definition 4.1.6 
A partial order (D,) is prime algebraic iff for every element 
d. E D, LJPd exists (where P d {p 	d p E 
Pr(D)J) and d = UP. 
Example 4.1.1 
In the above representation of partial orders the (complete) primes 
are circled, and it is easy to see that none but the last of these 
qh- 
partial orders are prime algebraic. 
We relate the concept of prime algebraicity to more standard 
lattice-theoretic concepts in the next proposition. 
Proposition 4.1.8 
A complete lattice is prime algebraic iff it is algebraic and 
every finite (or isolated) element is a lub of complete.primes. 
Further in such a lattice every complete prime is finite, an element 
is a complete prime iff it is completely irreducible and the 
distributivit3r property holds. 
We now present results leading to the characterisation of the 
structures 
Theorem 4.1,9 
Let (E,.i) be an elementary event structure. 	Then , (E) is a 
prime algebraic complete lattice. Its complete primes are those 
elements of the form [e] =5te' € E e' < el for e € E. 
Proof The structure 	(E) is a complete lattice with Ux = ox (and. 
flx= (x).. 
Each Eel is clearly left-closed, and. is a complete prime as if 
[e] Ux = Ux, then e € Eel 	X and so for some x in X, e E x,. 
and so [e] c x. As we have x = U{[e] e € x}, for any x in 
- (E),. each element is a lub of the complete primes below it, and so 
(E) is prime algebraic. 
Finally,, if x is a complete prime, then as we nave 
x = U {[e] I 9' € 	we must have x . [e] for some e in x. 	But then 
we must have x = Eel, which completes the proof. 
This theorem indicates how to map our lattices to elementary 
event structures. 
Definition 4.1.10 
Let (D, ) be a prime algebraic complete lattice. The 
elementary event structure P(D) is defined as 
(Pr(D), 	Pr(D) 2 ). 
Before stating the characterisation of the structures 4 (E) 
we shall need- the following general lemma. 
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Lemma 4.1.11 
Let (D,) be a prime algebraic partial order. Then the map 
D -> j (P(D)) is defined by 
	
iT (d) =def 	€ Pr(D) ( p dl 
is an order monic (i.e. 1T(d)rr(d') iff d Q d.'), it preserves and 
reflects complete primes, and preserves those lubs that exist in D. 
Proof Clearly ir is monotonic. 	If, on the other hand, 1F(d) E7 Tr(d') 
then from prime algebraicity of P 
d = Li {p E Pr (D) p G d} = UTr(d) UTr(d') = d'. 
Let p be a complete prime of D then 7r(p)  is a complete prime in 
/ (f(D)) from Theorem 4.1.9. 	On the other hand, it also follows 
from the theorem that if 1T(d) is a complete prime, then d is a 
complete prime, too. So, T preserves and reflects complete primes. 
Finally, if UDX exists then 
ir(U x) = { p E Pr(D) I p QH X J 
p = 
	
{p € Pr(D) J p xl (by the definition of complete 
= U() 	 primeness) 
x€X 
We shall often make use of the well-known fact that any mapping 
between partial orders which. is onto and an order monic is an 
isomorphism. This happens in the proof of the next theorem, which 
states the very close relationship which exists between our 
lattices and event structures.. 
Theorem 4.1.12 
Let (E,<) be an elementary event structure; then 
Similarly, let (D,) be a prime algebraic complete lattice; then 
D 	(D)). 
Proof Define 	E -> 	((E)) by )fr(e) = [e]. 	Then 	is well- 
defined and onto from Theorem 4.1.9. 
proved to be an ordermonic, and hence 
proves the first part of the theorem. 
is known from Lemma 4.1.11 to be an o 
since for any element X of 
and 
Furthermore, is easily 
it is an isomorphism, which 
As for the second part -Ti-
rdermonic; fl is also onto, 
I, 	 IS4 
exists (D, complete lattice) 
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4x) = XEX T, (-) 
	
(by Lemma 4.1.11) 
	
= U[x]1x € xl 
	
(by the definition of IT ) 
= X. 
So, 11 is indeed an isomorphism. 
Example 4.1.J3 
a, 	 a 






Take E to be the elementary event structure associated with the 
causal net from Example ZJ+.2. E and ,(E) are pictured 
above- 	-. The primes of f4 (E) are circled, and it is easy 
to see that E ' '((E)). 	 - 
Theorem 4.1.12 shows that elementary event structures and 
prime algebraic complete lattices are equivalent structures, in the 
sense that one does not lose any structural information going from 
one to the other via the pand 	mappings— in contrast to the 
earlier result about the relationship between causal nets and 
elementary event structures. 
The framework we have set up so far can be pictured as 
(loses structure) 
Causal nets 	 > Elementary 	Prime algebraic 
event 	 complete 
structures 	7' 	lattices 
A lot of our work in the next few chapters will be in extending and 
consolidating this set-up. 
In. the last chapter on concrete domains we saw another 
representation theorem in which events were extracted from the 
domains by taking equivalence classes of prime intervals under r'1 
the reflexive, symmetric, transitive closure of < 1 given by 
[x,x'] <' [y,yt] if x-Cy& x' —Cy'.. There the elements 
x,x',y,y' were assumed isolated. A. more general relation, between 
arbitrary prime intervals, is the following: 
Definition 4.1.14 
Let D be acpo. 	For [x,x'] and [y,y'] prime intervals of D 
define [,'] I [y,y'] iff y' = y Ii x & r = y r7 x'. 	Define 
to be the symmetric transitive closure of . 
The relation ,-..,' extends the relation.-/ -v of chapter 3. 	The 
,'v -equivalence classes are in 1-1 correspondence with the 
ij'-equivalence classes for the domains of chapter 3; this follows 
from the representation theorem which shows that for such domains 
events are secured by a finite set of events. 
In many ways prime intervals correspond more closely to our 
intuitions about events; a prime interval corresponds to a unit 
jump in information. How do these two notions of an event tie up? 
For a prime algebraic lattice there is a one-one correspondence 
between primes and ,--equivalence classes of prime intervals. 
This follows most easily using the above representation theorem. 
Proposition 4.1 .15 
Let (D,r) be a prime algebraic complete lattice. Then for 
any prime interval [d,d'], 1T(i') NiT(d) is a singleton. 	Hence if 
we put 
pr([d,d']) E T1(d.') \TV(d) 
then pr is a well-defined map from prime intervals of D to Pr(D). 
The following theorem states the relation between the 
equivalence ,- j ' and pr. 
Theorem 4.1.16 
Let (D,.) be a prime algebraic complete lattice. Then the 
following are equivalent for prime intervals [d1, '] and [d2 , di]: 
Ed l ,d l l,-'._- ' Ed dt] 2f 2 
pr([d 1 ,d]) = pr([d2 ,d]) 
3.. There exists a prime interval [d 3 ,d..] s.t. 
[d 1 ,d] > [d3 'd] <[d,d] 
Further, if p is a complete prime of D then 
p=.pr([U{p' € Pr(D) I p' :p},p]). 
Proof 
1. => 2. It follows easily from the definition of < that 
[d 1 ,d] < [d2 ,d.] => pr([d 1 ,d]) = pr({d2 ,d]). 
2.=>3. Define d3 =d1 fld2 and d.=dr1d. 
3 => 1. Trivial.. 
The last part of the theorem is obvious. 
This theorem is the lattice-theoretic statement of the fact 
that an event is enabled (or caused) in a unique way. It proves a 
one-to-one correspondence between the complete primes and the more 
intuitive equivalence classes of prime intervals. This justifies 
our-translation of events into complete primes. 
Now, it is easy to see that the events of a causal net N are in 
one-to-one correspondence with the events of (N), and the events 
of an elementary event structure E are in one-to-one correspondence 
with those of W(E). On the other hand, the events of E are also 
T 
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in one-to-one correspondence with those of 	and the events 
of a prime algebraic complete lattice are in one-to-one corres-
pondence with those of 
The situation for translation of conditions is a good deal less 
pleasant. Our main tool for handling conditions is the 
extensionality axiom N2 which allows us to identify any condition b 
with its pre- and postevent (Th and b). For simplicity, we shall 
only demonstrate how conditions translate into elementary event 
structures. 
A condition of an elementary event structure E is taken to be 
any condition of J1f(E). By definition this gives a nice one-to-one 
relationship between conditions of E and 11(E), but, obviously, it 
is more interesting to see how conditions of a causal net N corres-
pond to certain conditions of ' (N). 	Define the map, bed, between 
these two sets of conditions as follows: 
(oet) if 	b = 	and b' = {e'} 
Vb E Br bed(b) = <'(e,1) 	if Th {e} and b = 





	fell e,e') 	f 
0b = je and b = 
It follows from the axioms of causal nets that bed is well-defined, 
and that it is one-to-one.. However,, in general bed will not be onto,, 
obviously because of our construction of At(E) ,.. which in general 
generates a lot of redundant conditions. One could try to remedy 
this by a characterisation of the "essential" conditions of E. The 
following lemma is such an attempt. 
Lemma 4.1.17 
Let (E,) be an elementary event structure, and b one of its 
conditions. Then the following two conditions are equivalent: 
For every causal net N (B,E,F) for which E = 	(N), 
b € bed(B). 
b = (e,e'), where e' covers e (with respect to the relation 
Proof Assume b of the required form, then clearly for every causal 
net N = (B,E,F) for which E = 	(N), there must exist a condition 
b' € B such that eFb'Fe',. and hence b = bed(b'). 	On the other hand, 
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if b is not of this form, construct a slightly modified form, N, 
of X(E) leaving out the condition corresponding to b, such that 
E = 	(N) and b , bed(B).a 
This lemma shows that the only essential conditions are the 
"points of non-density". However, the net consisting of the events 
of E and all essential conditions will not in general be mapped onto 
E by 	. Indeed., considering, for instance, the elementary event 
structure associated with the rationals shows that it is even possible 
for no condition to be essential. 
In the next section we shall see how the causal dependency and 
the concurrency relation of causal nets translate nicely into the 
event and lattice structures. 
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4.2 Occurrence nets, event structures and domains 
In chapter 2, introducing Petri nets, we often had to 
distinguish events (or transitions) from their occurrences and 
similarly conditions (or places) from their holdings (e.g. in the 
tcW 
discussion of 2.2.10). Here we shall showAan occurrence net, in 
which conditions and events stand for occurrences, can be associated 
with a contact-free transition net with initial marking. For one 
thing this will enable an especially simple definition of the 
concurrency relation. For another the associated occurrence net 
of a transition net seems a canonical representative of the 
computation described by the transition net at that level of 
description. We would like some category theoretic characterisation 
of the occurrence net of a transi1on net to clarify and support 
this view. At least it is an unfolding of the transition net (see 
section 2.5). Petri has said that the process level semantics of a 
transition net is the class of causal nets it unfolds into, where 
all the choices associated with such an unfolding are "made by the 
environment" [Pe4 The occurrence net unfolding of a transition 
net represents such a class. Again we shall not worry too much 
about computational intuition here, sidestepping issues like what to 
take as states of the occurrence net (see chapter 5), how we play 
the token game on transition nets, whether or not we allow events to 
have concession forever etc. For the sake of definiteness however 
one can assume that no events are restless so that the transition 
nets here may be imagined to describe datatypes. 
In general because of the presence of forwards and backward 
conflict the subnet "caused byor"causing" an event or condition 
is not. unique. In an occurrence net we wish the elements to 
represent occurrences as was the case with causal nets. From this 




the condition b can be caused to hold in two ways, either through 
the occurrence of e 0 or e 1 . 	In occurrence nets we choose only to 
allow (formal) forwards conflict marked by events sharing a common 
precondition. 	(We say formal because for the moment we do not 
discuss whether or not there is a state at which this conflict really 
occurs.) In net theory this might seem undesirable as there one is 
sometimes concerned with "information leaving the system" ,which 
• 	meanc getting to a state which could have arisen through 
different conflict resolutions. However our concerns are different. 
Firstly I am not clear what the semantics of a transition net with 
contact should be. Secondly we shall use 
occurrence nets to go from transition nets to domains of information. 
Here following Scott the level of information is determined by a 
partial order not, as would seem appropriate in net theory, by a 
digraph or category. This is because an information point in a 
domain "remembers" its past; it is like a partial history. On the 
other hand in net theory it is less standard to look at all the 
information potentially available to the environment as a system 
runs.. There the information is stored by the system itself; because 
a. system can loop there can be loops in the "can lead to" relation 
on information points.. 
As we have chosen to deal with forwards conflict only and we 
wish to stay close to causal nets it is natural to look for a 
replacement to axiom,N4- in the definition of causal nets (2.4.1). 
Axioms N5 and N6 are maintained as,respectively,we still disallow 
backwards conflict and wish events and conditions to be occurrences. 
Definition 4.2.1 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a Petri net satisfying N and N of 
definition 2.4.1 (that of a causal net). Foi any a E B U E let a 
denote the subset of E defined by 
= {e EEjeF*al. 
Two events e 1 and e2 are said to be in (formal) direct conflict, 
e1#IN e2 1ff e 1 A e2 Z e 1 n °e 2 $ 
Two elements of Bi B, a 1 and a2 , are said to be in (formal) 
conflict, 
I04- 
a 1 	a2 iff 	e 1 ,e2 C E e1 € 	e 
E a2 	e 	e2 . 
We can now generalise the notion of a causal net. 
Definition 4.2.2 
A Petri net N is an occurrence net iff it satisfia 96  and Wcb 
	
of definition 2.4.1 and further: N4' 	is irreflexive. 
We shall sometimes need to distinguish conflict as it arises 
in playing the token game (chapter 2) and what we call formal 
conflict which arises simply through F*..predecessors of two elements 
sharing a common precondition. This makes no mention of "reachable 
markings". Indeed, here we have not discussed what a state of a 
causal net or occurrence net should be in our view. Until we do 
it cannot be clear how real formal conflict will be in general. 
Occurrence nets will be our new class of semantical nets.. Elements 
of E and B still represent unique occurrences and holdings, 
respectively, and N4' guarantees that no event (or condition) is in 
conflict with itself (can occur on two different branches of the 
computation, so to speak). More importantly, the concept of 
concurrency carries over nicely: 
Definition 4.2.3 
For an-occurrence net N = (B,E,F), the concurrency relation 
coN_ (B '....' B) x (B .j E) is defined by 
Co
x = 	(( B V E) x (B v E))N(? U (F) —1U N). 
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of our 
definitions. 
Proposition 4.2.4 
Let N = (B,E,F) be an occurrence net. Then coN  is symmetrical and 
reflexive. Furthermore, any two elements of B U B are related in 
one of the three mutually exclusive ways: causally dependent, 
concurrent or in conflict. 
Now we can generalise Petri's idea of case (though I do not 
regard it as the correct formulation of state - see next chapter). 
Recall the definition of ken (2.4.10). 
Definition 4.2.4 
For an occurrence net N = (,E,F) a case is defined to be a 
N2 
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ken of CON. 
Unfortunately there are difficulties in correctly 
generalising the definition of sequential process to occurrence 
nets. An obvious definition would take them to be kens of 
- 	41N)• Then a generalised definition of K-density 
would result from using the generalised definitions of case and 
sequential process in 2.4.13. One would expect generalised 
sequential processes to be trees and generalised, K-density to at 
least hold for finite occurrence nets. Significantly neither is 
the case as the next examples show. 
Example 4.2.5 
Above we have drawn a finite occurrence net N.. A case is marked 
by the dotted line. A ken of (p* Li consists of all 
the ancircléd elements.. Not - only- does this "sequential process" 
have an odd form but also it does. not meet the case chosen. Thus 
this net would not be K-dense in the generalised. sense suggested 
above.. 
The next two nets show how peculiar is the suggested generalised 








N 1 	I 
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For N 1 the set {b.I j ECU} i.j Ie.( i € cU1 U {s.j i EC.A.)}c) {t Ii €w} 
is a ken of F 	 • For N2 the encircled events form a 
ken of F C) 	 4N 2.1 
We show how an occurrence net may be associated with a contact-
free transition net with initial marking (N,M0). Recall that a net 
is contact-free iff' for any reachable marking M and transition t, 
t M => ° t A N = $. The idea behind our construction is that the 
behaviour of N will be described by an occurrence net with precisely 
one condition for each residence of a token on a place, and precisely 
one event for each firing possible for N. Roughly, in the 
construction the event and condition occurrences are taken to be 
transitions or places respectively together with the "minimal way" in 
which they are "caused' according to a local application of the 
token game. In more detail: The occurrence of a place is taken as 
the pair consisting of the place together with the transition 
occurrence which causes it. to hold; the occurrence of a transition 
is taken as the pair consisting of the transition together with a 
set of concurrently holding- occurrences of its preplaces from which 
it may occur. We grow the associated occurrence net inductively 
in. stages starting from-the initial marking as a. set of occurrences. 
Definition 4.2.7 
Let N = (P,T,') be a contact-free transition net with initial 
marking N0 . 	Define- 	'((N,M0)) inductively as follows..' ollows. 	(We use 
and -1 
 to denote the first and second co-ordinate of a pair.) 
Initially define B0 {ol x N0 
E0=t 2 
with F0 = *0 = and coo =' B0 .. 
Then inductively define 
B 1 = BL) I ({e},p) I p E PS e € E £ p(e) 
E 1 = EJ{(f3t) /t E TAO 9 	B. -& (i)1 = 't(Yb,b' € 	
bcob')) 
with relations F1, 	r+l,con+1 on (B 1 j E +1 ) 2 
given by 
x F +1 x' iff x € 
	
1 x' iff5e,e' € E 	 e 	e' g e F 	x S, e' F*+i x t . 
(e),(e') / 0 
+ 	/ ± -1"- t+,).co 	 )F1 = B 1 jE 11tj 1 )  
Foy'A A- set (A ) = ?x I3 	( 1j)€A a..t.I s3ar( 
e. 'C—ia, ao( C- ) 	La c IoL k set). 
10'l 
Finally define 0((N,M0)) to be the net (B,E,F) where 
B= L)B,E= U  and F= UF. 
flE 	ii 	nEW fl 	 flEw fl 
We have used the contact-freeness of N where we assumed a 
transition could occur solely through its preconditions holding. 
The very simple transition nets below illustrate the point. 
Exaiirple 4.2.8 
LO 
N 1 	 N2 
In N 1 there is contact immediately. It would be unreasonable to 
have an event occurrence for t firing. In I\12  contact can happen 
through backwards conflict; our construction would allow f and t 1 
to occur. 
The next example illustrates a transition net with initial 
marking together with the occurrence net constructed as in 4.2.7. 
We have indicated what parts of the occurrence net have been grown 
by the nth stage of the inductive definition. 
Example 4.2.9 





Stage 4 - - -. 
In the inductive construction of the occurrence net associated 
with a transition net we have chosen to take the occurrence net as 
grown after ci) iterations. It is noteworthy that the closure 
ordinal [Mos] associated with the inductive definition may well be 
greater than &) in general 	For example the following transition 
nets with. initial marking would give closure ordinal 0) +1. 
i oi 
According to definition 4.2.7 their occurrence nets would be 
If one could play the token game very fast, so that the final 
events could occur, definition 4.2.7 would be inappropriate 
(This kind of issue occurs in discussing the 	s-mind to lend 
intuition in recursion theory ­ see [Rog].) One could then 
accordingly continue the inductive constructi Dli up to the closure 
ordinal. Note this would require a more general definition of 
contact-free; ours is based on the reachable markings of chapter 2. 
We remark that definition 4.2.7 is more general than that in 
[Niel which was for finite transition nets; that approach would 
not produce a transition occurrence if it depended on an infinite 
set of transitions occurring concurrently. 	As in [i'Tie] the 
construction gives an occurrence net for which there is a natural 
folding to the original transition net. The proof of this 
proposition follows from the inductive construction. 
Proposition 4.2.10 
For any contact-free transition net N with initial marking M0 , 
satisfies the axioms fdr occurrence nets. The map f, 
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defined below, from B tJ B to places and transitions of N is a 
folding: 
f((O,p)) = f(({e,p)) = p, 
Let us now see how conflict is handled in event structures and 
domains. Since elementary event structures were our "poorest" 
structures, it is not surprising that the only way of introducing 
conflict is by adding structure. 
Definition 4.2.11 
An event structure is a triple (E,<,), where 
El. (E,.i) is an elementary event structure, 
E2. 	is a symmetrical and irreflexive relation in B, 
satisfying V e 1 ,e2 ,e3 E B: e 1 > e2 e3 => e 1 	e3 
X is called the conflict relation. 
With these generalisations of causal nets and elementary event 
structures, the next two theorems provide straightforward general-
isations of the mappings 5  andjV' the results of Theorems 4.1.2 
and 4.1.3. 
Theorem 4.2.12 
Let N = (B,E,F) be an occurrence net. Then 
(N) =def 	
E2, *N f' E2) is an event structure. 
Proof The irreflexivity of 	follows from N4 1 . Then 
follows from the definition of*N. 
Theorem 4.2.13 
Let (E,<,.) be an event structure. 	Then there is an 
occurrence net 	/(E) such that B = 	(JV(E)). 
Proof Define the set /E)as follows: 
Kj E)= f {xc B IV e,e' E x: e 	e' => e 
The events of IV(E) are obviously those of B, and the set of 
conditions is defined by 
B = (e, x) 	e € B, x €J(E) and 'V'e E x e < e  
{(o,x) I x EJE 
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Finally, the F relation is defined as 
	
F = {(e,x ,e') 	(e, x) € B, e' € x} (.2 
((o,x),e') (o,x € B, e' € xl 'J 
{(e,(e,x)) ( 	(e,x) € B}. 
It follows that VV(E) is a well-defined occurrence net for which 
= 	and. restricts to give 	on events, and hence 	(J'/ (B)) = B. 
This construction of 	may seem more unnecessarily complicated 
than the one from the proof of Theorem 4.1-3. 	Obviously, many 
simpler ones would do; however, we have again chosen a "maximal" 
construction, in the sense that any condition in any occurrence net 
N for which conditions are extensional and for which 6 (N) = B has 
a representative in ,4/(E) (which means that our treatment of 
conditions in elementary event structures discussed in the previous 
section carries over to event structures). 
Things get a bit more interesting when we move on to our 
lattice structures and generalisations of the mappings 4 and 
Intuitively, an event structure represents a class of courses of 
computation (processes according to Petri) where e 	e' means 
that e and e' never occur in the sane course. So, not all left-
closed subsets of an event structure make sense as information 
points. Only the conflict free left-closed subsets can be the 
sets of occurrences at some stage of an associated course of 
computation. 
Definition 4.2.14 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure, and let x. be a subset 
of B. Then x is conflict free 1ff 
V e,e' Lx -, (e' 	e'). 
Our idea about the ordering of information points is still he 
same, though. 
Definition 4.2.15 
Let B = (E,<,) be an event structure. 	Then '(E) is the 
partial order of left-closed (w.r.t. ..) and conflict free subsets 
of E, ordered by inclusion. We shall sometimes call x in (B) 
a configuration of B. 
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What about our characterisation of the structures 
Obviously, we do not any longer get complete lattices. Two 
points will be incomãiL€ (have no upper bound) iff their union 
(as sets of events) contain conflict. 	But any comp&b1e set of 
points will have alub (their union), so the structures will be 
consistently complete. For a characterisation we need the even 
stronger condition of coherence (see 3.1). 
Theorem 4.2.16 
Let (E,<,') be an event structure. 	Then ',(E) is a prime 
algebraic coherent partial order. Its complete primes are those 
elements of the form [e] = té l € B J e' < el. 
Proof Let X 	(E) be pairwise consistent. Then U  is conflict 
free,. and so Ux = Ux, showing that 7(E) is coherent. 
The rest of the proof proceeds is in the proof of Theorem 4.1.9, 
noting that all elements of the form [e] are conflict free from E2, 
and that for any x in 	(E) the set {te] e E xl is pairwise 
corx,16k. R 
From this theorem we see how to generalise the mapping P. 
Definition 4.2.17 
Let (D,) be a prime algebraic coherent partial order. Then 
-P(D)  is defined as the event structure (Pr(D,), where < is 
restricted to Pr(D),. and for all e,e' € Pr(D): e 	e' iff e and e' 
are inconipEile. in D. 
It is easy to see that '1(D)  is indeed an event structure, and 
we are now ready to prove the equivalence between event structures 
and prime algebraic coherent partial orders corresponding to 
Theorem 4.1.12. An isomorphism between two event structures is 
naturally any one to one and onto mapping, which respects and 
reflects both causality and conflict. 
Theorem 4.2.18 
Let (E,<,) be an event structure, then E 
Similarly let (D,) be any prime algebraic coherent partial 
order, then D 
Proof Define 	: E -> 7 '( ' ( E)) by '(e) = [e]. 	It follows 
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along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.1.12 that 	is an 
isomorphism with respect to  and the corresponding relation in 
Furthermore, 	is easily seen to respect and reflect 
the conflict relation. 
The mapping 7T as defined in Definition 4.1.11 is known to be 
an order monic from D toi,((Pr(D), rPr(D) 12$)) (from Lemma 4.1.11). 
From definition , ((D)) is a subordering of 	((Pr(D)gf'Pr(D))) 
so all we have to prove is that the range of IT is equal to the set 
of elements of'j('(D)), i.e. for every left-closed set, X, of 
complete primes of D: 
3d E D 1(d) = X iff Vp,p' EX p and p' are corn 
The "only if" part is trivial. Assume X satisfies the right hand 
side assumption. Coherence of D implies the existence of UDX 
and it follows that 7r (UDX) = X (just like in the proof of 
Theorem 4.1.12) 
1n Example 4.2.19 an occurrence net N is pictured with its 







fe I j 
fe fc2} 
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Theorem 4.2.18 has an intuitive interpretation. For an 
event structure E the domain ,(E) may be thought of as a set of 
possible courses of computation. The theorem says that two event 
structures are isomorphic 1ff the structure of the courses of 
computation they determine are isomorphic. Given an occurrence net 
N an element x of'. ( 8 (N)) determines a causal subnet of N namely 
the net consisting of events x, conditions {b 13e € x b € e LI e0 
with F-relation induced by N. Recall it is. causal nets which Petri 
chooses to represent courses of computation. As a contact-free 
transition net with initial marking determines an occurrence net it 
also determines a class of causal nets.. 
So, we have now established a complete generalisation of the 
picture from the previous section: 
La  (loses structure)  




j Coherent Poseta 
<--  
All considerations about translation of events and conditions work 
as in there. 	Formally, Proposition 4.1.15 and Theorem 4.1.16 hold 
for prime algebraic coherent partial orders, and a straightforward 
version of Lemma 4.1.17 can be proved. 
Restricting ourselves to these relations on events, the 
following should now be obvious to the reader. 
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Occurrence Nets 	Event Structures Prime Algebraic 
N = (B,E,F) (E,i,) 	Coherent Posets 
(D,E) 
Causality 	F r E2 	< 	r Pr(D) 2 
Conflict 	4k E 2 j  
Concurrency E2\(FL (F+)_ 1 N)l E2\(<> v) 	Pr(D)2\(') 
Finally, let us see what these relations look like in terms of 
prime intervals of partial orders. 
Definition 4.2.20 
Let (D,) be a prime algebraic coherent partial order. The 
relation -4--("may occur before") on Pr(D) is defined as follows: 
P1 > 	
iff there exist prime intervals of P, tx 1 ,x 1'],[x2 ,x], 
such that pr( [x 1 ,x]) 	p.1 , pr([x2 1 x]) = p2 and x 	
x2 . 	The 
complement of --- is denoted 
Proposition 4.2.21 
Let (D,) be a prime algebraic coherent partial order, and let 
Pr(D). 	Then 
PI 	p2 iff (p
1 _-.—p2) g_ 
p 1 p2 iff (p 1 	_p2 ) A (p2 4_-p1) 
and hence p 1 and p2 are concurrent iff (p --)k (p2—>--p1). 
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Chapter 5. 	States and observable states 
In this chapter we look at the key idea of states of an occur-
rence net in detail using event structures as an intermediate notion. 
We shall look at these intially later 	 ?D -. occurrence nets. 
We introduce two types of state of an event structure, observable 
states and states in general.. 	Observable states correspond to states 
which may be observed in finite time whereas states may require 
unbounded time. Using the idea of an observer we arrive at 
definitions of these two notions of state consistent, it seems, with 
the net-theoretic intuitions. 	(Observable cases of an occurrence 
net will be determined by observable states of the associated event 
structure. The reachable markings of a transition net are the image 
of the observable cases of its occurrence net unfolding.) Through- 
out this chapter we shall assume the computations have a fixed initial 
state at which they start (see the initiality restriction). We 
shall relax this in chapter 7. We shall also assume that the extent 
of the holding of a condition lasts at least unit time (see the 
discreteness restriction). The technical machinery we develop on 
states leads to a batch of results. 	One is a. more concrete appraisal 
of K-density.. Unfortunately we shall disagree with it though give 
some results consistent with its spirit (as Petri himself has agreed 
in a letter). We- shall also investigate the assumption of finite 
width which is appropriate to descriptions of computations involving 
only finitely many agents at any finite time. The property of finite 
width will depend on a finitely-branching property. However we shall 
reserve the term "finitely-branching" for-event structures which-
possess only finite non-determinism in a sense to be made clear 
In 5,5 we show how the notion of confusion translates over to event 
structures and domains, establishing a connection with concrete 
domains. - 
5.1 Observers, states and observable states 
In chapter 2 we gave several examples of a transition net 
modelling a computation or datatype (itself an extreme form of - 
computation in which no assumption is made about whether an event can 
have concession forever-or not). In chapter 4 we showed how such a 
transition net could be unfolded into an occurrence net to which in 
turn we could associate an event structure. These then become 
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descriptions of computations. 	In more detail an event structure 
(E,<,) is an abstract description of a computation which picks out 
certain event occurrences related to the computation and'represents 
causality and conflict on E through the relations < and 	• The 
concurrency relation and the relation 	U 1 are not the identity in 
general; this reflects, respectively, the indeterminacy of the 
relative speeds in the various subprocesses and the choice of course 
that a run of the computation will follow. Having described a 
computation by an event structure, E, it is natural to associate 
information about a particular course of computation with an element 
of 	(E). However it is not so clear whether every element of -4 (E) 
corresponds to a state that the computation may reach in finite 
or unbounded time. Informally, we take an observable statelan 
element C of '7o (E) for which there is a finite time in the course of 
a computation for which events in C are precisely those observed by 
that time. A state is defined similarly but here the observation 




Here E 1 is the (elementary) event structure 
ea 	 consisting of an unbounded chain 




e. 	 Here E2 is the (elementary) event 
structure consisting of e with chains 
e nO 	ni 	nn 
< e < ... < e of unbounded 
length leading up to it. 
ella 
Example 5.1.3 
e0 	 Here E3 is the (elementary) event structure 
e 1 consisting of an infinite chain e 0 > e 1 > e2>... 
e 
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Consider computations described by E 1 , E2 and E3 . 	(Note that 
they are the event structures associated with the causal nets of 
examples 2.4.5 9  2.4.8 and 2.4.krespectivel3r.) 	First let us suppose, 
that there is a uniform lower bound on the extent of time which 
passes between the occurrences of e and e' if e < e'. Thinking of 
occurrence nets which induce E 1 . E2 and E3 , this ib equivalent to 
assuming a uniform lower bound on the extend of the holdings of the 
conditions. Then as the events e in E 1 	2 	 fl 
and E and any event e of 
dominate chains of unbounded length, if the computations always 
start with no events having occurred e E E 1 , e € E and e € E3 can 
never occur. 	Thus for such computations [e] € '7, (E 1 ), [e] e 	(E2) 
and [en] € 7, (E3) are not states. If we keep the first assumption 
for computations but no longer insist that they start at some definite 
time the events e of E 2 	n 
and e of E could now occur. 	(We shall look 
at this possibility in detail in a later chapter.) If we drop our 
first assumption as well then for instance example 5.1.1 is naturally 
associated with Zeno's paradox and the event e to Achilles catching up 
with the tortoise (a very peculiar computation). Thus depending on 
what assumptions we make on the computation and the event structure 
description of it the left-closed conflict-free subsets may or may not 
correspond to states.. Also without extra assumptions the observable 
states are not derivable from the event structure alone. 
In making the last statement we diverge from the approach of 
conventional net theory where we understand the observable states of 
a causal net are identified with its cases. 	(See section 2.4 in 
which-it is shown that the K-density axiom is natural once this commit-
ment is made.) With this interpretation of a case as an observable 
state, insisting on K-density for a causal net guarantees every 
observable state determines a unique point in every sequential process. 
We shall not feel bound by K-density but note we expect a revised 
version of it to hold in a causal net where we restrict cases to 
observable cases (viz, those determined by observable states of the 
associated event structure). We establish this in section 5.4. 
Referring back to the examples and the ensuing discussion we 
shall make two restrictions on the nature of the computations and our 
event structure descriptions of them. With these restrictions we 
shall be able to identify states with left-closed conflict-free 
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subsets. We insist that if in an event structure E, for events 
e and e', e < e' then their occurrence must be separated by at least 
unit time. 	(We call this the discreteness restriction.) 	As 
pointed out above this is equivalent to assuming that the extents in 
time of the holdings of conditions in an occurrence net inducing the 
event structure have a uniform lower bound. Thus we avoid the 
problems of dense event structures such as the rationals and the reals. 
We will also assume there is a state of null information, when no 
events have occurred from which the computation starts (we call this 
the initiality restriction). 	In chapter 2 we d5d Oh€ A06-0h of 
what the "reachable markings" were in playing" the token game. (The 
issue of how fast one could play it arose in defining the occurrence 
net unfolding of a transition net.) The initiality restriction 
accords with transition nets having initial markings and the discrete- 
ness restriction will imply a formulation of reachable whicha6tm wi 2.22, 
probably the most intuitive. 
We now formalise the intuitions above. We first define the 
concept of an observer which corresponds to a particular (complete) 
run or history of a computation where each event'a.occurrence is 
recorded together with the time at which it occurred. Time will be 
discrete starting at zero and we use the symbol "" to "record" 
events which never-occur - according to a particular observer. An 
event may never occur either - through being in conflict with a 
preobserved event-through the computation diverging before the event,. 
or simply through the event being "too far" from the starting state as 
in example 5.1.10 Time will be represented byWL/,} ordered as 
usual. 
Definition 5.1.4 
Let E be the event structure (E,<,). 	An observer for E is 
a map 0: E -> W U { 	 such that 
e < e' g  0(e) <.t'=> 0(e) < 0(e') 
e < e' 	i(-O(e) =oq => 0(e') 
0(e) < do ' 0(e') < oo => -i(e 	e') 
We denote the set of observers for E by 0b(E). 
The above paragraph explains clauses 2 and 3 in the definition 
and clause 1 formalises our first restriction on computations. 
Note that the above definition allows computations to diverge at 
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any itage; 	no events are obliged to lose concession 
eventually" extra assumptions would restrict the class of 
observers and the states though not the observable states. We have 
already motivated the following definition of the latter two notions. 
Definition 5.1.5 
Suppose (E,<,) is an event structure and C . E. 	Say C is an 
observable state of E iff 
3o e Ob(E) at €w C = e E E\ 0(e) < t. 
Also say- C is a state of E iff 
30 € Ob(E) at €W -i {OO C = {e € E J 0(e) 	t}. 
We write and. S(E) for the observable states and states 
respectively, ordered by inclusion. 
From these definitions it is obvious that 
Lemma 5.1.6 
For Ran event structure, 
() 	() 9 4 (E).. 
The next section provides a simple characterisation of 
and 
5.2 Distance measures on events and states 
In this section we define a distance measure on events 
and. then use it to define an integer metric on left-closed conflict 
free subsets - strictly speaking it is not quite an integer metric 
as it is possible for two states to be infinitely far apart. The 
ideas are simple. The distance measure 	(e,e') between two events 
9-and e' of event structure E is the supremum of the lengths of 
chains between e and e'; it represents the minimum time possible 
between the observation of e and e'. 	The distance d(C 1 ,C2 ) between 
two elements of 4 (E) is the supremum of L (e,e') fore and e' in 
(c 1 + c2) the symmetric difference of C 1 and C2 . 	First we define 
the distance measure on events. The set WL/fool is ordered as 
usual 
Definition 5.2.1 
Let (E,<,) be an event structure. 	Define 
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L: E2 	-> ijfool by 
L (e,e') = Sup{n 	 E E e0<...<e n S, ((e0 = e 	en = e') 
or (e0 = e' - en = e))} 





In E 1 there is an infinite chain between e 0 and e 	so 
A (e0 ,ew) = . In E2 there are chains of unbounded length between 
e and e' so A  (e,e') =Co 
We note that A is symmetric and that Li (e,eO = 0 1ff e = e' 
or e and e' are <-incomparable. Suppose we have three events 
e < e' <e". Then in general there may be more chains from e to e" 
than go through e'. These remarks account for the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.2.3 
For E. and A  as in definition 5.2.1 we have: 
1.. 	L(e,e') = I(et,e) 
(e,e') = 0 1ff e = e' or e and e' are <-incomparable.. 
For e < e' < e lt, 
(e,e ' ) +tI(e',e") I.i.(e,e'O. 
Notice that 3. is the "wrong way" triangle inequality. We 
remark that such measures occur in cosmology but there the analogue 
of < means "may be a cause of" (see exercises 	in [Sac ]). 
From A on E we obtain a metric on 	E) the left-closed 
consistent subsets. 	(Strictly speaking d is not quite a metric as 
it may be infinite.) 
Definition 5.2.4 
For E andA as in definition 5.2.1 we define 
d: 1, (E) 2 —p Ct) LI {o} by 
d(C 191C2) = sup{L(e,e') + 1 e,e' € (c + 
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We say for C 1 ,C2 € 4 (E) that they are reachable from each other 
iff d(C 1 ,C) <00 . 
The latter concept of reachability allows two incompatible 
conflict-free left-closed subsets to be reachable from each other. 
This may seem unusual. We shall relate it to the perhaps more 
standard idea of forwards reachability after the next lemma detailing 
the properties of d. 
Lemma 5.2.5 
For d as defined in 5.2.4, if C 1 ,C2 ,C3 Ea (E): 
1.. 	d(C 19 C) = 0 <=> C = C2 
d(c 1 ,C2) = d.(c,c 1 ) 
d(C ,c2) + d(C 2 ,C3 ) > d(C 1 ,c3 ) 
d(C 19 C) = Sup{d(C 1 , C2 ,C 1 ),d(C 1 ç c 2 ,c} 
s. 	c 1 	c2 c C3 => a(c 1 c2) < d(c 1 ,c3). 
Proof Use the fact that C 1 ,C2 ,C3 are left-closed. 
1 • and 2. are obvious from the definition of d. 	if c 1 = C3 the 
result is obvious so suppose w,l.o.g. there is chain between e and e', 
with e < e', in C
3
' \C . Then the chain splits into two chains one 





The two parts make a contribution of at least the length of the 
chain to d(C 1 ,C 2) + 





Now we can relate our relation of reachability given in 5.2.4 
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to forwards reachability. Note thatthe one-step-forward 
reachability relation below corresponds closely to the relations 
[-> and- 1 of 2.2. 
Proposition 5.2.6 
Let E be an event structure. For C 1 ,C 2 in 7(E) define one-
step-forward reachability by 
C 1  f— C2 iff C 1 	C2 &. Ve E CC1 	{e} 	C 1 . 
Then define the forward reachability relation as the transitive 
closure of F-1 . 
Suppose C 11 C2 are in '(E). 	We have 
C1 F— C2 if C 	C2 & d(C 1 ,c 2 ) < Co. 
The reachability relation of 5.2.4 is the least equivalence 
relation extending -. 	In fact d(C 1 ,C2 ) < 	iff C 1 #'\ C2  1— C 1 - 
C 1 t • C2 -i C2 . 
Proof 
1. Clear from the definitions. 
2.. This follows from property 4. in 5.2.5. 
We use the following definition in characterising states. 
Definition 5.2.7 
For d and event structure (E,<,) as above and e E E, say e 
has finite depth in E iff d(t,[e]) <' 
It is obvious that: 
Lemma 5.2.8 
If e has finite depth in event structure E and et < e then e' 
has finite depth in E. 
We could have defined fir)ite 	depth by introducing a fictitious 
event i below all events in the event structure E, defining A  as 
above on the amended event structure, and then said an event e of E 
had finite depth iff L (i,e) <ce. 
The characterisations of 	(E) and 	for event structure 
E now follow: 
Theorem 5.2.9 
Suppose E is an event structure with metric d. on L (E) as defined 
12,Ii- 
in 5.2.4. 	Then for C € % (E) 
C E 	(E) iff V e £ C e has finite depth. 
C E(E) if  d($, C) < cO. 
Proof 
Suppose C € ' (E). Then each event in C is observed 
in finite time and thus by the definition of an observer is of finite 
depth. 
"4?' Define the observer by 0(e) = d(Ø,[e]) if e € C, o 
otherwise. 
2. As for 1. but this time we have a uniform bound on the 
depths of the events. 
Corollary 5.2.10 
For an event structure E, 
= 	(E) iff for all events e are of finite depth. 
O' (E) is closed under intersections and finite consistent 
unions. 
If an event is not of finite depth it can never be observed. 
Consequently the states only involve events of finite depth. Thus 
it is natural to restrict ourselves to event structures in which all 
events are of finite depth. For example this excludes the event. 
structures 	E and E of examples 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 respectively, 
even though. 4f(E2) is K-dense. 
Definition 5.2.11 
An event structure E is of finite depth if f every event of E 
has finite depth. 
Theorem 5.2.12 
If (E,<,) is an event structure the following are equivalent: 
E is of finite depth. 
(E) = f,(E) 
V e € E 30 € Ob(E) 0(e) € w 
V 	E (Va 1 ,a2 £ A '7(a 1 	az)) => 3o E ob(E) A . 0 1 W 
Proof 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure. 
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=> 2. by theorem 5.2.9 part 1. characterising states 
=> 3. Assuming 2. we have [e] € 	(E) for any event e. Thus by 
the definition of state 3  0 € Ob(E) 0(e) E () 
=> 4. Supposing 3. gives that every event e has finite depth thus 
we may define the required observer 0 by 0(e) = d.($,[e]) if e E [A]. 
otherwise. 
=> 1.. as {e} is certainly a conflict-free subset of E so there is 
an observer seeing e, giving that e has finite depth.5 
Thus if an event structure E is of finite depth 	(E) = '(E) so, 
by the results of the last chapter, we can recover E, to within 
isomorphism from (E). It can also be recovered directly from the 
observers for E. 	Precisely: 
Theorem 5.2.13 
If (E,<,% ) is an event structure of finite depth then:. 
. r <and *= nw, 
o€ob(ET° 	 0€Ob(E) 
where 
e < e' <> 0(e') <'Q => 0(e) <0(e') 
ee' <=> (0(e) 	OQ <=> 0(e') =oo). 
Proof 
Obviously by the definition of an observer 	 and. 
Qo so 	we require- 
(e < e') => 	0 E ob(E) —i (e 	e') 
( 	-syJ 	,', 	 -' 	.-', / 	
/ 	"- 
an, 7 \C'j).. '; =.' _...ju € uoi1 i.e e') respectively.. 
The latter follows from theorem 5.2.12 part 4. 	For the former, 
as E. is of finite depth, take 0 E Ob(E) such that 0(e') € C4) 
If e 	e' (i.e. 0 is unsuitable) take 0' defined by 
" o'() = 0(e) if 
0(.) + j(e') + 1 otherwise. 
Then. 0' is the required observer. 
5.3 Event structures with finite width and finite branching 
So far we still allow computations of a very general nature. 
For instance we allow an infinite number of concurrent events to form 
an occurrence net or event structure. For real computational 
processes at normal levels of abstraction this seems unlikely. One 
would expect that an infinite Milner net for example would have to be 
grown, perhaps by a recursive definition, over an infinite stretch of 
time. In such a Milner net,in any finite time only a finite number 
of events (including communication and possibly "births" of agents) 
would occur. The next example shows this a little more formally. 
Example 5.3.1 
A Milner net might be defined recursively by p = po ll p the 
parallel combination of p with p where p is some fixed net. Imagine 
the behaviour of p described by an occurrence net abbreviated, as S 
and the behaviour of p by an occurrence net abbreviated as @. One 
implementation of the recursive definition of p would give rise to 
this occurrence net. 
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Here each event drawn represents the action of expanding the net 
further according to' a single application of' the recursive definition.. 




The recursive definition preserves the fact that at any finite time 
only finitely many events can have occurred. 
The above discussion motivates the next definition of finite 
width. However note that a more detailed analysis of what class 
of computations to allow would perhaps yield a more restrictive 





Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure of finite depth. Then 
E is of finite width iff all observable states of E are finite. 
Note that we presuppose E to be of finite depth. This is because 
such event structures are natural for our definition of observable 
state expressing.those events which may occur in finite time. Such 
event structures will arise from the occurrence net unfolding of a 
finite transition net. 
If E is an event structure of finite depth then for any event e 
in E we have Eel is an observable state. Thus for finite width event 
structures {e] must be finite. Also considering a total observer for 
an elementary finite width event structure E we have that E is a 
countable union of finite sets and is thus countable. 
Lemma 5.3.3 
Let E be an event structure of finite width.. Then for all e 
in E we have {e] is finite. 	If E is elementary too then E is cot.)nbZl'Ie. 
Thus the left-closed consistent subsets of a finite width 
event structure satisfy axiom P of chapter 3. The converse does not 
hold however; the event structure consisting of an infinite set of 
<-incomparable events with null conflict relation is not of finite 
width and yet gives a domain satisfying axiom F. 
Thinking- of characterising finite width some finite-branching 
property springs to mind. Perhaps the most obvious one is that 
{et €! ee'} is finite for all events e, where we have used—< 
for the covering relation in E. This is incorrect however as the 
following example shows. 
e 
The above example of an elementary event structure, E, is of 
finite width-yet we do have {e' €EJ e—<ell infinite. Thus 
imposing 
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V e € B let E El e--.< et} is finite 
is too strong even restricted to elementary event structures. The 
correct finite-branching property follows. First we have some 
notation generalising that in 4.1.9. 
Definition 5.3.5 
For B and event structure and A £ B define [A] to be the left-
closure of A i.e. 
[A] = {e € B 	a € A e< a1.. 
Definition 5.3.6 
For B = (E,<,) an event structure and A E B. we define the 
concession of A by 
conc(A) = {e € B ( e A [A] g, 
<1 
 {e} c [A]} 
and the immediate futures of A by 
IF(A) = {B ç B 	B is -maximal s.t. B is a conflict-free 
subset of conc(A)}. 
Then B is said to be finitely-enabling iff 
VA B I A( <00 	=> 	V 	e, IF(A) fBI 	< 00. 
We avoid "finite-branching"' which is more appropriate for finite 
non-determinism. 	We then have:- 
Theorem 5.3.7 
For E an event structure (E,i,) of finite depth,- R is of 
finite width iff E is finitely-enabling. 
Proof 
Suppose E is of finite depth and finite width and that A 	E 
and (A( <° . 	Take B E IF(A). 	Define C = A (\ [B].. 	We have 
B € ir(c). As C is conflict-free and I C I < cv using finite depth 
and 5.2.9 part 2 we get [c] € O' (E). 	Now d(Ø,[B]) < a(Ø,[C]) + 1 <00. 
Thus by 5.2.9 again [B] E (2J' (E). As B has finite width this means 
l B) 	< 2. 	 - 
It<.Jt Suppose E is finitely-enabling. Then one shows by induction on 
n that the following induction hypothesis holds: 
VC E LIO(E) d(Ø,C) < n => id 	< 
Corollary 5.3.8 
For E an elementary event structure (E,<) of finite depth, 
E is of finite width iff VA E JAI <00 => Iconc(A)f <00. 
Proof 
Simply note for elementary event structures we have 
IF (A) = {conc(A)} for A S E. 
In general the observable states of an event structure E will not 
correspond to the isolated elements of 	((E),.) (written 
(E) ). 	However: 
Theorem 5.3.9 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure of finite depth. Then 
= 	(E) iff E is of finite width. 
Proof 
• Let E = ( E,<,() be an event structure of finite depth. 	First 
note that the isolated elements of 	(E) take the form 
L [e.] fore. Ex. O<in 1 	 1 
Obviously an element taking such a form is isolated. For the converse 
simply see that x is the supremum of the directed set 
[{e0 ,...,eIII 	 €. xl and use the fact that x is isolated. 
Thus as E has finite depth 	(E) 
"<=" Suppose E has finite width then observable states are finite 
so O ' ( E) 9 3(E) ° giving 	(E)0 = 
Suppose 	(E) = S(E) °. We require Vx E O'(E) lxi <co 
Suppose otherwise i.e. for some x € 	'(E) 14 = 
Define z  = {e € x id($,te]) = ni. 	As x c O(E) by 5.2.9 with 
m = d($,x) we have x = 0 for n > m. Thus for some i (i < i < m) we 
have x an infinite set of -incomparable events. Thus 
Ix i i A 	(E) ° . 	Yet [] € C4' ( E) by 5.2.9,. a contradiction. 
Therefore \71'x € O(E) I r( <Oo and E has finite width as required. 
Thus those event structures of finite depth and width are characterised 
by the observable states coinciding with the isolated elements in 
the domain of states. 
Finite-branching ideas suggest ideas along the lines of KBnig's 
1   
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lemma. 	So it is with finite width. We shall use th4y result 
below later, in establishing an equivalent of the K-density axiom 
under some restrictions. 
Theorem 5.3. 1 0 
Let E = (E,<) be an elementary event structure of finite depth 
and finite width. Then if E is infinite there is an infinite chain 
in E. 
Proof 
Suppose E satisfies the hypotheses of the theorem and (El = 
We divide E into sections according to depth by: 
Define E n = fe £ El d(Ø,[e]) = ni for n = 1,2,... 
We note: Every event belongs to a unique E; no En  is null; 
each event of depth n+1 has a <-predecessor of depth n. 
We now define t, a (finitely branching) tree with all nodes but 
the root labelled by elements of E, as consisting of the least set 
satisfying 
0€ U 
e € E 1 => (0,e) € t 
€ t 9, 	0 	(o)i € E => {(o,e) (o) < e 9, e € E n+1 
ordered by the transitive reflexive closure of 4 where 
if 	c'= (c') 
(We use ( ), ( ) to denote the projection functions.) 
Then (t'44) is a tree, a non-root node cK being labelled by 
€ E. 	It is finitely branching by the observations made of the 
En 's above. Moreover every event e of E labels some node of t. 
For suppose e £ E. 	Then we choose a chain e 1 < e2 < ... < en = e 
where e. € E. and n is the depth of e. 	Induction on n shows that 
= (...(((O,e 1 ),e2 ),e3 )...,e) € t as required. 
Thus t is infinite and finitely branching so we may apply 
K1nig's lemma to yield an infinite branch 
0 < oK K• 	-< ... <c( - 	... 
This gives an infinite chain in E i.e. 
1,1 
< 	< ••• < °'n1 < 
which proves the theorem. 
Corollary 5.3.11 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event struc,ure of finite depth and 
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finite width. Then x E 	(E)\C(E)Xincludes an infinite chain. 
Proof Let E satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem. 
obvious. 
tL>It Take x € S (E)\Uf(E). 	Then define E to be the 
elementary event structure (x, .('x). This is of finite depth and 
width. Moreover x is infinite. Therefore by 5.3.9 x has an 
infinite chain. 
Consider the elementary event structure E0 consisting simply 
of an infinite set of <-incomparable events. We can draw it as 
e0 	e1 	.... e 
Our definition of observer (5.1.4) allows all the events to occur 
within some bounded time. Of course the event structure is not of 
finite width. However we can regard it as derived from finite width 
event structures in which we ignore some events. For example the 







Think of E and E as two possible finite width "implementations" 
of E 	 the event structure E is obtained by ignoring the infinite 
branches of E and E2 . Think of E as an abstraction from all 
possible implementations in the above sense. 	Then our definition of 
observer would be made less general so that any observer of E is the 
restriction of the observer of a finite width implementation. In 
fact the observers of E would then be all observers such that only 
finitely many events of E occur by any finite time. We now spend a 
little time formalising these ideas but only for elementary event 
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structures. 
Firstly we define two natural ideas of implementation. 
Definition 5.3.12 
Let (E,<) and (E',I') be elementary event structures. 	Define 
E' 0 EiffEE'R < 
and E' 	B iff B ¶2 El< = <' r E. 
(Say B' 4-impiements or 	-itnlements B respectively.) 
The relations B' 	B and E' 	B give two ways that B' may 
implement E. The relation 4 corresponds to the idea above while for 
4 we would have B' 	B for theent structures: 
e2 
e 	 * 1 e0 	e 1 	e2 
e0 
B' 	 B 
Both relations are partial orders and 	has an easy characterisation. 
(We use OE to mean the observer 0 in Ob(E') restricted to B a subset 
of B') 
Lemma 5.3.13 
Both the relations 
partial orders. We have 
event structures with E' of 
aJ.ent to either of 
1.. B 	E'2 Va' E Ob(E') 
2. BcE' &V" C' 
Proof 
Routine. fl 
and 	on elementary event structures are 
C Let B and E' be elementary 
finite depth. 	Then B' 	E is equi..v 
0' i' E E ob(E) 
C' ( B 
According to the views of this section "real computations" 
will give rise to event structures with finite width implementations. 
To characterising those event structures which have finite width 
implementations (in both the 4 and 	sense) the following lemma 




Let (E,<) be a countable elementary event structure such that 
for all e in E we have LeJ is finite. 	Then there is an order- 
preserving countable enumeratinn of E i.e. there is a countable 
enumeration 	 of E such that if e < e' in E then 
e = e. and e' = e with i < j for some i,j in 0.) 
Proofs 
Enumerate the countable elementary event structure E as 
a0 , a 1 , . . . , a, . 
Easy proof: Let p be the nth prime. Represent e by c(e) = 
fl {pj a.< el, the product of primes corresponding to those elements 
below or equal to e. The ordering <' given by e <' e' iff 
c(e) < c(et) is a total ordering of order type W 
Intuitive proof: The idea is to regard the sequence a 0 ,a 1 ,... as 
assigning a priority to elements of E and then to serialise E by 
inductively "firing" the event with highest priority (earliest in the 
enumeration) amongst those with concession at any stage. 	Clearly .< 
is well-founded. Take e 0 as the earliest <-minimal event in the 
enumeration. Inductively define e as the earliest <-minimal event 
of E {e as the earliest <-minimal event of E\{e.\ i < n} in the 
enumeration. 	Thus we produce an enumeration eO,el,...,en... of E. 
By its construction it is order-preserving. Also any element of E 
is in the enumeration by induction on <. Consider any element of E; 
it will be an  in the enumeration, for some n. Inductively assume 
{e( e < a}c. {e.J i. €ui}. 	Then as lei e < a} is finite it is 
included, in {e0,ei,...,e} for some in. 	Also a is <-minimal in 
• As an  is preceeded by n elements in the enumeration, 
it will be contained in {e0 , .. .em+n). 	(Alternatively one can define 
the required enumeration ordering recursively from the original 
enumeration a0 ,a 1 ,...,a ,... and work with that. 	Let the priority 
of e)written p(e) = n if e = a in the enumeration. Write e for 
the immediate <-predecessors of e. Then new enumeration <' is 
defined recursively by 
e <' d iff(3d 1 € d e <' d 1 ) or (d <' e g Oe (' d £ p(e) < p(b)) 




Let E be an elementary event structure. Then E' 	E for 1 0 
some elementary event structure E' of finite width iff E is countable 
and for all e in E we have [e] is finite. 
Proof 
Clearly if E' 	E where E' is of finite width we have E ' E' 
with El countable and < C <1 P E with <' 1 {e} finite so E is countable 
with [e] finitein E. The above lemma provides the converse; take E' 
to be the set E ordered as in the order-preserving enumeration it 
provides. 
Event structures which may be -implemented are characterised by 
the same properties. 	Lemma 5.3.14 simplifies the proof. 
Theorem 5.3.16 
Let E be an elementary event structure. 	Then E' 	E (or E 	E) 
for some elementary event structure E of finite width iff E is 
countable and for all e - in E we have [e] finite. 
Proof 
Suppose E is an elementary event structure. Suppose E' < . E 
with E' of finite width. Then clearly as E ' E' and E' is countable 
we have E countable. For e in E we have [e] finite in E as [e] is 
finite in E'. 
Conversely suppose E is countable and for all e in E we have [e] 
finite. 	If E is of finite width take E! = E. 	Otherwise countably 
enumerate E in an order-preserving way as 	 Form 
E' by adjoining the event structure 	 - 
e 
More formally define E' = E 	I i € w } where each e A E with 
causality relation <' = < t(2.,.)J j, j €L < j}{(.e)I j,j EW 
As the enumeration e 0 ,e.1 ,... is order -preserving it follows that <' is 
a partial order. The event structure E' has finite width and 
E' 
Thus domains of event structures which can be implemented by finite 
width event structures will satisfy axiom F of chapter 3. 
Now we characterise those observers of an event structure which 
result by restricting the observers of its finite width implementations. 
Regarding an event structure as an abstraction from such implement-
ations these observers are the only ones possible. 
Theorem 5.3.17 
Let E be a countable event structure such that for all events e 
we have [e] finite. 	Suppose 0 € Ob(E). 	Then 3 E' 	B B' has 
finite width & 0' € Ob(E')L 0 = 0' B iff 
Vt € w Ile E B 1 0(e) < t} <DO- 




Suppose 0 € Ob(E) s.t. Vt € co Ile € B I 0(e) < tJJ < " 
We extend B to a finite width event structure E'. However now we 
must take care that 0 extends to an observer of E' so the construction 
of B' is a little more complicated than that in 5.3.14. 	Let 
e0 ,e 1 ,...,e,... be a countable order-preserving enumeratii of 
E\0c.o .. 	Take JE ( i € C4 I disjoint from B. 	Define B' by: 
B' = B 	
i 	
€ C'.) 
< =< 2 	 i,j E )j< j}){(.,e)j 0(e) €LuO(e) > i 
U 1( 2.,e.) i,j EWS:j < 3}. 
The idea: For the chain Is i Ji E £Q } we ensure that E.. is <' all 
events which are really observed by 0 after time i and also <' all 
events which are not observed (except at a ) but at i or later in 
the enumeration. Because the enumeration was chosen to be order-
preserving <' is a partial order. The event structure B' is of 
finite width with B' 4 B, and has observer 0' where 
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0'(e) = 0(e) if e E E 
=i ife=E 
= c%D otherwise 
Then 0 = 0 E and E' E as required. 
The proof for, rather than, is similar. 
As a corollary we characterise the observable states of an event 
structure which result by restricting the observable states of a 
finite width implementation. Again regarding an event structure as 
an abstraction from all such implementations these observable states 
are the only ones possible. Recall that for event structures E of 
finite depth the isolated elements of $ ( E), written 3 (E), are 
precisely the finite sets in 
Theorem 5.3.18 
Let E be a countable event structure such that for all events 
ewe have [e] finite. ' Then (SE' (E,C' E O(Et) E' is of finite 
width £ C = C'E'I E) 
iff a € 
An identical statement holds replacing 4. by 
We , summarise the last batch of results. 	(Here all event 
structures are elementary.) Assuming "real computations" determine 
finite width event structures we can still interpret event structures 
not of finite width; provided they are countable and any event has 
only finitely many pre—events, they can be regarded as an abstraction 
from all possible finite width implementations (5.3. 1 5 and 5.3.16). 
The possible observers and possible observable states are restricted 
accordingly; in particular states which really can be observed at 
finite time are now exactly the isolated elements (5.3.18) in the 
domain of states. 
We have argued that with respect to the definition of observer 
in this chapter "real" computations determine finite width event 
structures. The converse, that any finite width event structure is 
determined by a "real" computation is not so obvious. Clearly it 
would depend on precisely what class of computations we wished to 
represent. Reasonably it might be a class of Milner nets in which 
a single communication could be between a finite set of agents not 
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necessarily just two. 	Then as in chapter 2 communications could 
be- represented as events and local states of agents as conditions 
in a transition net. A suitable class of Milner nets would give 
occurrence net unfoldings inducing event structures of finite width. 
Importantly one would expect only finitely many conditions to hold at 
any finite time corresponding to there only being finitely many 
agents at any finite time. However not all event structures of 
finite width are induced by such occurrence nets. The next example 
gives & finiteIwidth event structure such that any occurrence net 
inducing it must have infinitely many conditions holding initially. 
Example 5.3.19 
Consider the event structure E induced by this occurrence net N: 
The event structure E = 	(N) consists of an infinite set of pairs 
en,en' of conflicting events with e 0 ,e 1 ,...,e ... pairwise in conflict 
and 	 pairwise in conflict. Formally 
= {(e,e') n € W } j f(e,e)l n,m €OJ 	ii 	m.1 
n,m €W24nml. 
Suppose N' is an occurrence net s.t. ' (N) = E. Then N' must 
jflc,luJe the conditions k. shown i.e. it must have an infinite set of 
initial conditions. However E is of finite width; at most two 
events can ever occur. 
One can regard E as modelling the following computation: the 
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computation consists of two output places 0 and n t  both of which 
may be filled by a single integer provided the integers in the two 
places differ. 
The role of the finitely-enabling restriction (guaranteeing 
finite width) is to ensure that the number of conflict-free events 
can only grow finitely in finite time. It is natural to look at 
another finite-branching property namely one ensuring the comput-
ation possesses only finite non-determinism. We shall look briefly 
at ways to formalise this for event structures. The idea is well- 
known for purely non-deterministic processes which can then be modelled 
by finitely-branching trees. These computations are said to possess 
finite non-determinism, a property which has been useful in constructing 
powerdomains ([Pic, [Smy21). 	I believe that the assumption of finite 
non-determinism is more technical than that of finite width for 
example. With it one can give denotations to a wide class of non-
deterministic programs. The assumption is made in constructing the 
possible denotations, the elements of a domain, and not about the 
structure of the domains themselves. The domain of integers does not 
present any technical problems even though it has infinite conflict 
(thinking of the associated event structure). In Petri nets and 
event structures there is no explicit distinction between dataty -pe and 
denotation but still we press on with attempts to define finite 
branching in event structures so as to capture the intuition of finite 
non-determinism in a computation. 
Any definition of finitely-branching event structure should 
generalise the finite-branching property of trees. One possible 
definition could express that the event structure is built from 
purely non-deterministic processes individually capable of at most 
one of a finite set of actions at any time. Such processes would 
generalise the sequential processes of chapter 2 and as nets look 
like 
This gives a local idea of finite branching. The following seems 
the correct formal definition. 
13q 
Definition 5.3.20 
Let E be an event structure. Say E is locally finitely-
branching 1ff there is an occurrence net N s.t. g (N) = B and for all 
conditions b of N we have b. finite. 
But of course all event structures are locally finitely-
branching in this sense. 
Lemma 5.3.21 
Any event structure is locally finitely-branching. 
Proof 
Let E be an event structure. 	Define N to consist of events B, 
conditions B defined by 
B = I(e,{e'}) € E 	 e < e'} v {(o,{e,e'})l e)4 ell 
with F-relation: Ye iff e £ (b) 1 and eFb 1ff e = (b) 0. Then 
(N) = B and for all b we have b finite.0 
Thus we look for a more global definition of finitely-branching 
expressing that at any finite time the computation can only choose 
between finitely many courses. The idea of finite time is formal-
ised by using observable states so we naturally take event structures 
to be of finite depth. The following is suggested: 
Definition 5.3.22 
Let B. be an event structure of finite depth.. Say B is finitely-
branching iff IV C € 	(B) IIF(C)1 < C 11 _ (where IF was defined in 
5.3.6). 
The definition excludes the following example. 
Example 5.3.23 
e0 	e 	e 1 	e 	e2 	e 
Here the event structure consists of a countably infinite set 
of conflicting pairs. Thus in finite time the computation may 
choose between'.u.ncountably many courses. 
I believe the definition of finitely-branching is equivalent to 
Vn ECU {c € Of (E)i C is -maximal £ d(Ø,C) < n} is finite. 
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In the presence of finite width the Thllowing is equivalent 
V C E O (E) fconc(C) ( < 00 as is probably: V C € OX (E) 	K a ken 
of 'j in conc(C) => K finite. 	Of course this should not be the 
final word on finite-branching. One should seek alintuitive 
characterisation and if there are not any change the definition. 
5.4 States of occurrence nets and K-density" 
So far we have worked with event structures. Here we 
translate our results to occurrence nets. Firstly we can extend the 
notions of finite depth and finite width to occurrence nets. 
Definition 5.4.1 
An occurrence net N is said to be of finite depth iff 	(N) is 
of finite depth. Furthermore if N is of finite depth it is said to 
be of finite width iff 	(N) is of finite width. 
We wish to associate a case of an occurrence net N = (B,E,F) 
consisting purely of conditions with an observable state of 
In order to do this we impose the axiom: N3. V e E E e 	e 0 A 0. 
We associate holdings of conditions in an occurrence net N with 
elements of 	o ' (N) by the following. 
Definition 5.4.2 
Let N = (B,E,P) be an occurrence net. For C € 4 o (N) define 
the frontier of C in N, written FrN(C),  by 
FrN(C) = (U{e° ( e € C} U b € B\ Th = $})\U{e \e € 
The idea: Given C a left-closed consistent subset of events of a net, 
the frontier of C is those conditions which hold because the events in 
C have occurred. The axiom N3 ensures that every event occurrence is 
reflected in a change in holding-of the conditions. 
In general such a frontier will not be a case. However 
Proposition 5.4.3 
Suppose N = (B,E,F) is an occurrence net of finite depth 
satisfying N3. Then for C E 	 (N), FrN(C)  will be a case. 	We 
call such frontiers observable cases of N and FrN(0)  the initial case. 
The map FrN15  1-1. 
Proof 
We sketch the proof that FrN(C)  is a case for observable states C. 
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From the fact that C is left-closed and consistent it follows that 
all conditions in Fr (C)are CON  to each other. 	That it is a ken 
of CON  follows as C does not include any infinite P*.ascending 
chains and its complement E\C does not include any infinite F*- 
descending chains.1 
The definition of observable cases of an occurrence net allows 
us to extend proposition 4.2.9 a little. 
Proposition 5.4.4 
Let N be a contact-free transition net satisfying N3, with 
initial marking M0 . Recall the occurrence net unfolding 
and the folding f from O((N,M,.)) to N (see 4.2.9). 	Then f takes 
observable cases of U((N,M0))to reachable markings of (N,N0). 
Conversely any reachable marking of (N,M 0) is the image of an obser-
vable case in 
Proof 
We give the idea. That observable cases Fr(C) are mapped onto 
reachable markings is proved by induction on d(,C). To show the 
converse ., take C to be those event occurrences giving N 0 -> N for the 




We now move on to a discussion of K-density.. First note that 
our assumptions of finite width, finite depth and axiom N3 are 
independent of K-density, either separately or in combination. The 
net 	/1/ ' ( E2) for the event structure E 2 of example 5.1.2 is K-dense 
and. satisfies N3 but is not of finite depth. Also note that the non 
K-dense net of example 2.4.4 satisfies N3 and is of finite depth and 
width. 
It is useful to note that the restriction of finite depth forces 
sequential processes to take a particularly simple form.. Without 
this restriction various order types are possible for sequential 











In both the causal nets N 1 and N2 the set fel L, {e ( n Eco]u{b 
n  ( n 
€w 
forms a sequential process. In N 1 it does not include any post-
conditions of the event e while in N2 it does not include any pre-
conditions of the event e.. For nets of finite depth this is 
impossible. 
Theorem 5.4.6 
Let N be a causal net of finite depth. 	Its sequential processes 
are precisely maximal sequences of the form x 0Fx 1 Fz2 ... where x0 is an 
F*_minimal element of N. 
Proof 
Let N be a causal net of finite depth. Using finite depth and 
proposition 2.4.10, maximal sequences of the form above are sequential 
processes. 	Conversely suppose S is a sequential process. Then 
inductively produce a maximal subsequence x0Fx 1 F...Px... of S using 
proposition 2.4.10; while S\{x I 0 < i < n} 	inductively take 
xn+1 as the F-minimum element of S\{x 
i 1 0 < i < n}. This process 
either yields a maximal finite chain whose elements are S or an 
infinite chain. In the latter case finite depth guarantees the 
chain includes all elements of S . 0 
We now prove a restricted form of K-density. 
Theorem 5.4.7 
Let N be a causal net of fini depth satisfying N3. Then every 
observable case meets every sequential process.. 
Proof 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a causal net of finite depth satisfying N3. 
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Suppose C is a case not meeting some sequential process S so 
S r C = jZ. 	We show that C is above S (i.e. V s € S c € C sFC) 
and that S is infinite. From this it follows that C cannot be 
observable. 
By theorem 5.4.6 we know S has the form b Fe Fb Fe ...b Fe 0011 	nfl 
where b0 is an F*_minimal  condition in N. As b0  A C and C is a ken 
of cc where Co = (B (i E) x (B& E)\(Fj () -'), we have b0Fc0 for 
some c0 E X. As b = {e0 }, for-some e0 €-E, we have e 0 € S. Thus 
e0 A C giving e0Fco o Then for some b 1 € B, fb I = S r e. There-
fore as b 1  A C, a ken of co, we have either b 1  F c or c 1  F b 1 for some ± 	.. 	-1- 
e 1 € C. The latter yields c 1  F e0 winch with e 0  F c0 
gives c 1 F
+ 
 c0 
contradicting 	 Thus b 1 Fc 1 . This process may be continued 
inductively to show that S is an infinite sequential process below C 
as required. Thus an observable case meets every sequential process. 
The proof indicates how essential conditions are for IC-density ojr 
restricted form of it to be true. 	See 7.4.3 for a generalisation of 
the above theorem.. 
This follows as observable states do not include infinite 
ascending chains. For both the above proposition and theorem we note 
that a weaker notion of observable case and finite depth would suffice. 
Taking N as (B,E,F), the restriction of finite depth could be replaced 
by:. 
Mr- x E BLiE, any ken of F* .1 p* 1 in {' Jx'Fx} is finite. 	This 
says no (sub) sequential processes below an element are infinite.. 
Of course the element x may be restricted to range over events. The 
new observable cases could be taken as the frontiers of left-closed 
conflict-free subsets C in which any ken of (< c.' ) is finite. 
Presumably one could paraflèl the results of this chapter for these 
different notions aid a generalised idea of observer. For finite 
width structures, new and old definitions and results should coincide 
in the main as by Corollary 5.3.10 the two ideas of observable state 
do. 
We conclude our discussion of K-density here with a result which 
illuminates and reinforces our net-theoretic argtent for K-density in 
chapter 2. With suitable restrictions on a causal net we can give an 
equivalent of the K-density axioms; then a causal net is K-dense iff 
all cases (in Petri's sense) consisting solely of conditions are 
I" 
observable cases (in our sense). 
Theorem 5.4.8 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a causal net of finite depth, finite width 
and satisfying axiom N3. Then, taking FrN  as defined in 5.4.2: N 
is K-dense 1ff the map Fr  from C( (N))  is onto the cases of N 
consisting purely of conditions. 
Proof 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a net satisfying the above conditions. 
tt<=tt Suppose Fr 
  is onto the cases consisting purely of conditions i.e. 
all such cases are observable cases. Moreover assume N is not 
K-dense i.e. C r S = 0 for some sequential process S and case 
C 	E u B. 	Defining c' = (a t., (a i) E) )\CriE gives C' a case with 
C' B and Cl/) S = 0.. But then C' is an observable case, as FrN  is 
onto, not meeting S - a contradiction by theorem 5.4.7. 
=>" Suppose N is K-dense and that C is a case of N with C c B. 
Define x = le € E 13 b € C eFb}. We require x £ Oo (N). Suppose 
otherwise i.e. there are chains of unbounded length in x. By the 
assumption of finite width this implies there is an infinite chain in 
x (theorem 5.3.10). The infinite chain will determine a sequential 
process S in N such that S (\ C = 0 - a contradiction as we assume N is 
K-dense. I 
The role of finite width in the above proof is to convert there 
being chains of unbounded length in x to there being an infinite chain 
in x. A revised version of this theorem would hold in which we 
merely required that observable states included no infinite chains; 
then we could omit the requirement of finite width. The next example 
shows why finite width is necessary for the above theorem with our 
definition of observable case. 
Example 5.4.9 





The causal net consists of an infinite set of sequential processes 
each of finite length - the nth process has length n - but overall 
of unbounded length. The net is not of finite width. The net is 
K-dense but clearly the case Jbn ( n E Col is not observable. This 
shows that finite width is necessary for the equivalence of theorem 
5.4.8. 
Reasonably assume a course of computation is represented by a 
causal net of finite depth and width. 	By theorem 5.4.8 the assum- 
ption of K-density is then equivalent to assuming all cases are 
observable cases. But why should all cases be observable? Assuming 
so bans the innocent net of example 2.4.4. According to our view 
K-density is too restrictive an axiom. However the intuition 
motivating it remains: An observable case does meet any sequential 
process (theorem 5.4.7). 
5.5 Confusion and concrete domains 
K-density proved to be a concept which did not translate 
very cleanly into the framework of event structures and domains. 
Fortunately confusion does translate well; indeed confusion-freeness 
was discovered independently by Glues Kahn and Gordon Plotkin in 
their work on concrete domains. 
Recall our discussion of confusion in chapter 2. 	It arose 
because of two violating situations called symmetric and asymmetric 
confusion. In net theory these are introduced formally at the level 
of transition nets. The following are the obvious corresponding 
definitions for an occurrence net. 
Definition 5.5.1 
Let N = (B,E,P) be an occurrence net of finite depth satisfying 
N3. 
We say N is symmetrically confused iff there are an observable 
case C and events e,e',e" such that 
('e,e', e" ' 	C) ,&(e c'e' 	) R ('e' r e" 	) . ('e r'i e" 
We say N is asymmetrically confused iff there are an observable 
case C and events e,e',e" such that 
('e,'e" 	C).('eC) & (e'(C\e).j e')2 (e r\°et = 
£(e'c'e" 	Ø) 
1 
Finally we say N is confused iff N is symmetrically or 




- Symmetric confitsion 
Asymmetric confusion 
In the special case where the occurrence net is the unfolding of 
a transition net definition 5.5.1 reflects the situation in the 
transition net; observable cases of the unfolding determine the 
reachable markings under the folding map and firings from a reachable 
marking are images of occurrences from an associated observable case. 
Proposition 5.5.3 
Let.(N,M0) be a contact-free transition net with initial marking 
MO P satisfying N3. 	Then (N,N0) is symmetrically (respectively 
asymmetrically) confused iff the occurrence net unfolding 0 ((N,M0)) 
is symmetrically (respectively asymmetrically) confused. 
In order- to see how confusion manifests itself in event 
structures and domains we define the relation ,pover an event 
structure, representing immediate conflict. 
Definition 5.5.4 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure. 	Define 9. by putting 
for e,e' in E: 
e 	e' i f f e' e' & 	C E X(E) C Li-[e],C j  -te'} 
We then say e and e' are in immediate conflict. 
The relation of immediate conflict between events e and e' 
represents the possibility of a stage in the computation at which 
either of e and et (but not both) may occur. 	Its properties are 
summarised in the lemma below. 
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Lemma 5.5.5 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure of finite depth and 
suppose 	is as defined in 5.5.4. Then 
is a symmetric relation. 
e 	1ff ewe' 	(V <e(e&(V€' < i 
eke' 1ff 3E, 9 E E E<e 	' 
Proof 
Obviais. 
"<=" This follows by taking C = [e]u Eel] \{e,e'}. 
"=>" Suppose e W/-  el i.e. e )e' and C u{e3',c.i {e'} €C '( E) 
for some C E OS(E) . Merely note C 1 {ej, C 1 {e'} 	C. 
3.. Suppose e 'e'. 	By the well-foundedness of < that finite 
depth provides we may find a minimal pair in {(,')I E< e,& 
< e'2, E ''} w.r.t. to the ordering on pairs defined 
componentwise. Such a pair will be 	related. 
We can now transfer the notion of confusion to event structures 
using 	and its properties. 
Theorem 5.5.6 
Let N = (B,E,F) be an occurrence net of finite depth satisfying 
N3 and define NV as in 5.5.4. 	Write 	(N) as E. Then 
N is symmetrically confused 1ff 3e,e',e ll £ E e 	e 	ell 
—i (e'j I e s'). 
N is asymmetrically confused iff 
e , e t, e tt £ E e 	e" k e < e''i (e < e").. 
Proof 
for 1. and 2. follows by "unwrapping" definitions.. 
1 • "<" Take C, the required observable case, to be 
FrN([e]O[e]\i [e"]\{e,e', ell  j) 
2.. "=>" Without loss of generality suppose e is a <-maximal element 
below e' with 1 (e < e"), so e —<e'.. 	Take C, the required 
observable case, to be 
	
Note the occurrence of "u" and not 	in part 1 of the 
above theorem. 	In our next theorem we shall show, in the course of 
the proof, that ria tfplateA U. 	 once N is known to not be 
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asymmetrically confused. With our next theorem in mind as 
justification we give a definition of confusion-freeness for event 
structures. Clause 2 below can be interpreted as requiring 
enablings to respect the 	-. equivalence classes provided by 
clause 1. 
Definition 5.5.7 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure of finite depth and 
take 	as defined in 5.5.4. 	Then 
E is confusion-free iff 
( is an equivalence relation 
e < e 	e" => e < e". 
Now we look at the domain version. 
Theorem 5.5.8 
Let N be an occurrence net of finite depth satisfying N3. The 
following are equivalent. 
1. I'T is not confused. 
2.- 	(N) is confusion-free. 
o (N) satisfies axiom Q of concrete domains. 
Proof 
"1 <=> 2" By theorem 5.5.6 N not. being asymmetrically confused 
is directly equivalent to 5. 5. T part 2 holding for 	(N). From 
this it follows that if N is not asymmetrically confused then for 
\YZ€ B e 	e' 	e" £ i (e( u I e") <> 
e,,M. 	e"Z i (e,u L/ 	the fact that then the 
enabling < respects 	. Thus given N is not asymmetrically 
confused, N is not symmetrically confused iff part 1 of 5.5.7 holds. 
(This justifies part 1 of definition 5.5.7.) 	Therefore 1 <=> 2. 
"2 => 3" Suppose ' (N) is confusion-free. 	We wish to prove 
axiom Q. which we remind the reader takes the form 
) x = y R z 	y => 	! t x 	t 	y  
Thus suppose z )— x 	y 2 z 	y in 	(N). Then 
z = x L,{e}, e 	e' and e' € y\x for some events e and e' of 
(N). Then by part 2 of definition 5.5.7 of a confusion-free 
event structure, t = x J {e'} is also in ' o (N). 	Thus using 
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part 2 of definition 5.5.7 we have the existence part of axiom Q. 
The uniqueness follows from part 1 of definition 5.5.7. 
93 => 2" The existence part of axiom Q yields part 2 of 5.5.7 
and then the uniqueness, part 1. To show part 2 of 5.5.7 suppose it 
were false i.e. that we have e < e' 	e" and e /f e". 	We may 
assume e is <-maximal so that e < e' 2 e / ett - then e' covers e in 
the event structure. 	Take x = ([e']\{e,e'})'([e"]\{e"}). 	Take 
z = ([e']\te,e'})[e"]. 	Take y = [e']u [e"]. 	Then z)— x Q Y. 
However by the choice of x,y,z we have x -ct y implies t\ x.= {e} 
so t'j'z contradicting the existence part of Q. 	To show part 1 of 
5.5.7 assume 	e' 	e' and e e". By the above the existence 
- 	 - 
part of Q gives <
-1 <
1 
tel = le'} 	<
1 
 je'j. 	Suppose —i (e... 	e") 
Then take x = < {e}, y = [e]jte'] and z = te']. 	This choice 
contradicts the uniqueness part of axiom Q so we have e 	e" as 
required. 
Corollary 5.5.9 
Let N be an occurrence net satisfying N3. Then 
E is countable 
F*1 tel is finite for all events e, and 
N is confusion-free 
iff to (N) is a distributive concrete domain. 
Proof 
	
The domain J o 	is prime algebraic so distributive and 
satisfies axioms C and R by the work of chapter 4. It being 
i -algebraic and satisfying axiom F correspond to (1) and (ii) 
respectively. Axiom Q corresponds to (iii) by the above theorem. 
Recall the intuition in net theory that confusion leads to 
,,conflict-resolution not being objective; whether or not conflict 
appeared to be resolved between events depended on the observer. 
Confusion-free nets can be represented by the matrices of Kahn and 
Plotkin. Then conflict between events is localised in that two 
immediately conflicting events will always be enabled at the same 
time and be competing for the same place. All observers will 
agree whether or not conflict has been resolved and at which place 
the resolution occurred. 
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5.6 Alternative axioms on event structures and other ideas of 
observable state 
In this section we remark on other ways of formalising the 
intuition behind observable states. We have worked largely with 
(E) for an event structure E. 	The elements of 	are 
consistent left-closed subsets of E uniformly reachable from the 
initial null-state. The restriction to event structures of finite 
depth is then natural; no event not of finite depth can ever occur. 
We mentioned the weaker definition taking consistent left-closed sub-
sets which do not include infinite chains. Then the finite depth 
restriction is replaced by: 
Definition 5.6.1 
Say an event structure E is well-based iff for all events e any 
total order below e is finite. J_(  Thesedefinitions were sufficient 
to prove the results on K-density in 5.4.) We prove further 
restrictions (implying axiom F) follow from Dana Scott's thesis that 
computable functions are continuous. All the definitions express a 
finiteness constraint on event structures and on those states which 
can be observed in finite time. For event structures of finite width 
they agree. All these restrictions on event structures imply a form 
of discreteness. As yet it is unclear how to represent non-discrete 
or ttCOfltj.flUOU5It processes by event structures. 
Recall the idea of observable state.. An observable state is a 
subset of events consisting of all those events which may be observed 
in finite time in a history of observation. in this chapter we have 
taken an observer to be intuitively a run or history of computation. 
This form of observer is passive, playing no computational role. 
We take another look at £ ' (E). Apparently this definition 
	
rather than the weaker one is more appropriate to net theory. 	(In 
a letter Petri said he wished to ban nets associated with the event 
structure of example 5J.2). This definition is also appropriate to 
the ideas of local time introduced in [Lam]. In [Lam] an elementary 
event structure is built up from chains of events representing 
processes in which some events represent the sending or receipt of 
messages between processes. A ("logical") clock is associated with 
each process so that the time ascribed to an event is greater than 





The weaker definition, taking observable states to not include 
infinite chains is implied by Hewitt's axioms [Hew] on the event 
structures associated with actors. Hewitt imposes the axiom, called 
E-discreteness in [Bes], that there are no infinite chains between 
events. Then saying there are no infinite chains between an initial 
fictitious starting event and any other event (i.e. the event 
structure with initial event in E-dense) is equivalent the well-
based restriction 5.6.1. According to this restriction starting from 
the initial null state the event e may occur in E but not in E or 
below: 
Only infinite chains of events are obliged to take infinite time. 
Regarding the event structure as modelling a set-up as in [Lam] no 
restriction is made on the relative rates of clocks ascribed to 
process beyond that they all agree that only finite time has passed 
at events corresponding to communications. 
ifl chapter 4 we took JP (E) as the natural Scott domain of 
information to associate with an event structure E. Let us explore 
a little further how the ideas of Scott [Sco] translate to event 
structures. Scott proposed the thesis that all computable functions 
are continuous (see 3.1). 	In more detail, datatypes are represented 
as complete partial orders of information (cpos) and computations from 
one d.atatype to another as functions between the associated cpos; 
Scott's thesis says computable functions are continuous in this 
framework. 	The thesis has an intuitive justification (see 3.1,or 
[Wad] for more detail). We give an argument which characterises 
those elementary event structures which agree (in a formally defined 
way) with Scott's thesis. 
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In examples 2.3.7 and 2.3.9 we showed nets associated with 
computations between datatypes. The datat3rpes were subnets of the 
net of the computation with :less causal structure than the 
computation as a whole. Recall the relation 	on event structures 
introduced in 5.3. For elementary event structures E and E' we have 
E 	E' jff E' 	E and <' 	<rE'. 	We shall regard E' as a data- 
type involved in the computation described by E. Suppose E 
and E 4 E 1 0 Regard E0 as representing an input datatype, E 1 as 
representing an output datatype and E as the computation between them. 
Take '10(E0) and j (E 1 ) as the associated domains of information. 
The event structure E determines a function between 'o(E 0) and 
in this way: 
Definition 5.6.2 
Let E be an elementary event structure. Suppose E 	E0 and 
E ' 
	
E1 . 	Then define 
0' 1 
E : 	(E0) -> 	(E 1 ) by 
fE0'E1 (x)={eEE1 I Eel 	 E0 x. 
To intuitively justify the function f E E suppose an event of E occurs 
once the appropriate "reading" events 1n 	can occur through input 
having been supplied. It is clear that: 
Lemma 5.6.3 
The function f 
EOYE 
 defined above is monotonic. 
1 
However in general the function will not be continuous. We give 
examples below. According to Scott's thesis it should be; further-
more it should be for any choice of E 0 and E 1 with E 	E0 and E 	E1 . 
Intuitively such event structures are those consistent with Scott's 
thesis, they respect continuity. 
Definition 5.6.4 
Let E be an elementary event structure. Say E is continuity-
respecting iff 
E Y,E 	=> f 	is continuous). 
Such event structures have a familiar characterisation. 
Theorem 5.6.5 
Let E be an elementary event structure. Then E is continuity- 
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respecting iff V' e E E Eel ( < Co. 
Proof 
Let (E,) be an elementary event structure. 
"=>It Suppose E is continuity-respecting i.e. 
V E0 ,E 1 (E 	E 	> 	E is continuous). Suppose for 
some e in E we had Eel infinite. 
1 
Take E0 = {e' € E l et < el and < the identity relation on E0 . 
Take B = {e}. Define S to be all finite subsets of E0. Then S 
is a directed set in ,(E0). Moreover no element of S is E0 as 
is infinite. However then f EE (Us) =. {e} while 
0 , 1 
U fE0' E1 S = in ' (E 1 ). 	Thus 1'E E is not continuous,contra- 






especting.. Thus [e] is finite 
for all e in E. 
tt<=t Suppose Eel is finite for all e in E. Assume E 	E0 and 
E 	E1 . Let S be a directed set of -4,(E0). Abbreviate 
E to f. As f is always monotonic we have ,)f 5 	f(US). 
Sup ose e E f(JS). Then Eel ( E c Us. As [e] is finite so is 
Eel r E0 0 	Thus because S is directed {e] (1 	S for some s in S. 
Then e E f(s). This gives f(US) SUfS so f(US) = JfS. There-
fore f is continuous and E is continuity-respecting as required. 
If the notion 	were used instead of . 	in the definition of 
continuity-respecting-the corresponding weaker characterisation would 
be that the event structure E satisfies: 
(i) Ve,e' € E(e' < e => Ej e € E e' < e"< e) 
(2) For e in E if A is a pairwise incomparable subset of Eel 
then A is finite. 
(We use —< to mean the covering relation in E i.e. e -< e' iff 
e < e' £ V e" (e < e ' < e' => e" = e or e" = e IM 
In this context axiom F on domains is a consequence of Scott's 
thesis, Of course we do not expect axiomF to apply to domains in 
general, such as function spaces; our argument depended on the 
domains being of basic input or output values where increased 
information corresponded to later behaviour in time. 
The theorem is a little surprising - continuity-respecting event 
14- 
structures are discrete! How is it that non-discrete event 
structures, (e.g. the reals) have been ruled out? It might be 
thought due to taking 	(E) as the domain of information even when 
the event structure represents a "continuous" computation. The 
following example suggests not and that in order to extend the notion 
of continuity-respecting to "continuous" event structures the relation 
should be restricted in accord with some topological structured 
(The causal order should follow or at least be closely related to the 




We consider two very simple analogue computations based on a meter 
which may indicate any real value in to,']. We assume the indicator 
is initially at zero and that the value indicated can only increase in 
time. It is natural to associate the meter with the event structure 
E = [o,i] ordered by < on reals. 	The event e- in [o,i] stands for 
"the value e is indicated". 
For the first computation suppose we know nothing further about 
the meter; regard it as a datatype. Then two kinds of deflection of 
the indicator are possible; it may deflect to some real value e in 
[o,i] and stay there or it may deflect so as to approach closer and 
closer to some real value e in [0,1] but never reach it. 	The two 
kinds of deflection give information [O,e] and [O,e) respectively. 
Thus in this situation 	([o,i]) is appropriate as the domain of 
information. 
For the second computation the indicator makes a maximum 
deflection to value 1. 	(By the way is [o,i] now more appropriate 
than ' ([o,i]) as the domain of information of E?) For some r in 
(o,i] take B0 = [O,r) ordered by < and B 1 = {i}. 	The f E B is not 
continuous. 	However choosing E of the form ([O,r],) a 	1 E1 = Iii 
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does give fE' E continuous. 	The set 	is closed while 	is not. 
Thus it is hpe that by restricting o according to topological 
structure the functions f EE 
 will be continuous. 
0' 1 
So Scott's ideas imply axioms on event structures. 	Can we 
interpret isolated elements as some form of observable state? Yes, 
by the results of 5.3, but only if we accept that the event structure 
is an abstraction from one of finite width. 	Note that Scott's thesis 
does not seem to tell us, for example, how to interpret an event 
structure consisting of W incomparable events, if it should be 
regarded as an abstraction from a finite width event structure or 
whether'all the events can occur in finite time.. However by theorem 
5.6.5 it does imply that no event can occur if it depends on an 
infinite set of events occurring. In this sense a computation cannot 
recognise or observe in finite time that the infinite set of events 
has occurred; only the isolated elements can be so observed as is 
formalised in the rext lemma. 
Lemma 5.6.7 
Let E be an elementary event structure such that [e] is finite for 
all events e (i.e. E is continuity—respecting). Then for x E 
x EL(E)° iffE 4 E (Ve.' € E'[e']I < oo ) L (se' € E' 
x= le € E' 1 e <' e'}) 
Proof 
To get E' adjoin an event e' above the finite set of events 
X.,  
"<" Given the r.h.s. x is finite so isolated.. 
For a very simple situation, it says isolated elements correspond 
precisely to information which can cause an event to occur, th2kfa can 
be "observed" by a computation. This intuition is held for 
isolated elements of domains of a far more general nature - isolated 
elements are regarded as finite information. Appropriately there 
will be more general results (with more difficult proofs). 
As a final remark it should be possible to cast Scott's thesis 
in the form: Behaviour over infinite time is the "limit" of the 
behaviours over finite times. As such it would be seen to express 
a physical principle. 
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Chapter 6. 	Conditions 
In the previous chapters we have dealt only a little with 
conditions. In net theory they have three main uses: To mark 
conflict; as part of the modelling process where they stand for 
physical or abstract states; to define a case, a notion of state. 
In this chapter we interpret conditions having extents in time. 
In the first section we show how to associate conditions with an 
event structure and study an intuitive relation on conditions. 
It yields a new construction of a net from an event structure. In 
the second section we introduce the idea of an expressiveness 
relation on nets; roughly one net is more expressive than another 
if it supports more interpretations. Expressiveness provides a 
characterisation of the new net-construction from an event structure - 
the third section. Finally we look briefly at the extra structure 
on an event structure which distinguishes certain events as being 
ttrestlesstt (recall such events cannot have concession forever). 
This seems to involve a kind of generalised condition. 
6.1 Conditions of an event structure 
We illustrate some basic ideas by examining conditions of 
a causal net. Consider this simple causal net: 
b i 
b OF 
A condition is associated with its pre and post events. In fact 
if the net is condition-extensional (i.e. b = b' Lb = b' => b = b'), 
as this one is, the association is a 1-1 correspondence. 	The 
pre-event of a condition marks the beginning of the condition 
holding. The post-event marks the end of the condition holding. 
Regard a condition's holding as having an extent in time. Then 
clearly whenever b0 or b 1 holds so too does b2 . Of course for 
causal nets this is easy to formaUe in terms of the pre and post 
events of conditicns. 
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Definition 6.1 .1 
Let N =(B,E,F)be a condition-extensional causal net. Define 
b 1 b' iff b' < °b A., b' < b" 
Recall the idea of essential conditions of a causal net in 4.1. 
A condition was said to be essential iff it occurred (to within 
condition-extensionality) in every net inducing the elementary 
event structure. 	In 4.1.17 these were characterised as those 
conditions b such that b' covered b in the associated event 
structure i.e. b is 	-minimal. 
Lemma 6.1.2 
Let E be an elementary event structure of finite depth (or 
well-based). Let b be a condition of a net inducing E. Then b 
is 7 -minimal iff every causal net N inducing E has a condition b' 
s.t.. b' = Th £ bt' = b. Also for any causal net N such that 
(N) = E the subnet determined by its 1 -minimal conditions inducesE. 
Thus the ~) -relation enables us to construct the minimum condition-
extensional causal net inducing an elementary event structure of 
finite depth. We look for occurrence-net analogues of these ideas. 
In 4.2 we showed how to produce a net 4"4(E) from an event 
structure E. The net was the maximum condition-extensional net 
preserving the underlying event structure E. We pick out part of 
its construction as a definition. 
Definition 6.1.3 
Let E = (E,<,) be an event structure. 	Define 
= [A IS E f 'Va l , a € A a 1 >O v I a }. Then define the 
conditions of E by 
B (E) = {(e,A)j e C E LA E J (E) A e < Al 
{(o,A) /A c <(E)} 
(We use e < A to abbreviate Va € A e < a. 	It is convenient to 
regard the symbol 0 as a fictitious starting event below all other 
events and by convention we shall regard it as a member of every 
left-closed subset of E.) 
Recall from chapter 4 that the conditions of a condition- 
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extensional net inducing E can be regarded as a subset of 8(E). 
We shall sometimes draw a condition (e,A) as a "cone", like: 
e 
A condition holding is associated with the condition beginning 
and not having ended. It is easy to formalise the idea.. (Recall 
the conventions concerning the fictitious starting event 0.) 
Definition 6.1.4 
Let E be an event structure. Suppose b E 8(E) of the form 
b = (e,A) and C € '4(E). 	Then define 
beg(b,C) iff e € C 
end(b,0) 1ff A i\ C 0 
on(b,C) iffe ECArc=Ø 
For b a condition and C a member of (E) the predicate beg(b,C) 
means b has begun to hold for C, end(b,C) that has begun and ended 
holding while on(b,C) means that b holds at C, it has both begun 
and not yet ended.. 
From these basic predicates we can construct relations between 
conditions. For example here are some familiar ones: 
Lemma 6.1.5 
Let E be an event structure. Suppose b = (e,A) and 
bt = (e',A') are conditions of E and so conditions of 
Then 
bcob' iff 2C E 	(E) on (b,C) ' on(b',C) 
1ff 	(e e') 9. (A u AOfl ([e] V [e s ]) 
b tz b' if  VC € ,( E) beg(b,C) => .1 beg(b' ,c) 
iff e 	e' 
bF*bt 	1ff VC € 1(E) beg(b',C) => end(b,C) 
1ff 	a € A a < e'. 
Proof 
Trivial consequence of the definitions. • 
There is a natural partial order on conditions, called 
which has this intuitive interpretation: For conditions b and b' 
of anent structure, b -s b' iff whenever b holds b' holds too. 
Definition 6.1.6 
Let E be an event structure. Define the relation -s on cond-
itions of E by: For b and b' conditions of E, 
b-sb' 1ff 	€ '.(E) (on(b,C) => on(b',C)). 
In the next lemma we characterise - and as a corollary show it is 
a partial order. We also show that for event structures of finite 
depth the relation - could have been defined equivalently by 
restricting ytification to the observable states.. This means 
b -s b' iff whenever b is observed to hold b' is observed to hold. 
(One could formalise this further by extending our definition of 
observer to conditions of the event structure - a condition would be 
observed after the occurrence of its pre-event and before the 
occurrence of any of its post-events.) 
Lemma 6.1.7 
Let E be an event structure. 	Let b = (e,A) and. b' = (e',A') be 
conditions of E. Then 
(i) b —s b' iff e' < egVa' € A' (a')' e or 3 a * E A a < at). 
(2) If E is of finite depth then 
b -b' iff 	'C € O4(E) on(b,.C) => on(b',C).. 
Proof 
Suppose b = (e,A) and b' = (et,At) are conditions of the event 
structure E. 
(i) "=> 't Assume b -sb'. 	Take C in '.(E) to be [e]. 	Then 
on(b,[e]) so on(b',[e]). 	Thus e' < e. 	Take a' in A'. Assume 
1 (a's e). 	Then C 7[a']¼J[e] € 	(E). As i on(b',C) we also 
have i on(b,C). 	This means either e A [a']L/[e], clearly 
impossible, or A(\ ([a']tj[e]) 	. 	Thus 3a € A a <a'. 
(i) "<=' Assume the r.h.s. of (i) above. 	Suppose on(b,C) for 
some C in 'j41 (E). 	Then e € C and A C = 0. Thus e' € C. 	If 
a' € C for some a' in A' then by the .r.h.s. either a" 	e 
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contradibting the consistency of C or A ., \ C 93 a contradiction. 
Thus A' f C = 93. 	Therefore on(b',C). 
(2) Suppose E is of finite depth. 	Now (2) is clear as all the 
elements of j,(E) used in the above proof are then observable. 
Corollary 6.1.8 
The relation 	is a partial order. 
Proof 
Reflexivity and transitivity were already clear. To show 
antisymmetry suppose we have (e, A) —s (et,At)_._. I (e,A) for conditions 
(e,A) and (e',A') of an event structure. 	By the above e = e' 
immediately. Take a' €A'. 	As 1(a' e') for some a in A we have 
a < a'. Similarly for some a" in At we get a tt < a. Therefore 
all < a < a' with a')XL1l a". 	Thus 'a = a'. 	This shows A' 	A and 
the converse A 	A' follows the sane way giving A = A'. Therefore 
(e,A) = (e',A') as required. 
Concurrency propagates upwards under -. Formally:,  
Lemma 6.1.9 
Let B be an event structure. Let co be the concurrency 
relation on JV(E). Then for b,b' ,b" in 	(B) we have 
b co b - b" => b co 
Proof 
Clear as the concurrency relation may be equivalently expressed 
by b co b' 1ff 3 c g 1.(E) 	(b C 	 '.' \ , / , '-1 • — 
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Here. • .b n ... .. -i b  2 — 1 	0 b - b . (Thus 
the relation - may "propagate high 
UP" the net.) 
The last example shows how "non—local" is the relation - 
We now define a "local'! subrelation of .__ called 	- soon we shall 
justify extending-the notation of 6.1 .1. 	We use to construct a. 
net ii,(E) from an event structure E; the net '(E) will express 
conflict in an economical way. In fact we shall show its 
conditions are essential in some generalised sense over an important 
subclass of occurrence nets, those which are maximally expressive. 
Clearly from example 6.1.10ff bkbt then it is possible for b' to 
end holding without b ever having held. B restricting - to 	this 
is forbidden: if b 4, b' and b' ends holding then b must have held 
for a subinterval of the time that b' held. ' - 
Definition 6.1.11 
Let E be an event structure. For subsets A,AL of E define 
AA' iff 'Val €A' 3a EAa<a'. 
Then for conditions b = (e,A) and b = (e',A') of E define 
b 4,  b' iff e' < e £ A 	A' 
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(Recall the convention for a.) 	The definition of b 1 b' has two 
parts; the first says if b has started holding then so has b'; the 
second that if b' has ended holding then so has b (started and) 
ended holding. The relation I is a partial ordering. 	(In fact 
when restricted to t2.(E).) 
Lemma 6.1.12 
Let E be an event structure. The relation I is a subpartial 
order of 	. 	 Suppose b = (e,A) and b' = (e',A') are conditions of 
B. Then 
A 	At iff V  € 	(E) end(b',C) => end(b,C) 
b I b' iff b - b' £ € '/,,(E)(end(b',C) => end(b,C)) 
b - b' . • b = °b' => b ~I b' 
Finally for F. an elementary event structure <1 = - and iI coincides 
with the relation in 6.1.1 for 
Proof 
By the characterisation of —s we have 	is a subpartial order of 
—.Properties 1., 2. and 3. follow in an obvious way from the 
definitions. The conditions of an elementary event structure are 
always of the form (e,A) where A is null or a singleton. This gives 
the final remark. E 





The following example shows El is not well-founded in general, even 




The event structure consists of an infinite set {e. ( i € C01 of 
pairwise conflicting events. 	Clearly b = (o,e.) i < m}), for 
m. €c), is a condition as is b,,,, = (O{e ± I i Ek) }). 	Obviously 
... 4b1 ... 4 b 1 J b0 . 
So we see the ordering <1 is not well-founded in general. 
Assume E is an event structure which is well-based (5.6.1), implied, 
of course, if E is of finite depth. Then there are sufficient 1 - 
minimal conditions to determine the event structure. In fact then 
4, will be atomic in the following sense: 
b a b' 	b b ' in 1 -minimal. 
The relation b._4 b' on two conditions b,b' of E may be pictured as: 
) 
In subsequent work we shall use a particular form of 1 -minimal 
condition below b'. 	Suppose b' is (e,A'). 	Then there is a 
-a-minimal cond±±ion b = (e,A) with b i b'. Pictorially it looks 
like 
The condition b begins to hold when b' does but may end before. 
We show the existence of such a condition b as a corollary to the 
following. 
Lemma 6.1.15 
Let E be an event structure so < is well-founded. Suppose 





Let E be an event structure so < is well-founded. Suppose 
(e,A) E (B). We show 	0-descending chains in A' € 	1 e<A' 	A 
have a lower bound in the set. The result then follows by Zorps 
lemma. 
Let JA 	Y € fl I be such a chain indexed by a total order fl. 
Define A* to be the <-minimal elements of U A, . By the well-
foundedness of < we have A* 	U A . 
In fact A* E )(E): For suppose e, e' € A*. 	Then e' € A and 
e £ A where w.l.o.g. A 1 	A 1 . But then e € Ay by he 
definiions of A* and 	Thus2as A., £ )< ( E) we have e / 	e' 
so A* £ }<(E). 	
1 
Obviously e < A*. Thus we have the desired lower bound.W 
Corollary 6.1.16 
Let B be an event structure so < is well-founded. Suppose 
b = (e,A) is a condition of E.. Then there is a 	-minimal element 
b* of the form b* = (e,A*) with b 	b. 
Proof 
Suppose b = (e,A) is in B (E). Take A to be a' -minimal 
element of IA' € K(E) I e < A' E. Al. 	Define b* = (e,A*). 	If 
= (el a') 	(e,A*) we have e <e' and A? 	A* with e' < Al. 
Thus A? = A*. Supposing e < e' then implies e < Ia' I 	contra- 
dicting the definition of A*.. Thus b* is 	-minimal as required. 
In example 6.1 • 14 b corresponds to any b and b* to b,.. The 
condition bw was formed from aken of 	1 above the "event" 0. 
This is true in general. 
Lemma 6.1.17 
Let B be an event structure. Suppose e € B '-' {o} and A € k(E). 
Then any 0-miaimal element of IA' 	E K(E) f e < A' = 	 Al in K(E) 
is a ken of 	'u 1 	in 	{e' 	€ B 	e < 	e'}. 
Proof 
Suppose A* in k(B) is a 0-minimal element described above. 
Certainly \/e,e' c A* 	e'. 	Suppose A* were not a ken. 
Then A* may be strictly extended to a ken B. But then B 	A, a 
contradiction. 
Corollary 6.1.18 
Let E be an event structure. Suppose b is a I -minimal 
condition of E. Then for some event e we have b = (e,A) where A 
is a ken of A  1 in {e' € E e < e'). 
Note it is not true that any ken A of ' _1 1  in {e' e < ell for 
some event e always arises from such J -minimal condition. This is 
shown by the next simple example: 
Example 6.1.19 
E: 	:O e2 
The ken of )%<...i 1 , 1e 1 ,eI can never appear as a 	-minimal condition. 
Such a condition must be of the form (0,{e 1 ,e2 }). However clearly 
(O,e0 ,e2 1) 4 (O,{e 1 ,e 2 }). 
We can now show that the net formed from an event structure by 
taking the j -minimal conditions induces the original event structure 
provided it is well-based. First we formally define the net 
construction. Note '(E) does not have the isolated condition 
(o,) possessed by X(E) unless E is null. 
Definition 6.1.20 
Let E be an event structure. Define '6(E) b be the < -minimal 
conditions of 
Define i't(E) to be the occurrence net with events E,. conditions 
and causal dependency relation F given by 
eFb iff e = (b) 0 
and bFe iff e € (b) 1 
for e in E and b in 
Theorem 6.1.21 
Suppose E is an event structure which is well-based. The 
net -(E) is a condition extensional occurrence net satisfying N3 
and 	(- ,( E)) = E. 
Proof 
Let E be a well-based event structire. 	It is obvious that 
I 
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yields a condition extensional occurrnce net. We show 
(ii,(E)) = B and -yt.(E) satisfies N3. 
Obviously eF*eI in-il,(E) implies e < e'. 	The converse follows 
by induction on the length of chain using corollary 6.1.16. If for 
some b in T(E),b E F*{e} i1 F* 1 1et} in (E) then e, 	e'. 
Conversely supposing e, e', take e" <-maximal in £. € B (< e,e'l. 
Using corollary 6.1.16 there is a condition b* = (e,A) j (e",{e',e"}). 
Then by the choice of e' t as e .tet  we have e,e' in A so b* € e (\ e' 
in-sl..(E). 	Thus 	on(E) = B. 
For an event e there is a condition (e,). Then using corollary 
6.1.16 there is b in(E) with b = (e,A) i (e,Ø). 	Thus e 	0 in 
'.(E). 	To show •e 0 let e' be <-maximal in 	B .j o}( e < e}. 
Then (e',{e}) is a condition. 	Using 6.1.16 we produce b in • e. 
Therefore,t.(E) satisfies N3.I 
The construction of-fl(E) is natural, at least mathematically. 
We shall characterise it later in section 6.3. For the time being 
we point out why a few obvious conjectures fail. 
As earlier when we looked at causal nets we may define a 
condition to be essential iff it belongs to every net inducing the 
event structure. Because there are so many different ways to 
express the same conflict by conditions rarely are sufficient 
conditons essential to recover The underlying event structure from 
them. For instance any pairwise conflict between three events can 
be expressed at least two ways by conditions as is shown in the next 
example. 
Example 6.1.22 
e0 	e1 	e2 
B 
(e,O) 	(e,0) 	(e2,$) 
{e0 ,e 1 ,e 2 }) 
%(E) 
As the same event structure is induced by 
e0 
the condition (0,1e 1 ,e2 ,e2 1) is not essential. 
In section 6.3 however we shall show that 	-minimal conditions 
are essential for a suitable subclass of nets namely those which are 
11mima11y expressive". 
Note that 4 -minimal conditions do not always express immediate 
conflict (denoted between events. Here is an example showing 
this. 
Exanrple 6.1.23 
The induced event structure 
of this occurrence net is 
e2 clear. The conditions b* 
and b are identified 8S 
(o,e0 ,e 1 ,e3 j) and 
(0,{e0 ,e2 }). The condition 
b* is 	-minimal (and b*J  'a) 
yet,. while e0 	e2 , we do 
not have e0 'e 1 or e 1 e2 . 
(Note the above net is 
symmetrically confused - 
consider e0 ,e2 ,e4.) 
This example serves as a basis for the next example in which 
above has been replaced by an infinite conflict-free set of events. 





The event e 1 of 6.1.23 has been 
replaced by {e 1 (n EC)}. Corres-
pondingly there are an infinite 
number of copies of b* written 
b*(n €c,). Here Yn b1 b. 
Thus in general there are far more (possibly infinitely more) 
-minimal conditions than are needed to express the underlying event 
structure. This example also shows that the net-r(10 may be such 
that Oe is infinite for an event e even though there exists a net N, 
such that S (N) = E, with a finite number of preconditions for each 
event. 
Definition 6.1.25 
Say a Petri net N = (B,E,P) has finite-preconditions iff for all 
events e we have e finite. 
Say an event structure E satisfies the finite-preconditions property 
iff there is an occurrence net N having finite-preconditions such that 
= EL 
The following gives a characterisation of the finite-preconditions 
property for event structures. 	It refers to the immediate conflict 
relation 	5.5. 
Lemma 6.1.26 
Let E be a countable event structure of finite depth. Then E 
satisfies the finite pre-conditions property iff (i) V e € E \[e]  <oo 
and (ii) 	A1 ,... ,A E k'(E) 	L.' I {e} = LA.. 
Proof 
Let E be a countable event structure of finite depth. 
Assume E satisfies the finite preconditions property. Assume 
[e] is infinite for some event e. Without loss of generality suppose 
e is of minimal depth so that [e] is infinite. Then e covers an 
infinite number of events in the ordering <. Thus any net inducing 
E must have e infinite, a contradiction. Therefore [e] is finite 
for all events e. To show (ii) consider any event e. 	In some net 
e 	e0 	e 	e 	e 	... 	e 	e' n n 
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inducing Ewe have e = {b 1 ,...,h}. 	If e )e' we have b.Fe and 
b1Pet for some i. 	Thus taking A. = b. gives property (ii). 
Conversely assume properties (i) and (ii) above hold. We give 
a very crude construction of a net having finite preconditions and 
inducing E. We determine it by determining its conditions. First 
we include all conditions of the form (e,{e'}) where e' covers e for 
the <-ordering - this ensures the net induces the partial order <. 
So that it induces the conflict relation 	while maintaining finite 
preconditions first enumerate E as e ,e ,...,e ,... . 	By (ii) we have 
for any m that there are Am,...,Am  with 	i' le } = •U A''. 1 	1 	
/A. 	m 	11 	1 
Clearly we may assume em € A1m. 	
m 
Inductively add these conditions: Initially add the finite set 
{(o,4),....,(o,A° 
)} 
as preconditions of e0 ; subsequently add the
RO  finite set {(O,A{e ,...e 	1)1 0 < i < n } as preconditions of e i'. 0 	m-1 m 	 m 
By the construction, for a particular event, no extra preconditions 
are added after a finite stage in the induction. Thus the net deter-
mined has finite preconditions. 
The above proof is a bit unsatisfying. The net constructed 
depends on the countable enumeration of E. It is hard to see a more 
canonical definition or construction (on the lines of the definition 
of -E)) for the general class of countable event structures with the 
finite preconditions property. 	The following example illustrates 
the difficulty. 
Example 6.1.27 
The net below has finite preconditions. 
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The net consists of an infinite set of pairs of conflicting events 
e.,e with {e} u {e. i EC01 and {ej '-' {e! ( i €c} pairwise 
conflicting. 	Note that the sets 	 are kens of'ui and 
there are associated conditions. If included,e would have an 
infinite set of preconditions and the associated net would not have 
finite preconditions. 	Yet, it is hard to see any significant 
difference in kind between conditions of the form (O,{e,e.,e!}) and 
those of the form (O,{e.,e!}). 	Certainly the net construction n 
would include conditions of the former sort too. 
When event structures with the finite preconditions property 
satisfy restrictions there may be a canonical net which has finite 
preconditions. Confusion—freeness is one such restriction (the next 
lemma) while finite width does not appear to be - the net of 
example 6.1.27 above is of finite width. 
Lemma 6.1.28 
Let B be a confusion—free event structure such that [e] is 
finite for all events e. Then B satisfies the finite—preconditions 
property. 	In facti*(E) has finite—preconditions. 
Proof 
Let B be a confusion—free event structure s.t. [e] is finite for 
all events e. We show-n.(E) has finite—preconditions. By the 
definition of confusion—free, the 1 —minimal pre—condition of an 
event e will be of the form (e' 	{e}) where e covers e' in the 
event structure with the fictitious starting event 0 adjoined. 
There are only finitely such conditions. 
Of course one would prefer a similar result based on a less powerful 
restriction than confusion—freeness • This would further justify 
the net construction-n.. 
In section 4.2 we showed there were peculiarities in 
generalising Petri's notion of sequential process of a causal net to 
occurrence nets. The obvious definition, taking a sequential process 
of an occurrence net to be a ken of the complement 'of the concurrency 
relation, gave odd—looking subnets which did not meet every case. 
This was so even for finite occurrence nets 	Fortunately if B is an 
event structure of finite depth, kens of the complement of co have a 
simple form in the nets .JV(E) and )i,(). Then injV(E) and n(E) a 
"sequential process" looks like a tree and a revised-]<-density result 
can be proved once cases are restricted to being observable. 
Definition 6.1.29 
Let N =(B,E, be an occurrence net. 	Say N is tree-like iff 
(B,F* t' B) is a tree. 
Note the tree may be infinite. A tree-like net has the form: 
Thus tree-like nets are a generalisation of sequential processes of 
causal nets of finite depth (see 5.4.6). 	Clearly no two distinct 
elements of a tree-like net can be in the concurrency relation which 
is the complement of (F*._, 	). 	Thus: 
Lemma 6.1.30 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a tree-like occurrence net. Then for all 
x,x' in B 	B we have x(F*..i FU 	).' that is X Co X' => X = X'. 
Now we characterise "sequential processes", regarded as the kens 
of the complement of co, in the nets X(E) anctil.(E) for B of finite 
depth. They are tree-like and satisfy further conditions (a), (b) 
and (c) to ensure their maximality. 
Proposition 6.1 .31 
Let B be an event structure of finite depth. 
1. Let S be a subnet of N( E)., Then S is a ken of (FF*J  4) 
iff S is tree-like and 
For some condition b in S we have ('o) = 0. 
For all conditions b in S we have • b S S & b . S £. b is a 
ken ofvI in {e € B \ (b) 0 < el. 
For all events e in S we have er' S / 6. 
2. Let S be a subnet of -(E). 	Then S is a ken of (F* Li 
iff S is tree-like and 
(a) For some condition b in S we have (b) 0 = 0. 
l'12 
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For all conditions bin S we have 'b 	S. b' S S. 
For all events e in S we have e' 0 => e ( S 0. 
Proof 
Let E be an event strudture of finite depth. Recall 
F* U 	is the complement of co in JV(E). 
Assume S is a subnet of 	which is tree-like and 
satisfies (a), (b) and (c). 	As Sis tree-like we clearly have 
x(F* t.) F*_ 1 u 	)x' for all x,x' in S. 	For S to be a ken we 
further require x(F* j F*'u zfj )s to imply x E S. Assume x is an 
event e and e(F* Li p*44 )s. Let b0 be the condition of S with 
(b0) 0 0. As i (e cob0) we must have e0 < e for some e 0 in b. 
Take b to be the P*_maximal condition in S so that e' < e for some 
e' in b e  - such a b exists aS. e has finite depth. 	It follows that 
e = e' and so e e S: Suppose otherwise, that e' < e; then e t 
so there is a condition b' in S with ° b' = e'; as -i(e co b') we get 
e > e" where et' E b' contradicting the maximality of b. 	If x 
happened to be a condition b then the above argument shows e = b E S. 
The condition in S with pre-event e is concurrent to b and so is 
identical with b, giving b € S. 
tt>tt Assume S is a ken of (F u F* U*). It is inductively 
shown that S has a subnet 5t  which is tree-like and satisfies (a), 
(b) and (c). By the above S' is a ken so S = S'. As S is a ken 
for any b in S we have • b,. b ° . S. We define the subnet 5' by 
inductively picking its conditions. 	Initially, let A,. be. the 
<-minimal events of SrE. Then as S is a ken of (F*, F*L) 
we have A0 € K(E) so we may define b0 to be the condition (0,A0).. 
Then b0 E S and A0 is a ken of Wu I.- We initially pick b 0 as a 
condition of S'. For each event e in A 0 
 (=b* ) define Ae  to be the 
set of .<.-minimal events in S t\ {e' € El e < e'}; then (e,A) is a 
condition in S which we include in 5'. Continuing we define a 
tree-like subnet S' satisfying (a), (b) and (c). 
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2. "<=" This follows from 1 • 	as for a condition b of ft(E) we 
have b is a ken of,tJ1 in {e 1(b) 0 < el. 
IL...>tt Following the induction in 'el. =>" each condition chosen will 
now be 4, -minimal. 
For the special nets .Af(E) and-(E) of a finite depth event 
structure E we show a restricted form of j(-density holds. 
Proposition 6.1.32 (Restricted K-density) 
Let E be an event structure of finite depth. Then for the 
nets ..i(/(E) and 11.(E) every ken of the complement of co meets every 
observable case. 
Proof 
Let E be an event structure of finite depth. The same proof 
works for N =-71(E) or N = JV(E). Let S be a ken of (p* , F*, * ) 
in N.. Suppose C € O(E) 	3y finite depth we take e to be the 
<-maximal event of S in C if such exists; otherwise take e = 0. 
Let b be the unique condition in S s.t. (b) 0 = e. If end(b,C) then 
(b) 1 ti C 	Si1. 	However (b) 1 	S so supposing end.(b,C) contradicts 
the maximality of e. Thus b € Fr(C) (' S as required.. 
Note the above proof would work taking S to be a ken of (F*-Q
the proof depends only on S being an 	-maximal tree-like subnet - 
the simplest example of such a net would be a chain b 0Pe0P....bFe... 
of maximal length where (b0 ) 0 = 0. Presumably the last two 
propositions also hold when finite-depth is replaced by well-based 
and the definition of observable state weakened appropriately. 
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6.2 Expressiveness 
In this section we present a formal way of interpreting 
an occurrence net. 	Each condition is interpreted as asserting a 
conjunction of propositions. This induces an expressiveness 
relation between nety associated with the same event structure. 
Roughly one net is more expressive than another if it supports more 
interpretations. In the next section we shall use the ideas to 
characterise the construction fl(E) from an event structure E. 
In the main our formal development is rather brutal. Many 
of the ideas should work to produce expressiveness relations between 
the more general class of transition nets with initial marking. This 
may open a Pandora's box of possibilities. 	In the final part of 
this section we shall sketch some of them. 
Throughout we shall assume a fixed (sufficiently large) set of 
propositionsP. We shall also assume all nets are condition—
extensional and satisfy axiom N3 (i.e. all events have at least one 
pre-condition and post-condition).. 
Definition 6.2.1 
Let N be anet (B,E,F). An interpretation of N is a map 
I: B-> 	(p). We denote the set of interpretations by 
With respect to an interpretation I a condition b asserts all 
propositions 1(b) are true. 
In general one works with interpretations satisfying-restrictions 
(there will be examples later).. Restrictions determine an inter- 
pretation class.. 
Definition 6.2.2 
An interpretation class is a map ' from nets such that for all 
nets 
- '(N) S I (N). 
We denote the interpretation class of all interpretations by 
An interpretation extends to markings in the obvious way. 
Definition 6.2.3 
Let N be a net (B,E,P) and I an interpretation of N. For 
1'7 
M 	Bdefine 
1(M) = U (b) 
We summarise the idea of expressiveness (with respect to an 
interpretation ciass)in the following proposition. Here it is 
defined only between occurrence nets inducing the same event 
structure. We shall outline extensions of the idea later. 
Proposition 6.2.4 
Let 'E be an event structure of finite depth. Let I ' be an 
interpretation class. We define an expressiveness relation 
between nets {N IN is an occurrence net and (N) = El by 
N, N 1ff VIE 	'(N) 31' E f'(N') Vc € O(E) 
I a Fr1(C) = I'OFTN,(C). 
Then 	is a preorder. Thus the relation 	defined by 
N 	, N' 1ff N 	, N' 2- N' 	, N 
is an equivalence relation. 
The definition of expressiveness depends on what we take to be 
"essential structure" of an interpreted net. In the above definition 
of expressiveness we have taken it to be the interpreted, observable 
statesdefined using the map Fr. 
Definition 6.2,5 
Let N be an occurrence net of finite depth. Let I be an 
interpretation of N. Then define C(N) to be the set 
C €(N)} 
with relation -.> given by 
(c,i o FrN(C)) _>• (c;I 	FrN(c')) iff C 	C l & d(C,C') = 1 
The structures 	(N) are useful in establishing the relation 
between nets (see the examples below). More importantly they draw 
attention to a "parameter" in the definition of expressiveness pointed 
out in the following obvious lemma. 
Lemma 6.2.6 
Suppose the event structure E, 	', and nets N and N' are as 
in the definition of expressiveness (6.2.4). 	Then 
III 
N 	Nt iff VIE J'(N) 1I' E 	t(NI) O(N) = 
The lemma can be regarded as saying NN' iff for any inter-
pretation of N there is an interpretation of N' such that the 
interpreted nets are equivalent or.have essentially the same 
structure. Here that structure is taken as 	N) for an occur- 
rence net N with interpretation I. One would get different 
expressiveness relations by replacing the C(N) 's by different 
forinalisations of essential structure. 
We now look at some examples illustrating the expressiveness 
relation. 	where j is the interpretation class of all inter- 
pretations. Clearly for this interpretation class in establishing 
N1 	N we may assume the conditions of N1 are interpreted as 
singletons. 	(This will also be the case for. the other inter- 











In this example we have N 1 	I'T2 where 	is the interpretation 
class of all interpretations. To establish N 1 	N it is 
sufficient to consider only those interpretations I. such that 1 1 (b) 
is always a singleton. Above we have marked such an interpretation 
I and an appropriate 12  showing N 1 	N2. To show the converse 
that N2 -N1 ,again a singleton interpretation 12  of N2 suffices. 
Suppose it is given as: 
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Importantly not all nets of an event structure are equally 






1p qO rU 
s,r 	tAq 	uAp 
N1 	 N2 
Certainly N1 	N2: For the typical singleton interpretat.on of N 1 
shown above the interpretation 12  of N2 suffices; both O''1(N1) and 
()" '2(N2 ) take the form: 
s , ri 
{pqr} 





has the form 
{ q } 	{rI 	{sI 
{p} 
Suppose there was an interpretation I of N 1 such that O1(N1) 
had this form. Then without loss of generality 1 1 (b01 ) maybe 
supposed to contain p. But then p would hold, after the occurrence 
of e2 , a contradiction. 	Thus IT2 
Consider the equivalently expressive nets of example 6.2.7.. 
Their equivalence can be made more intuitive by assuming that event 
occurrences do not occupy extents in time but that they are instant-
aneous changes in the holdings of conditions. Consider a typical 
event occurrence. For-simplicity assume e has only one precondition 
and only one poatcondition b 1 so it looks like 
bo 
Regard the event e as marking the end of the holding of b0 and 
simultaneously the beginning of the holding of b 1 without any gap in 
tjone .in between. 	Thus the extents in time (represented by 	of 
the holdings of b0 and b 1 might be represented by the following 
intervals 
b0 holds 	b 1 holds 
time --so- e occurs 
(This suggests a formal definition of an observer for interpretations 
according to which an observer allocates abutting semiclosed intervals 
of 9 to holdings of propositions of F2-related conditions. 
However we do not follow-up this.) 
We now focus on some particular interpretation classes. 
We might assume that no single proposition can be concurrently 
true throigh the concurrent holding of two distinct conditions. This 
means that holdings of the same proposition must be causally related. 
This would occur for example in modelling a Milner net by an inter-
preted occurrence net so that each proposition referred to strictly 
one agent. This restriction attempts to capture an idea that 
propositions refer to local states of affairs. Formally: 
Definition 6.2.9 
Let 	be the interpretation class on occurrence nets given by: 
For N an occurrence net (B,E,F) 
I E 	1(N) iff 'V' b,b' E B b co b's- I(b)r, I(b') 	0 => b = b' 
In other words for such local interpretations two assertions of the 
same proposition must be causally related. 
We have mentioned that intuitively event occurrences may be 
taken to be instantaneous changes in holdings of conditions. 
Accordingly propositions interpreting the pre and post conditions of 
an event will hold before during or after the event's occurrence. 
We may wish to identify an event with the change in proposition 
holdings its occurrence sometimes or always incurs. To guarantee 
such event extensionality" we can restrict interpretations. The 
stronger restriction is: 
Vc.c' E Qo 	(N) c' = C .' {e} —\ T. 1-..  -, 	 r 
(An event e must always incur a change in proposition holdi ngs.) 
The weaker restriction is: 
C, C' EUO 	(N) C' = C 	{e I £ I'FrN(C) 	1°  FrN(C'). 
(An event e sometimes incurs a change in proposition holdings.) 
Consider the following examples. Example 6.2.10 fails both 
restrictions while example 6.2.12 fails only the stronger. 
Example 6.2.11 satisfies both.. 
Example 6.2.10 
For this net with the interpretation shown the 
instantaneous occurrence of e involves no change 




q 	 q 	 For this net and interpretation (not 
in the interpretations class 	) the 
e0 	 e 1 	 occurrence of e 1 is sometimes associated 
- with a change in the holding of 
p 	 propositions and sometimes not. 
For the interpretation class 	both restrictions are 
equivalent to the extra restriction in the following definition. 
Definition 6.2.1 
Let 	le be the interpretation class consisting of inter- 
pretations I in 1 1 which. in addition satisfy.: For all events e 
I(e) 	I(e). 
(Then say I is event extensional.) 
It is natural to ask how the expressiveness relation changes for 
different interpretation classes.. In the next section we consider 
and 	for occurrence nets: associated with the same 
event structure. 
Of course one may restrict the interpretation class further 
basically transferring more of the computational structure to the 
interpretation.. For example one might like an interpretation class 
consisting of interpretations, r, for which the structure consisting 
of interpreted markings of the form I o FrN(C) with induced reachability 
relation determined the event structure. 
We now examine some issues involved in extending the idea of 
expressiveness to more general classes of nets such as all occurrence 
nets or initially-marked transition nets. Such a re]ion will 
depend on what we choose as the essential structure of an inter-
preted net. Let us suppose a net N (perhaps with initial marking) 
with interpretation I in interpretation class 	' has essential 
structure M'(N). Then the expressiveness relation over an inter- 
pretation class 	will have a definition of the following form: 
N 1 	N2 iff VI € 	'( N1) 	I2 E 	'(N2 ) j44,1(N) 	
J '2 (N) 
The problem is thus to find, intuitively acceptable vV and 
iz 
Consider first defining an expressiveness relation between 
occurrence nets not necessarily associated with the same event 
structure. 	Certainly taking the tt(I (N) above as 	'1(N) makes 
nets with different event structures incomparable under an 
expressiveness relation. The following example suggests more 
general choices of 
jilt 
Example 6.2.14 
r 	59 	 r,s 
rAq 
p 	q 






r A s 
pA 	 S 
as 
In this example the nets 	and N with the interpretations shown 
are "interleaved simulations" of the net N 1 with interpretation 
shown. We have indexed the interleaved events of N and N 2 by 
the events of N 1 they correspond to. The net N2 has an additional 
event 1 2 denoting the simultaneous occurrence of events 1 and 2. 
If we draw the observable states together with the one-step-forward 
reachability relation we get for N 1 ,N2 and N3 respectively: 
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fr 
1 rjj 	, 	f q c 1 
4 p s} 
where we have marked-in I 0 Fr(C) for the observable states C. 
If we identify states when the same propositions hold there we get 
{r,s} 
[r,q] <> fp'sl 
{p,q• } 
for both N 1 and N2 . This reflects the fact that the possible extents 
of time of the holdings of propositions for the interpreted nets N 1 and 
N2 are the same. For N. however, we get 
{r,s} 
ip,qc 
Taking such diagrams as the essential structure thus gives N 	N 
In fact also N2 N 1 and N 1 N3 . The diagrams are based on one-
step-forward reachability. If instead we based essential structure 
on forwards reachability (its transitive reflexive closure) we would 
then have N 1 	N3 as well as N1 	N2 . 
The above example suggests that given an occurrence net N and 
interpretation I we take as its essential structure the set 
{Io FrN(C) C an observable state 
together with some reachability relation 	induced by the 
reachability relation on observable states. Such a definition 
requires care. For definiteness take -> the 1-step forward 
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reachability relation on observable states. An obvious definition 
of 	is 
I a Fr1(C) _>I I 
a Fr(C') iff C -.> C'. 
In general this will lead to loops in -> or even 	which are not 
intuitively reasonable as the following example shows. 
Example 6.2.15 
For the interpreted net q 	p 
V 
we get, according the above definitions, 
\I 







In both cases the initial condition interpreted by p can end so q 
holds while the terminal conditions interpreted by p cannot. Thus 
states have been identified which have different future behaviours. 
One could avoid such problems by-restricting interpretations, 
for instance so loops were banned, while keeping the above definition 
of _>i.  This would not generalise to transition nets. Alter-
natively one could seek a more refined definition of equivalence of 
interpreted nets including transition nets. 	it is suggested that a 
definition of observational equivalence of interpreted nets along the 
lines of that used by Hennessy and Nilner in [Hen] for defining 
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equivalence of synchronisation tree is appropriate. Roughly 
this would say two interpreted nets are equivalent (have essentially 
the same structure) iff whatever "interpreted state" can be reached in 
one can be reached in the other with the same subsequent behaviour 
under the interpretations. Perhaps category theory is the approp-
riate framework; take objects to be (interpreted) states and 
morphisms to be events. 
6.3 The constructions jV andgive maximally expressive nets 
Here we shall look at the constructions of occurrence nets 
/4E) and(E) for an event structure E from the point of view of 
expressiveness. Our main result is to characterise the construction 
ji,(E). 	For the three interpretation classes 	 tje of the 
last section the net a.(E) will be maximally expressive in the set of 
nets associated with EL In addition the net .(E) will be included 
in all such maximally expressive nets. We work with the expressive-
ness relation defined in proposition 6.2.4 and chiefly with the 
interpretation class 
Throughout this section we assume nets are of finite depth 
condition—extensional and satisfy axiom T13 i.e. for all events e we 
have 'e and. e non—null. Note the results go through for a weaker 
notion of event structure and observable state; we shall only use 
the 'fact that observable states do not include infinite chains of 
events. 
Notation 6.3. 1 
We write 	, 	
and 	ie for the expressiveness relations 
associated with the interpretation classes' 	
and le 
respectively. 
Amongst the set of occurrence nets inducing the same event 
structure it is obvious the maximal net /\f(E) consisting of all 
possible conditions of an event structure E is maximal with respect 
to the expressiveness relations 	,. 	
or 
Theorem 6.3.2 
Suppose E = (E,<,) is an event structure of finite depth. 
Let J1/"( E) be the occurrence net defined in 4.2.13. 	Then for all 
nets N 
=> N <A,t(E) 
Example 6.3..3 
63 0 	01 6 7 6-7 
where 	is any of the expressiveness relations 	 or 7<1 1e 
Proof 
As we assume all nets are condition-extensional all conditions 
of the net N above are "included" in the conditions of W(E). 
Interpret such conditions in X(E) identically and others as 
It is no surprise that the maximum net associated with an event 
structure is maximally expressive. That net includes all conditions 
possible under condition-extensionality. We now show that the net 
1(E) of 6.1 constructed by taking conditions to be 1 -minimal is also 
maximally expressive. In addition every maximally expressive net 
will include ii,(E). This means every condition of-n(E) will be 
included in every maximally expressive net i.e. the J -minimal 
conditionsof an event structure are precisely the "essential" 
conditions of the maximally expressive nets. 	(Compare 4.1.17 
characterising essential conditions of a causal net.) 
Suppose N is an occurrence net such that (N) is the event 
structure E. For any 	1-interpretation I of N we require aft 
interpretation fl of-n(E) such that 
'VC - E C(E) IOFrN(C) =I t oFrE)(C). 
We illustrate how I' is determined, by I through an example. 
Above we have drawn (E) and a net N with (N) = E for an 
event structure E. Suppose p E 1(b). 	What conditions of 1(E) are 
to be labelled by p? We have a choice. We could label b 1 and b2 
by p. However then e0 might occur so b still holds while b 1 and b2 
do not. Thus we must also label b 3 by p. Alternatively we could 
label b4, b5 and b7 by p. As the interpretation ofii.(E) is to be 
17 
in 	we cannot label all b 1 ,b2 ,b,b4 ,b5 ,b7 by p. 	Note that in, 
for example, the first choice although in a sense the subnet 
determined by b 19 b2 ,b3 simulates b we do not have b 3 3 b. 
It might be thought that the ambiguity in the labelling is due 







The condition b may be "simulated" by either {b 0 ,b 1 } or {b2 ,'o3 }. 
We accent the choice of conditions of fl(E) used to simulate a 
condition by means of a choice function. Given a condition (e,A) 
this simply chooses a unique 	-minimal condition (e,A') with 
(e,A') <I (e,A) (such exist by lemma 6.1.16). 
Definition 6.3.5 
Suppose E is an event structure. A choice function for E is a 
map 9 	(E) -> 9(E) s. t. 
X((e,A)) = (e,A') 	(e,A) for some A'. 
Thus in example 6.3.3 we might have(h) = b 1 and. (b) = b for 
xi = 
Henceforth in this section we work with a fixed event structure 
E of finite depth together with a fixed choice function 	. For a 
condition b of B(E)  we now define a set S,(b)  of conditions in 
which simulate b in this sense: 
VC E U(E) (on(b,C) <=> 3.b' E S(b) on(b',C)).. 
The idea is to use X to divide up the extent of b into a set of 
-minimal conditions which determine a tree-like subnet of ii.(E). 





For A a subset of E define 
p(A,e) = {a € A e < a}. 
Definition 6.3.7 
Let b = (e,A) be in B (E). 	Define S(b) = 	 where 
s(b) is defined inductively by:, 
nEW 
s+ 1 )(b) 	{%((e',p(A,e'))b' 	s'(b) e' € b''\ A}. 
1XI 
Picture b = (e,A) as 
Then the second stage of the construction of S%(b) may be pictured as 
e 
The events e0 ,e 1 ,e2 ,e3 are taken to be in ('6(b)) 1 . 	Theshaded 
regions denote events not below A. so p(e 0 ,A) and p(e3 ,A) are null. 
In the drawing %(e2 ,p(A,e2)) is a condition with p(A,e2 ) non-null. 
There are extra conditions in S(b), corresponding to b 3 of example 
6.3.3, of which one holds whenever b can no longer end holding. In 
the drawing 	(e,Ø) and 	(e3 ,) represent such conditions. The 
set S,(b) has been constructed so that b holds iff one and only one 
condition in S%(b) holds. 	We now prove this, 	Firstly S , (b) 
determines a tree-like subnet offl.(E) called 
Definition 6.3.8 
For b in V (E) define the net 	(b) to consist of conditions 
sz(b) and events {'b' b' E S(b)} {b1"( b' E S(b)}  with F-relation 
F  induced by 
Lemma 6.3.9 
For b in B (E) the set 	(b) is a tree-like subnet of -n(E). 
Further if b is of the form (e,A) then A equals the set of Ft-maximal 
elements in the net 	(b) which ara events. 
Proof 
Suppose b in (E) has the form (e,A). 	From. its inductive 
construction it follows that(b) is a tree-like subnet of-W(E). 
We show for all a in. A. there is a chain eOFblFel..FbkFek  in 
with e0 = e and e., = a.. The chain is constructed inductively. 
Initially put e0 = e and b 1 % (b).. Suppose we have defined 
e- .IVO 	 Fe a chain, in Z'(b) with e < 'a. 	If e = a we have 01 fl 	fl 	 fl 	 fl 
produced the desired chain. Otherwise extend the chain by putting 
b +i = %(en,p(A,en)) and  en+l  as the unique event in b 1 below a. 
As-there are no infinite chains below a we eventually construct the 
required chain. 
Thus by the definition of S,(b) no condition of S(b) has pre-
event a in A so each a in A is a maximal event in ,b).. The set 
A is precisely all such events as by the construction of S(b) any 
event in 2 (b)\A has a postcondition in Sb).N 
In theorem 6.3.11 we use the above lemma to show that if a 
condition b holds for an observable state then a unique condition in 
holds. 	The converse, that a condition of S..(b)  holding for 
an observable state implies b holds too, is ensured by the next lemma. 
Lemma 6.3. 1 0 
Suppose b E ' ( B). 	Then 
Vb' € s (b) b' - b. 
Proof 
Suppose b has the form (e,A). 	Assume b' € s(b) and b' = (e',A). 
Clearly e < e'. Suppose a € A. By the characterisation of 	we 
require a A  e' or 	a' € A' a' < a. From the construction of S(b) 
we have A' is 	0-minimal s.t. e' < A' 	o p(A,e'). 	If a € p(A,e') 
then 3 a' E At a' < a as required so assume. a A p(A,e'). 	Then 
a. By the above lemma a, e' E 	b) and a and e' are F*_ 
incomparable in x(b).  Thus as b) is tree-like there is an 
F*_xjmum condition b0 in S(b) so that b0  F*e and b
0F*a in the 
net %(b). This gives a e' as required. 
Now we can prove the precise sense in which S ,(b) simulates b. 
Theorem 6.3.11 
For b E 
VC € 	(E) (on(b,C) <=> 3b' € S(b) on(b',C)). 
Proof 
Let b = (e,A) £ 	(E) and assume C E Of (B). 
If on(b,C) then e £ C and A .i C = 0. 	Let e' be the 
<-maximum event in % (b) (' C - as C does not include infinite chains 
e' exists. 	Take b' to be the condition in s(b) with (b') 6 = e'. 
Such a b' exists as e' A A as A is the set of F*_ maximalevents in 
Then on(b',C) and b' is unique as z(b)  is tree-like. 
If on(b',C) for some b', necessarily unique, in S(b) then, 
as b'—b, we have on(b,C). 
It is now simple to show that (E) is maximally expressive 
amongst the nets inducing B. 
Theorem 6.3. 1 2 
Suppose N is an occurrence net such that (N) = B. Then 
N 	n(E). 	Also N,(E). and N 	le' 
Proof 
Suppose an occurrence net  is such that (N) = B. 	For I
2, 
interpretation 	n of N, define the 	1_ interpretation of(B) 
10 
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by I'(b) = (J{I(b')J b € s% ( bt)l. 	For all observable states we 
have 
= 	i'(c). 
Thus N 	n(E) as required. 
	
In addition for I in either of the interpretation classes 	or 
i le taking I'(b). = U{i(')i b E S(b')]gives I' also in the 
interpretation class I  or Ile  respectively. (From the properties 
of S,,b) it is easy to show I( -e) = I' ('e) and I(e) = I' (e°) so that 
I in 	implies I' in 4 ). As above this choice of I' from I le 	 le 
gives N =K j(E) and N le n(E).S 
The following is an occurrence-net analogue of 4.1.17. It 
means 4.  -minimal conditions are essential for the subclass of 





Suppose N = (B,E,F) is a maximally expressive net (w.r.t. j 
11 or) and 	(N) = E. 	Then 1,(E) 	B.  Ile 
Proof 
Let N = (B,E,F) be such a maximally expressive net. We know 
n(E). Take I to be the interpretation of (E) which to 
condition b associates the singleton fpblso thatPb = b' 
=> b = b'. 
As-n(E) 	N there is an interpretation of N, call it 12  ,such that 
I1Fr 	
= I2 0 Fr,(C) for all observable states C. Assume 
b € 	(E) is of the form (e,A). 	Taking C = [e] gives some b' in B 
s.t. E 12 (b'). 	Obviously b' has form (e,A') for some A' in /<(E) -. 
consider the beginning of the assertion of 	Consider endings of 
the assertion 	formally: Take C = [a] for a in A; then as b' has 
ended for some a' in A', at € [a]; thus A' 	A0 . 	This gives 
b i5,1 b. 	But b is 	-minimal so b = b'. Therefore j(E) G B asr9tth'ec/R 
Thus the conditions are essential within the class 
of maximally expressive nets; any Ej -minimal condition is contained 
in the conditions of any maximally expressive net. The net-n(E) is 
a subnet of every maximally expressive net. 
The demonstration that (E) is maximally expressive suggests the 
following characterisation of the expressiveness relations on nets 
iz 
inducing B. The expressiveness relation with respect to an inter-
pretation class merely expresses that in some sense each condition 
of one net may be simulated by a subset of conditions of the other - 
the manner of simulation is restricted in accord with restrictions on 
the interpretation class. 
Proposition 6.3. 1 4 
Let N0 and N 1 be condition-extensional occurrence nets satis-
fying N3, inducing B, with conditions B  and B 1 respectively. Then 
N0 . N1 ill 3 f: B0 -> F(B 1 ) f(b) —s b & 
Vc E 	(E)(on(b,C) => 3b' E f(b) on(b',C)) 
N0 
l N
1 (or N0 le N 1 ) jff 3f: B0 -> '(B 1 ) f(b) — b 
Y  € af (E) (on(b,C) => a Lb' € 1(b) on(bt,C)). 
Proof 
and 2. =>" Interpret N0 by 10 which associates B0 with distinct 
singletons of propositis. As N0 	N1 (or N0 1 N 1  ) there is a 
corresponding interpretation I of N 1 . Define f(b) to be the subset 
of conditions of B 1 whose interpretations contain 10 (b). 	(For 
N0 	N1 the nature of Il gives the uniqueness in 2). 
• and 2. <=" For an interpretation 10 of IT define I 1,by 
1 1 (b) = 0110  (b)lb1 € f(b)}.l 
Consider a subset of conditions X satisfying the conditions of 
f(b) in 2. i.e. suppose for a condition b 
X - b .& 	E O() (on(b,C) => 3b' € I on(b' ,c)) 
One expects such X to determine a tree-like subnet satisfying some 
further restrictions dependent on b. It may be that any set Tsuch 
that 
Y —b&-VC € 	(E) (on (b, C) =' 	b' € Ton (b',C)) 
always includes such a set (I expect so). 	If so the above 
proposition gives 1e 
 on occurrence nets inducing B. 
6.4 Restless events 
It is time we dealt with restless events. Mathematically 
they seem to involve constructions similar to those of the previous 
section. How similar is not clear from this section's incomplete 
I q3 
development. They may be important to a study of fairness. 
Certainly whether or not the framework suggested in this section 
is appropriate in detail some extra structure must be imposed on nets 
and event structures in order to model situations in which something 
will inevitably occur sometime. That something might be an event or 
some more general property such as an event losing its concession. 
Recall the situations which involved some idea of inevitability: A 
'r-communication in a Milner net was not supposed to be able to occur, 
and not occur, forever (see 2.3A); in a computation determining a 
function from one datatype to another,events other than input events 
occurred eventually if they could (see 2.3C,and. 5.6 where we discuss 
continuity-respecting event structures); the events of causal nets 
representing Petri's real processes are thought of as having occurred 
or inevitably occur'ng (see 2.4 and chapter 7). 	Of course the idea 
also arses, but implicitly, in deterministic computations; it is 
assumed that having finished one task,flow-of-control will move on to 
the next. 
Recall the idea of restless events. An event is said to be 
ttrestless!P if it is not. possible for it to have concession forever; 
of course it may lose concession through occurring itself or if 
another event in conflict with it occurs.. We wish to place extra 
structure on event structures to express this idea of inevitability 
for a subset of events; the extra structure will be a distinguished 
subset of events, those to be regarded as restless. 
Now we look at the formal implications. 	Firstly- we. can define 
when an event has concession.. 
Definition 6.4.1 
Let E be an event structure.. Suppose e E E and C € f,(E). 
Then e has concession at C, 
con(e,C) <=> <_ 1 fejG C 	( 	 Li ({e}) i C 
Note this is reminiscent of the on-predicate formalising when 
conditions hold. for consistent left-closed subsets. 	We could invent 
a new form of condition which for each event e would consist of a 
1 c 	 I C pair (<- e}, ,cj/e}) (or perhaps (<-' , e}) if E were 
of finite depth for example). 	Then 6.4.1 simply expresses that this 
generalised condition holds whenevei <_ 1 1el have all occurred and none 
1qz 
of 'L) ({e} have occurred. Note in general that even for 
It conditionslt of the form (C 1 {e}pt.i l ie)) we might not have 
in K(E) - the event structure need not be confusion-
free; however if E is confusion-free they correspond to places in 
a matrix. 
If an event e is specified as restless any observer who sees 
< 1 {e} at some finite time must eventually see at least one of 
Similarly if a subset of events A is specified as rest-
less then this is the case for every event e in A. It is obvious 
how to code in mathematical notation the restriction on observers 
Ob(E).that results when a subset of E is distinguished as restless. 
It is neater however to work with 	(E) rather than Ob(E). To 
justify this we require that for a restless event e we have that C 1 {e} 
if observed is observed in finite time. 	Otherwise the event may get 
concession only after an infinite time; clearly then we would not 
expect it to occur. For this reason,in this section we shall hence-
forth assume that event structures satisfy: 
For all events e,the set [e] is finite. 
Distinguishing certain events as restless disallows particular 
states at infinite time. For example suppose e is restless in the 
simple event structure consisting of a pair e and e' of conflicting 
events 
e 	 el 
Then over infinite time we would get states {e} or {e'}; the 
null-state after infinite time would not be consistent with the 
restlessness of e. More generally suppose E is an event structure 
with a set of restless events R. Those states which. are allowed at 
infinite time (call them eventual states) are those C € 	such 
that 
Y e € R 1 con(e,C) 
i.e. \/e € R(< 1 {e} GC => 	{e} t-1 C 	5). 
In this sense all eventual states are closed under R. 
In the simple example above, consisting of a pair of 
conflicting events e and e' with e restless,for no eventual state 
does e' have concession. 	In this sense e' is also restless. 
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Assuming e is restless implies e' is restless. 	In general suppose 
R is a set of restless events of an event structure E. It deter-
mines eventual states C where V  E R i con(e ; C). Often there 
will be an event e' A R such that 
'Ic E 	(E)((Ve E Ricon(e,C)) =>_con(et,C)) 
i.e. YC € ,( E)(con(e',C) => 	e €R con(e',C)) 
which say: that if events R are restless then so is e'. We turn 
this into a definition. 
Definition 6.4.2 
Let E be an event structure such that te] is finite for all e in 
E. Suppose AEand e E E. Define 
A J e if V  € 1,(E) (con (e,C) =>3a € A con(a,C)) 
Example 6.4.3 
a 	 e 	 a' 
:' 
:r :0 e2 
e (and yet {a.1 	e for i = 0,1,2) 
As the extra structure on events it would be natural to take 
subsets R which are closed under 	in the sense that 
R 	e => e E R 
Unfortunately I cannot yet characterise such R and the relation 
Any nice characterisation seems to involve a generalisation of 
Petri's conditions. The next lemma characterises A 	e. in the 
simple case where A is a singleton 
Lemma 6.4.4 
For the relation k defined in 6.4.2 we have {e} } e' iff 
<1{ 	'it {e} 	I 
Proof 
obvious. 
tL>tt Suppose {e' 	e'. 	Then VC € 	( E)( con(et,C) => con(e,C)). 
Take C = C 1 {e'}. 	Then con(e',C) so con(e,C). 	Thus C 1 {e} 	C 1 {et}. 
Assume elt.'U! e. We require e"V e?. 	If e",W e' this is 
obvious so assume 1 e" A e'. 	Take C = [e"] i_i 
Then 1 con(e,C) so 	con(e' ,c). Thus C l jelj 	C. 
=> ('v Ile' 1) c C 0. 	As < 1 {e'} 52 C we have T v ( {e' }r 
(Eel!] U < 1 {e'}) 	. 	But then IWO {e'} ,i [e"] 	0. 	Thus 
e" M LII e l . 
Of course distinguished subsets of restless events may not be 
the appropriate extra structure' in general. Perhaps labelled event 
structures on the lines of 2.3A would be a more suitable framework; 
there would be two kinds of events, "complete" events labelled by 
which would eventually occur or lose concession) and "incomplete" 
events which could only occur through communication with the environ-
ment. 
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Chapter 7. 	Event structures with infinite pasts 
In this chapter we present some mathematical results on 
modelling courses of computation with possibly infinite pasts. 
More precisely we examine the implications of removing the 
initiality restriction of chapter 5, while keeping the discreteness 
restriction and imposing the restriction that all events must occur 
sometime. 
From the point of view of denotational semantics this is a 
little off-beat and maybe it is. However in net theory causal nets 
the net-theoretic analogue of history are certainly allowed to have 
infinite pasts. For instance the discussion of K-density in [Bes] 
explicitly refers to the following net: 
It- is not disallowed because it has an infinite descending chain of 
events but because it is not K-dense. 
The definition of causal nets and the axiom of K-density in 
[Pet 11 is an attempt to define a net-theoretic analogue of history 
possibly with an infinite past. In this chapter we have a similar 
goal for event structures.. Again we shall make use of a notion of 
observer. These determine observable states. In defining 
observers we make restrictions on event structure descriptions of 
computations considered.. For instance they will be discrete as in 
chapter 5 and similarly they induce a reachability relation on 
observable states. The results on observable states of an 
elementary event.structure in chapter 5. There will be a special 
case - simply append a fictitious starting event and apply the 
results here. 
If there is more than one reachability class one can argue that 
the event structure alone does not represent a course of computation. 
The main result of this chapter is to characterise those event 	- 
structures with one and only one reachability class. They are 
called adequate. This involves some cute mathematics. 	By 
allowing extra structure on event structures a broader class of 
courses can be represented. 
In chapter 5 we have argued that K-density is too restrictive 
an axiom. In view of this the results of this chapter should be 
significant in defining the class of causal nets corresponding to 
courses of computation. 	It is suggested that a causal net alone 
represents a course of computation iff its associated event 
structure is adequate. It - certainly seems that one would wish two 
cases of a causal net to be reachable from each other (something like 
this is stated in [Pet ] to motivate K-density). As in chapter 5 
a restricted form of K-density will hold for a suitable class of 
nets when cases are restricted to being observable. 
7.1 Observers and observable states 
Throughout this chapter event structures will be elementary 






These drawings represent 
event structures consisting 
e20 	of an event e causally 
e 	
dependent on chains of 
21 unbounded lengths. 
e22 
Here an event structure models a course which may have an 
infinite past. As in section 5.1 an observer is a record of when 
events occur. It is assumed that according to an observer every 
event occurs sometime and also that the occurrences of two 
causally related events are separated by unit time (the discreteness 
restriction of section s.i). Unlike definition 5.1.4 events may 
occur unboundedly far back in the past. Accordingly time is 
represented by Z the positive and negative integers, ordered as 
usual. 
Definition 7.1.2 
An observer for an event structure E is a map 0 : E -> Z such 
1q9 
that 
e < e' => 0(e) < 0(e'). 
We denote the set of observers by Ob(E). 
Note the event structures of example 7.1.1 have observers. 	(In 
either case define an observer 0 by 0(e) = 1 and 0(e..) = 
Using this idea of observers we can define a notion of state. 
Definition 7.1.3 
For an observer 0 of an event structure E we define the state 
observed by 0 at time t to be 
os(0,t) = {e € El 0(e) < t} 
and further define the observable states of E to be 
{os(0,t) J 0 € Ob(E) 9, t E.Z. 
Of course not all event structures E have observers so Ob(E) 
01 
and 	'(E) may benull. The restriction on observers isAdiscrete- 
ness restriction; it is clear, for example, that the event 
structure formed by the reals does not have an observer in the above 
sense. Neither does the- following example. 
Example 7.1.4 
et 	 This event structure consists of events 
• • 
	
	e and e' with chains of unbounded length 
between theme 
For the distance—measure on events 	of §5.2, Le,e') 
is infinite in the above example. 	Obviously when A (e,e') is 
infinite for any events e and e' of an event structure the event 
structure cannot have an observer. When the event structure is 
countable the converse also holds. The proof uses convex subsets 
of the event structure. 
Definition 7.1.5 
Suppose E is an event structure and A is a subset of E. 
Then the convex closure of A is defined by 
con(A) = fe EE/3a 1 ,a2 €Aa 1 <e<a2} 
zoo 
Also A is said to be convex iff A = con(A). 
It is clear that the convex closure of a set A includes A. 
It is convenient to generalise 	of section 5.2 to convex 
subsets. 
Definition 7.1.6 
Let E be an event structure. For e in E and A a non-null 
convex subset of E define 
(A,e) = Sup{n 	 e0<..<e L ((e0 E A 9< e. A A £ç en = e) or 
(e0 = e A e E A Z e 1  A A))} 
We can picture 	*(A,e) - the solid lines denote chains which count: 
e 
L", e) 
The distance 	*(A,e) is the supremum of chains between the convex 
subset A and event e. As A is convex the direction of the chains 
between A and e will always be the same; if there are any chains 
between A and e they must either all go from inside A to e or all 
go from e to inside A. As for 	the distance measure 	may be 
infinite.. 
We use the new distance measure in the proof of the theorem 
below. Note the event structure is assumed countable. 
Theorem 7.1.7 
Suppose E is a countable event structure.. Then 
Ob(E) 	iff Ve,et E E L(e,e') <0° 
Proof 
tL>tI obvious. 
Enumerate E as 
Suppose 0 is defined for 
Extend 0 to E. 1 by putt: 
e0 , e 1 , .. . , e., . ... and. define 
Construct an observer 0 inductively. 





for some k. in 0) 
1 	 1 
Lng, for e E E. 1 \ E., 
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0(e) = k. + 	*(E.,e) if 	e' € E. e' < e. - 1+1 
=—k. - if 3 e' E E1 . e 1+1 < - e'  1 
= 0 	 otherwise.0 
The following example shows that the countability assumption is 
necessary in theorem 7.1.7 above. 
Example 7.1.8 
We construct an event structure E (not countable) such that 
Ob(E) = 0 and yet " e,e' E E A(e,e') <00. 
The construction starts with B0 a countable infinity of 
infinite chains unbounded above and below; 
e02 e 12 e 
e 01 e 11 e ni 
e00 e 10 e 0 
e 0-1 e 1-1 n—i 
e02 e12 e 2 
This clearly has an observer as it stands. By adjoining 
further events we make the existence of an observer impossible. 
By a cut of EL we mean a subset of B0 containing a unique event 
from every chain.. To each such out C written as e. ,e 	,..e . 
we join the following event structure: 	









Thus in E each cut of E is above chains of unbounded length from 
some event. Note that 	is still always finite. 	(The event 
structure E is uncountable as the set of cuts is uncountable.) 
The event structure E does not have an observer. Suppose 
o € Ob(E). Let C be the cut consisting of <-maximal elements in 
os(0,1). 	Then as all events C are observed before time 1 the 
event e  cannot be observed, a contradiction. 
Henceforth we shall chiefly be interested in countable event 
structures with observers. Theorem 7.1.7 justifies the following. 
Definition 7.1. 
Say an event structure B is countable-observable iff B is 
countable and V e,e' € B A(e,e') < oc. 
Formally at least convex subsets may be regarded as events. 
Convex subsets of an event structure when "collapsed" to a point 
yield a new event structure. 
Definition 7.1.10 
Let B be an event structure with convex subset A. By E/A 
is meant the event structure consisting of events 
Ifell e € E\A} V fAJ 
ordered by 
. < 	' iff 3e,e' € B e E 	& € 	' £ e < e'. 
I 	 - 15 convenient to allow A to be nui. ii the above definition.) 
The following define bounded. subsets of an event structure and 
time respectively. 
Definition 7.1.11 
Let B be an event structure. Suppose A is a subset of B 
and k € Ci).. Say A is k-bounded iff V a 1 ,a2 E A 	(a1 ,a2 ) < k. 
Say A is bounded iff A is k-bounded for some k in C.&> 
Definition 7.1.12 
For k1 ,k2 € Z with k1 < k2 , define the bounded interval 
[k 1 ,k2 ] to be in € Z I k1 < n < k2 1. 	Define the length of such an 
interval to be k2-k1. 
Recall the metric a. defined from A  in section 5.2. Its use 
abbreviates the following proof. 
Lemma 7.1.13 
Let E be an event structure. Then E is bounded iff there is a 
bounded interval [k 1 ,k2 ] and observer 0 in Ob(E) such that 
OE 
Proof 
,t<=" is obvious. 
tt>tt Define the observer 0 by 0(e) = d(,{e]). 	It is clear 
that as E is bounded d(,E) is finite and that the range of Ois 
the bounded interval [o,d(gc,E)]. 
The construction of definition 7.1.10 is used in proving the 
following lemma. Under certain conditions, it says for a k-bounded 
convex subset there is an observer recording precisely the events A. 
within an interval of time of length k. 
Lemma 7.1.14 
Let E be a. countable-observable event structure. Suppose A is 
a k-bounded subset of E. Then: 
- (3k19 k2 Ek2-k1 = k S 3 O € Ob(E) A = 0 1 {kk1) 
if  V e E E A*(A,e) <c. 
Proof 
"=>' is obvious. 
<= Supposing Ve € E 	*(A,e) < 0 together with the 
hypothesis on E give L always finite on E/A.. Thus there is an 
observer Q* for E/A. Without loss of generality suppose 0*(A) = 0. 
Considered as an event structure A has an observer OA such that 
OAA S [0,k] by lemma 7.1.13. Then define the required observer 0 
by 
0(e) = 0A(e) if e € A 
= k + 0*({e}) if e A 	0*({e}) > 0 
= Q*({e}) 	otherwise. 
Corollary 7.1.15 
Let E be a countable-observable event structure. Suppose A 







0 E Ob(E) 3t € 	 E A 0(a) = t iff Ye € E 	*(A,e) < oo 
Proof 
The set A is pairwise incomparable. Thus A is 0-bounded. 
It is obviously convex. The result then follows trivially from 
lemma 7.1.14. 
Now we characterise observable states. Unfortunately this 
involves the definition of yet, another distance measure. 8 defined 
from the metric d. of 5.2. 
Definition 7.1.16 
Let E be an event structure. Suppose C is a left-closed 
subset of E and e an event. Then define 
S (C,e) = Supd(C,CL'{e'f. e' <e}), d(C,C\{e'te' > e}) 
This may be thought. of as giving the distance from e to the "cut" 
of <-maximal events of C; unlike 	however the distance is the 
supremum of lengths of chains which need not "end up at" the cut. 
(With a trick we can define 5 from a A* measure; adjoin + oô - 
elements to the event structure and then take  
(C', e) = Sup {((C'j {4. cio 9,e),A'Con(C'Q  {_j),e)} where C' is 
the set. of <-maximal events of C.) 
We sununarise the three distance measures 	S and d 
together pictorially - the solid lines denote chains which make a 
contribution to the value: 
The next theorem characterises observable states using 
Theorem 7.1.17 
Suppose E is an event structure and C a left-closed subset of E. 
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Then 
C € X (E) iff /e € E S(C,e) < 00 . 
Proof 
'=>" If C £ 	we have C = os(,t) for some observer 0 
and time t. 	For e in E we have S (C,e) I I t-0(e) 	<00 . 
"=>" If S (C, e) < 00 for all e then define 
0(e) = S(C,e) if e A C 
= -S(C,e) otherwise. 
Then C = os( 0 , 0).0 
7.2 Reachability classes 
We first note that there is a natural equivalence relation 
on observers which induces a reachability relation on observable 
states. (Throughout this section event structures will be countable 
observable.) 
Definition 7.2.1 
Suppose E is a countable observable event structure. For 
0,0' in 0b(E) define 
0 "-i Of iff 	t,t' os(0,t) = os(0',t'). 
Then define /Vas the transitive closure of c'J 1 . Further, for 
C ' C' in. O(E), define 
C 	C' if  30,0' € Ob(E) 	t, t' 0 O & os(0,t) = C 
2< os(0',t') = C'.. 
A major point is that there may be more than one 	-equivalence 
class.. (Certainly there is at least one as the event structures 
are assumed countable observable.) This is best seen through a 
characterisation of 	using the metric d. 
Theorem 7.2.2 
Let E be a countable observable event structure. Suppose 
C,.C' are observable states. Then 
C 	C' 1ff d.(C,C') < 
Proof 
"<=" Suppose C,C' are observable states such that d(C,C') < co. 
2O 
Then by the properties of the metric d (see 5.2.5) we have 
d(C 	c',c) < CPO and d(C 'i C' C') <OO • 	The convex subset C\C' 
is thus bounded. 	Also 	*(C\Ct,e) < 0a for all e (otherwise 
&(C,e) = CIO or &(C',e) =00 for some e). 	Thus application of 
lemma 7.1.14 yields an observer 0 and times k and k such that 
os(O,k 1 ) = C ,i C' and os(O,k 2 ) = C. 	Similarly there is an 
observer 0' and times ki and 	such that os(O',k) = Ct) C' and 
os(O',k) = C'. 	Thus C 	C'. 
"=>" Suppose C Iry C' for observable states C and Ct. Then 
for some observers 0 and 0' and times t and t' we have 0 -̂/ 0 1 and 
C = os(0,t) and C' = os(O',t'). 	Induction on the number of 
steps in 0 ^v 0 1 , using the triangle inequality for d, gives d(C,C') <q 
The event structure in the following example is now easily seen 
to possess more than one 	-equivalence class and correspondingly 




e01 	 le nj 




e01 	e1 	 n-1e1 - 
This event structure consists of a 
countable infinity of unbounded 
chains of events. 	The observable 
states C = [{e. 0 i € 4] and 
C' = [{e..ji Ec}] ('diagonal to"C) 
have been indicated. Obviously 
d(C,C') =c. 
We note a countable-observable event structure may be recovered 
from a rv -equivalence class of observers. 
Theorem 7.2.4 
Suppose E a countable-observable event structure. For each 
observer 0 define: 
e < e' iff 0(e) < O(e'). 
00 
Then < 
= 0110 _01,  - 
Proof Suppose 0 is an observer of the event structure E. 
Obviously < 	 . 	Conversely suppose e e'. 	If 
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0(e) > 0(e') then (e,et) A 	so (e,e') A Co 5, as required. 
Otherwise define an observer 0' for which 0 1 (e) > 0 1 (e') and 
O'I\' 0 by o'() = o() if e 
=o(e) + O(el) - 0(e) + 1 	otherwise. 
It seems a course of computation should be associated with a 
unique 	-equivalence of observable states and accordingly with one 
and only one c'J-equivalence class of observers. Certainly in 
[Pet 2 ], where the axioms for "ropes" are presented, Petri motivates 
the K-density axiom by saying that "otherwise, there would exist 
cases c 1 ,o2 such that c 2 can be reached from c 1 only by an infinite 
number of steps, by performing a "super task"". 
So, cases are to be reachable from each other in some sense. 
(Interestingly K-density does not do this for the reachability rJakiot 
induces on cases. There is an obvious K-dense net associated with 
the event structure of example 7.2.3.) 	The main result of this 
section is to characterise event structures with a unique 
-equivalence class. Alone, without extra structure, they are 
adequate to represent a course of computation. 
Definition 7.2.5 
Suppose E is a countable-observable event structure. Then E 
is said to be adequate 
iff Vc,c' €. Of(E) d(c,c) < W. 
We define the property characterising adequate event structures. 
Definition 7.2.6 
Let E be an event structure. For A a subset of E we define 
= {e E E 13  € A a < e or e < a}. 	We say E is almost bounded iff 
for some finite subset A of E,E\ /Z is bounded. 
If E is almost bounded then it consists of a "tall thin bit" 




Let B be a countable observable event structure. Then B is 
adequate iff E is almost bounded. 
Proof Let B be an event structure. We are assuming that B is 
countable and \/e,e' E E i(e,e') < Co. 
If B is althost bounded then for a finite subset A we have 
Ed is bounded by Ic, say. Suppose c,c' € 12f(E). We have 
d(C,C') < Sup({k} 'i { S (c,a) I  E A} t. 	(C',a)1 a E A}) by the 
definitioiof d and S . 	As A is finite theorem 7.1.17 ensures 
d(C,C') < o'o as required. 
"=>" Suppose E is adequate. We assume B is not almost 
bounded to obtain a contradiction. 
Enumerate E as 	E0 1, 	'. 	 '." and define B. = 
As B is assumed not almost bounded we can inductively define pairs 
e.,e! where e.<e! with e. = . 	and e! = 	in the enumeration 




(e.,e!) > i 
e.,e! A1It 
1 1 	max{ki  ,1 	} -i i-i 
Now define C = {e.1 i E W I and C' = {e! j € (.))}. 	Both C 
and C' are pairwise incomparable. In order to apply corollary 
7.1.15 we establish 	*(C,e) <00 and 	*(CI ,e) < CO for all e. 
To show *(C,e) < Oo suppose e = in the enumeration. We 
have Ic < max{k ,i } for some n. Thus by the definition of the 
pairs e.e[ for i > n we have e incomparable with e... Therefore 
aoq 
= L *0e0,...,e1,e) <00. 
Similarly one may show 	*(c ,e) < 00 for all e. 
By application of corollary 7.1.15 there are observers 0 and 0' 
and times t and t' such that IV  c E C 0(c) = t and \71c' € C' 0 1 (c') = V. 
Defining D = os(0,t) and D' = os(0',t') gives two observable states D 
and D' with d(D,D') = Q i.e. the event structure is not adequate. 
This is a contradiction so B must be almost bounded. 
7.3 An axiomatisation of the reachability class 
We have defined the reachability classes of an event 
structure. The elements of a reachability class are ordered 
naturally by inclusion. We can axiomatise those structures and 
mention how to prove the axiomatisatiort is complete by establishing a 
representation theorem. This provides a reachability class of an 
event structure from a partial order satisfying the axioms. In 
stating them we first introduce some new definitions. 
Definition 7.3.1 
Let L = (L, iz) be a poset. Say L is non-null consistently 
complete if  for every non-null subset A 3XLAE x implies U  
exists in L. 
The consistent-completeness property is commonly used. Here 
as we do not necessarily have an initial state we have weakened it a 
little to only cover non-null subsets. 
In our previous work on event structures in chapters 4 to 6 the 
concept of complete primes was the domain analogue of event; in the 
representation theorems of chapter 4 a prime corresponded to [e] 
where e was an event. Here such left-closures may not be observ- 
able states. For this reason the more general concept of "relatively 
(complete) prime" is introduced. 
Definition 7.3.2 
Let L = (L,i) be a partial order with elements x and p. Then 
we say p is completely prime relative to x, and write this as x —3p, 
iff for all non-null subsets A of L for which Li A exists we have: 
xA 	pLJA=> 2 a E A p 	a. 
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We write x —p iff x - p or x = p. 
Note that —3 need not be transitive. (Consider the obser-
vable states of the event structure consisting of two <-incom-
parable events e and e'. 	Then 	3 {e} —3 fe,ell but 
-/3 {e,e'I.) 
Unfortunately I cannot see how to avoid almost explicitly 
introducing the idea of reachability into the axiomatisation. To 
do this we make the following definition of a domain analogue of 
the metric d. 
Definition 7.3.3 
Let L = (L,) be a partial order. 	For x,y E L s. t. x y 
define 
depth(x,y) = Sup {n 	1p  ...... p (' ' i x —3p.) 	p 1 a p2 EV 
(If the supremum is infinite we denote its value by 00 •) 
We can now state the axioms which will characterise the 
reachability classes. 
Definition 7.3.4 (Axioms for reachability classes) 
Let L = (L,.) be a partial order. 	Referring to the above 
definitions we are interested in the following set of axioms. 
L is a lattice. 
L satisfies non-null bounded-joins. 
Ifxythen Li{ 	y1x 	pI exists inLand equals y. 
UyJ x—Cy} and fl{yI y —< xj exist in L. 
If x & ythen depth(x,y) <00 . 
A few comments on the axioms: Axioms 1 and 2 are clear; axiom 
3 replaces that of prime algebraicity in the absence of an initial 
null state; axiom 4 is a completeness axiom mirroring the fact that 
we allow an arbitrary set of events to fire concurrently; as 
mentioned above the intention of axiom 5 is to restrict us to a 
reachable class. 
It can be shown that the reachability class obtained from an 
event structure (of this chapter) satisfy the above axioms. Far 
more tediously, from such a structure L one can obtain an event 
structure with reachability classes(ordered by inclusion) naturally 
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isomorphic to L. 	The basic idea is simple. From such a partial 
order L define events to be equivalence classes of pairs [,y] where 
x —3 y. The equivalence relation is the transitive symmetric 
closure = of .11  where 
['] I [x',y'] 1ff x 	xt Bc y = x' Li y. 
The required partial o:dering on such events is 
e<e' iff 3x,x,x" x-3x' & x —3 x" .9—, [x,x'] E e - 
[x , xtt] € e' & x' I;: x" 
(It requires a fair bit of tedium to show it is a partial order.) 
7.4 Causal nets representing processes with infinite pasts and 
K-density 
As in chapter 5 the results on event structures may be 
transferred to nets so that a restricted form of K-density holds. 
Definition 7.4.1 
Let N = (B,E,F) be a causal net. 	As in chapter 5 define 
(N) = (E,F*rE). 	Say  is countable-observable iff 	(N) is 
countable-observable. 
Say N is adequate 1ff 	(N) is adequate. 
Again as in chapter 5 observable states of the event structure induced 
by a net N determine observable cases of the net via the Fr   map 
introduced in chapter 5; we require the net to satisfy axiom N3 in 
order to get real cases. 
Definition 7.4.2 
Let N be a countable-observable causal net satisfying N3. 
Define the observable cases of N to be those subsets of conditions 
of the form FrN(C)  where C E 
Proposition 7.4.3 (Restricted K-density) 
Let N be a countable-observable causal net satisfying N3. 
Then any observable case is a Petri case. Also any observable 
case meets any sequential process of N. 
Proof We sketch the proof that a restricted form of K-density holds: 
Clearly any kens of < in the induced event structure must have order 
type n, or Z. Let C be the observable case observed by 
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observer 0 at time t in 	. 	Thus observation of a kens of F 
must "straddle" 0, have finished or not yet stated at time t. 	In 
all cases a condition holds at time t which is in the corres-
ponding Petri-case. 
Finally we note from the following example that neither does 
K-density imply adequacy nor adequacy imply K-density. 
Example 7.4.4 
I 	 I 
I I I 
N2 
The net N 1 is K-dense but not adequate. The net N2 is adequate 
but not K-dense. 
Z13 
Chapter 8. The full-abstractness problem for PCF - an introduction 
We introduce an open problem in denotational semantics. It 
concerns the language POP (programming language for computable 
functionals) a kind of typed lambda calculus. Terms of ground type 
called programs are evaluated deterministically by rules including 
the lambda calculus conversion rules. This gives a natural 
criterion for determining the operational equivalence of terms of 
POP. The problem is to construct a denotational model which exactly 
reflects this equivalence in a way which does not refer directly to 
the operational behaviour. Only then can we rely on abstract 
semantic properties of the model to prove such things as the 
operational equivalence or non-equivalence of terms. Although the 
language PCP is superficially unlike many programming languages 
essentially the same phenomenon can be found in "real" languages such 
as Algol, Pascal and Iswim whose programs are generally evaluated 
deterministically on a machine. 
In this chapter we outline the existing work. Gordon Plotkin 
introduced the problem [Piol], Robin Milner showed the d.enotational 
semantics was unique [MilI15 and Gerard Berry made significant steps in 
characterising the model for the denotational semantics. [Ber 
]. 
We 
summarise Plotkin's and Milner's work in the first section and 
Berry's in the second. We give sufficient details of Berry's work 
to support our use of event structures to duplicate a bit of his work. 
We shall not discuss the important work of Curien [Cur 1 [Ber and 
Our] in much detail because we do not refer to it in chapter 9. 
If this chapter contains anything original it is probably a 
mistake in copying out, translating or understanding. We refer the 
reader to [Mac] or tArb] for the relevant category theory. 
8.1 The problem 
PCP is a programming language based on LCP, Scott's logic 
of computable functions, ([Pioi],tMim2]). 	It is a form of typed 
lambda calculus in which certain terms are singled out as programs. 
The set of types is the least set containing t (for Booleans), 
i. (for integers) and (o -> ) whenever it contains 	and t 
We use 	O- ; "c') to abbreviate (c -> 	-> ... (o ->l)...)). 
The types ' and 1, are called ground types. 
2 1 4.  
Terms are produced from the following collection of constant 
functions with the indicated types: 
(numerals) 
(truth values) 
(increment and decrement by i) 
(test for zero) 
(conditional giving integer result) 
(conditional giving boolean result) 
(least fixed point operator) 
. . ..i' ... 	: type 1 
tt,ff : type 1Y 





Starting with the above collection of constants and countably many 
variables x. (1 € CO) for each type the terms are given by the 
formation rules: 
Every variable 
Every constant of 
IfM and N are te 
is a term of type 
IfMisa term of  
is a term of type Cr' 
type Cr is a term of type O 
ms o E' type 0 -> 't and Q respectively then (NN 
type ' then ( x'M) is one of type 3 -> 
In the standard way one defines the free variables of a term, 
the closed terms and contexts which are terms with "holes" to be 
filled by terms of the appropriate type; we write c[ ,..., ] for 
a context which when filled looks like C[M 1 9.0.,M]. 	By [ivi /x. ]N  is 
meant the result of substituting the term M for all free occurrences 
of x in N, making appropriate changes in the bound variables of N so 
that no free variables of iv! become bound. 
The programs are closed terms of ground type. Intuitively they 
yield concrete output; other terms are significant only as subterms 
of programs. 
An operational semantics is given to the language by defining 
eval a partial function from programs to constants. It is defined 
using an immediate reducti'n relation -> between terms: 
eval(N) = c iff M -> * c, for any program M and constant c. 
The immediate reduction relation is given by: 
+1 n> n+1 
-1 n+1 -> n 
ZO -> It 
Zi±L- 
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- ttNN ->M 	'D, 1, 
ff MN -> N j 
If M -> M' then 	M -> 	M' for M,M' of type 	and O 
.type ') or  
If M -> M' then (MN) --> (1VI'N) 
If M is +1 or -1 or Z and N - > N' then (MN) -> (MN') 
Y, N -> M(YM) 
9, ((x.M)N) -> [N/x]M 
The relation -> is a partial function so eval is well-defined 
above. 
We base the notion of a standard model for PCF on type structures. 
A (standard) type structure consists of 
1. AcpoD0- for each type r withD=tJ  and D= T.. 
2.. For all types cY and ' a two place application operation • 
x D. -> D,, which is continuous and order extensional i.e. 
X' iffVyx.yx'.Y. 
Condition 2. ensures that the elements of D 	are in 1-1 
correspondence with a subset of the continuous functions [D7 -> D] so 
that the ordering on D 	is the restriction of the pointwise 
ordering on functions. 
With respect to a type structure the environment Env consists of 
all type-respecting functions () from variables into UD r. 
A standard model for PCF consists of a type structure D and a 
semantics fl7 a type—respecting map giving values in D to terms in 
an environment 	. They are required to satisfy the following 
conditions: 
The terms ii, ±i, -1, Z, 2 ~D 2 and Y get their usual inter-
pretation. Thus 
YTiE1YJJ,a.o 	= 	 whereabbreviates 
n c'('S. 
'YYlEIIX]lr = PW 
flMN]] = DM]lp o  ThI{N11p 
= IMM11  f 
(f[x/] is the environment obtained from p by changing it so the 
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variable x is associated with o' ). 
Not all type structures determine models; there may be simply not 
enough functions in the domains to support the semantics. An 
obvious standard model is obtained by taking the type structure so 
that D> = [D -> D.], all continuous functions from Dr  toD 
with the application operator just the ordinary application of 
functions. Many other models are possible and according to 
criteria derived from the operational semantics the obvious model 
is not the best. 
The denotational semantics should"match" the operational 
semantics. Plotkin defined two natural operational relations. 
Terms are of interest only insofar as they are part of programs. 
For this reason it is natural to regard two terms as operationally 
equivalent if they can be freely substituted for each other in a 
program without affecting its behaviour. Formally define the 
equivalence relation by: M 	N if whenever CIM4-] and C[N] are rrojmms 
eva1([f4])ondevai(c[1-]) are both undefined or otherwise defined and 
equal. More generally an operational preorder can be defined by: 
Me.. 	Na-iff whenever c[M] and c[N] are programs then whenever 
eval(C[M]) is c then soya1(C[N]). 
Clearly M N iff M 	N and N = M. For a semantics m the 
expected semantic counterparts of these two relations are the 
relations on terms given by M. m  Niff 'YY1 EM ]Jo 7YFN  ]J0 for all 
N 0. 	Nr iff M 	Nand Ne.- 	M. 
In the circumstance when the relations and 	coincide the 
semantics N is said. to be fully abstract. 
For a standard semantics N the denotational relations will be 
included in the corresponding operational ones. However the 
converse will not generally hold. In particular Plotkin showed 
the obvious semantics based on taking D>  as all continuous 
functions [D -> D] is not fully abstract.. The counterexample 
depended on producing two terms which were operationally equivalent 
but denotationally distinct through acting differently on parallel 
or. Parallel or, (call it por) is of type (D,ThV). and has this 
truth table. 
21'? 
por  tt ff 
.L _1_ ft 
ft ft ft tt 
ff _j__ 	I 
It examines two arguments in parallel and if either is tt iyields tt. 
Compare it with sequential versions of or (called lor and or) which 
are obliged to look at one argument first (the left argument or the 
right argument). 
br tt ff 
J  I 
tt tt tt tt 
ff I J. 	I tt ff 




br =)\xy.x D x,y 	 ror =>.txy.y3r,x. 
Unlike !or and ror parallel or turns out not to be definable in PCP 
and because of this no program context can discriminate between the 
two termsPbotkin produced. He showed how by- extending the 
language PCP to allow limited parallelism the obvious model became 
fully abstract. 
Rather than extend the language PCP Milner showed how by 
restricting the model the semantics would be fully abstract. As a 
corollary of more general results he showed there was a unique 
fully abstract model for PCF (to within isomorphism) which he 
characterised as being that model in which all isolated elements of 
the domainwere definable in PCF. (An element is definable if 
there is a closed term which denotes it.) 
In fact in establishing the model's existence, Milner essentially 
constructed it from equivalence classes of terms determined by the 
operational relations. This method failed to specify directly, 
without reference to terms, precisely those functions which were 
allowed in the model. From the results of Plotkin and Milner it 
was clear that they had to be sequential in some sense but no 
existing definition of sequential cuts down the functions 
appropriately. The Kahn—Plotkin definition although precisely right 
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for low types of the form (tT,..., a;') where 0'. and ' are 
ground types does not extend up the types as the concreteness axioms 
fail there. The Milner and lTuillemin definitions, though satisfied 
by the functions are not restrictive enough. The problem remains of 
giving a purely semantic characterisation of the fully abstract model. 
8.2 The work of Grard Berry 
In the last section dOmains possessed only one ordering. 
Call it the extensional ordering as it reflects the extensional 
behaviour of the elements. On functions it was determined pointwise 
and it relates functions according to what values they give on 
arguments. With respect to this order the functions defined in PCP 
were continuous. If further operational behaviour of terms is to be 
reflected semantically so as to cut down the functions in a model of 
PCP one expects that domains should carry extra structure. For 
instance any notion of sequential function between domains should 
account for the nature of the objects represented in the domain. A 
function being sequential between concrete domains representing 
concrete input and output should not mean the function is sequential, 
when the same domains stand for functions ordered extensionally. 
Nor is the converse expected - see examples 8.2.1 and 8.2.2. 	Once 
the extra structure has been introduced to restrict the functions of 
the model one hopes that by then dropping it Milner' s fully abstract 
model will be obtained. These are the ideas of (rard Berry who 
introduced, the stable ordering as new structure ([Berl, [Ber and Cur]).. 
The following- two examples illustrate the need for extra 
structure which must at least distinguish functions from basic values. 
Example 8.2.1 
The application map ap: [ -> 	x i3 -> D , acting as 
ap(f,x) = f(x) is intuitively sequential. Encircling the least 







Clearly the Yomain [D -> ] xQ? ordered extensionally satisfies 
all the axioms of concrete domains and ap is not Kahn-Plotkin 
sequential. 
Example 8.2.2 
The function f: [ 	 -> (D] -> (1) defined by >.g.g(g(T,i_),g(J-,T)) 
gives T for the following least values. Again it is not Kahn-
Plotkin sequential. 
We trace -howie stable ordering arose.- One line of motivation 
is from the construction of syntactic models of the lambda calculus.. 
The idea is to capture syntactic properties in a semantic way and so 
restrict the functions present in a model.. For example Berry - 
has shown that the operation of enclosing -terms in a context induces 
a Kahn-Plotkin sequential function between domains of the syntactic 
model. The syntactic ordering in the syntactic model is the prefix 
ordering on Boehm trees, a kind of normal form ([Ber]). He 
conjectures that for the fully abstract model of PCP the stable 
ordering is the image of this syntactic order. 
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In defining syntactic models of the typed lambda calculus it 
was natural to abandon the extensional ordering and even forget that 
terms defined functions. This led to a more general definition of 
model without the order extensional condition of the last section-
For Berry a model of a typed lambda calculus is composed of the 
following ([Ber 1): 
1 • A set of cpos E 0.- one for each type Cr'. 	(A term in an 
environment denotes an element in one of these.) 
A set of cpos- D one for each type o . These are the domains 
of values which variables may be associated with. The environment 
Env consists of all type respecting functions 	from variables into 
D . 
Two continuous application functions: 
x 	->D 0 
Er xEnv -> D- 
4.: A semantics ')'Y which is a type-respecting - map- from terms into 
E.- sothat: 
Y}lE[x]J. r = 
JMTW J. = (n7ErM]].,o ) (mN]I1.f) 
(1)11JxM]J.p )oi = Vjmj . O [x/o'] for all in D. 
Such a model is said. to be extensional when for o, o(' in either 
or Er  we have 	= 	iff . 	 for all 
It is said. to be order extensional when for <,( in either 
D>or E we have 0< 	i±'f 'ç 
In this definition of model the cpos E can be thought of as 
functions from Env to values; the use of E leaves open precisely 
what functions to allow and what order to put on them. The 
definition ignores the constant functions of the language. Note 
however that fixed point operators 	can be given a denotation 
exactly as for-the standard models of the previous section because 
3 gives the required. mono tonicity (e 	=> 0< 3 Eo.'). The 
models we shall discuss will always be extensional though not neces-
sarily order extensional. In the work of Pierre-Louis Curien the 
model of algorithms is not even extensional ([Cur], [Ber and Cur]). 
Note that the standard models of the last section are order- 
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extensional models according to the above. definition 
Berry and Curien together found a means of constructing models 
from suitable order-enriched categories called J\,.--categories. An 
order enriched category [Wan] is a category in which morphisms are 
ordered so that the hom-sets form cpos making composition continuous. 
A 	-category is an order-enriched category which is cartesian- 
closed so that category-theoretic constructions satisfy sufficient 
strictness and continuity restrictions. We refer the reader to the 
definition of A -categories in [Ben or [Cur] for the exact details. 
We give the general idea precisely enough to support our exposition 
of Berry's work. 
Suppose we wish to constrain the model by imposing a condition 
P on domains and a condition Q on continuous functions. We shall do 
this soon when functions will have to be stable (Q) and epos 
distributive with continuous meet (P). To obtain a model it is 
sufficient to verify the following conditions (which determine a 
-category): 
Closure under conrposition: If D,E,F satisfy P and if h:. D -> E 
and h': E -> F satisfy Q then h'o h: D -) F satisfies Q. The 
identity 1D 
 for all D satisfying P satisfies Q. 
Closure under products: If D,E satisfy P then D x E satisfies P. 
The projections from B x E onto D and-Z satisfy Q. For all F 
satisfying P and all h: F -> D an& h':. F -> E satisfying Q, the 
function [h,hY] F -> D x E defined by [h,h'](o') = (h(o),h'(o')) 
satisfies Q. Also the same for countable products. 
Closure under erponentiation:. If D,E satisfy P then the set of 
functions [B _>Q E] which satisfy 0. are ordered by G such that: 
3.1 (ED _>Q E], Q) is a cpo satisfying P. 
3.2 Application app: [B _> Q E] x  -> E defined by 
app(h,o) = h(o) satisfies Q. 
3.3 If D,E,F satisfy P an if h: D x E -> F satisfies Q then 
the map curry(h): D -> tE -> Q F] defined by curry(h) (ac) çe) = 
h(ct',) satisfies Q. 
Continuity properties: The maps determined by composition o, the 
operation [ , ] and 'tcurryfication tt are continuous (w.r.t. =). 
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Within the above set-up is is easy to construct a model from 
the morphisms: 
Choose D so D>., = ([Do. ->Q D]Q) and 
([Env _> Q Dr ], gQ). The environment satisfies P by closure 
under products. Put 1T(r) 	1°(x) and S. ((PC) 	([x/o(] - 
again by closure under products 7T x and S satisfy Q. 
Define the semantic function 'flhl{ 	by 
'YYlE[xII= T1. 
'1)11{MN]1 = app o[MJj,TI1I[NIfl] 
11!L\xN]1 = curry(lllItMJj o s) 
This determines a model. The above three definitions are abstract 
formulations of condition 4 in the definition of a model: 
= -ç.p = f(x) 
VIMNT-P = app o1[tNjfl.jO "yYl[rN]].(' ] 
(Y1i].o ) 
'1YxMJ1.p1 = curry( )'Y1IM]] o 
= (?,1[MII o s)(p ,) 
The category of cpos with morphisms the continuous functions 
ordered pointwise (extensionally) forms a. 	-category. The 
category of concrete domains with morphi.sms the sequential functions 
ordered extensionally does not; this'is because it is not closed 
under exponentiation (see tBer and Cur]).. 
Because ot major difficulties in constructing a sequential 
model Berry initially narrowed his ambitions to forming one from 
an approximate notion of sequential function. He called such 
functions stable functions. Stability is a property in between 
sequentiality and continuity. 
Definition 8.2.3 
Suppose f is a continuous function from cpo D to cpo E.. 
Then f is stable iff it satisfies 
V x E D )V 	f(x) 3 m(f,x,y) € D, y f(x) <=> m(f,x,y) 
The set of stable functions D to E is written as [D -' E]. 
A function is stable if for all arguments x and all approximations y 
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of the result f(x) there is a minimu 'm approximation m(f,x,y) 
which produces y under f. Thus the following functions are not 
stable. 	(Note parallel or is not.) 
Example 8.2.4 (Non-stable functions) 
(T, T) 




 function f: 	
2 -> 0 defined by f(1,i) = 	, f(T,L) = f(t,T) = T 
is not stable as there are two minimal values (T,I) and, (I.,T) which 
produce T under f. 
Parallel or: Importantly the function parallel or is not stable.. 
It has two minimal values (tt,..L) and (J,,tt) which produce tt.. 
All Kahn-Plotkin sequential functions are stable. However the 
converse is false as is now shown.. 
Example 8.2.5 (i stable, non-sequential function) 
	
Define 	T 3 -> (l 
f(J.,tt,ff) = f(ff4,tt) = 
n, 	 i.,- 	 . ixi = i then x dominates 
etc. However f is not s 
to be. the least monotonic funótion such that 
f(tt,ff,.J-) = T. 	Then f is stable; if 
one arid only one of the points ( L,tt,ff) 
equential; the directions from 
correspond to argument places and no one is crucial to producing T. 
Often it is convenient to work with a more general definition 
than that for stable functions. This definition determines the 
class of functions called conditionally multiplicative (mc). Often 
they are precisely the stable functions. 
Definition 8.2.6 
Suppose D,E are two cpos with-meets denoted by fl • Then a 
continuous function f: D -> E is conditionally multiplicative (or 
mc) iff 
V E D x 1' x' => f(x r-, x') = f 	r f(x') 
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Call the set of such functions [D -> mc E]. 
Stable functions are always mc between domains with meets. The 
converse holds whenever the domains are algebraic, consistently 
complete and the restriction of the domain's orders to isolated 
elements is well-founded. In general neither the stable or mc 
functions form a cpo under the extensional or pointwise ordering. 
When the domains are consistently complete and algebraic the mc 
functions do form a cpo when ordered extensionally. 
In order to form models from stable or mc functions they are 
required to form A  -categories. In this construction there is one 
major obstacle; the application function is not generally stable or 
mc with respect to the extensional ordering. For this reason Berry 
introduced another ordering, called the stable ordering <, on 
functions from D to E. Let D and E be two domains both with meets. 
To guarantee the application map app, defined app(hp) = h(), is mc 
it is required that 
hjh'ofo" => h 	h I (o< flo(') =h(c) n h'(o(') 
where ttAI* denotes the meet of the stable ordering <. 	The stable 
ordering is chosen to ensure precisely this. 
Definition 8.2.7 
Let D,E be domains with meets.. The stable ordering l < on 
[D -> me  E] is defined by 
h<h' iffhh'2 V.0<' ED cDo<.' => h(p) nh'(') =h(')rh'(a() 
(Here hh' means Ii is extensionally less than h') 
Intuitively the stable ordering orders functions according to the 
fashion in which they calculate values from arguments. For stable 
functions h and h' the function h being less than h' for the stable 
ordering means: whenever h gives an approximation to its final 
value for an argument then h' gives that approximation to its final 
value for the argument and moreover the minimal argument determining 
that approximation is the same for h and h' • The stable ordering 




Let h and h' be stable functions from domains D to E which 
have meets and whose isolated elements are well-founded. Then 
h < ht iff h h' and V x € D 'y h(x) m(h,x,y) = m(h' ,x,y) 
where m(h,x,y) and m(h',z,y) are the minimal arguments given by 
the definition 8.2.1 of stable functions. 
We omit the proof (which is not hard) but give some examples. We 
denote the extensional or pointwise ordering on functions by qj and 
the stable ordering by <. For these examples stable functions 










([71 ->s o 1  G ) 	 ([ tlr —> 3 c1 ].i) 
Example 8.2.11 	c 	 T 
U 2 
 
(10 2 	CD ]1) ([(p2 —> 8 (D],) 
Having quit the extensional order in favour of the stable one 
some further properties must be imposed on domains to get 
exponentiation. As yet we do not even know stable functions and 
mc functions from a cpo under the stable ordering. However the 
exponentiation of two domains will exist when they have continuous 
meets. This assumption is preserved by stable exponentiation when 
the domains are distributive, a property which is easily inherited 
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by products and exponentiations. The end result: 
The category of distributive cpos with continuous meet having 
morphisms the me functions ordered by the stable ordering is a 
-category. 	(And analogously when the morphisms are stable 
functions.) 
Berry distinguishes a full subcategory of both the above 
categories. It is the category of dI-domains with objects those 
ópos which are in addition consistently complete, Cu -algebraic and 
satisfy axiom F. In this category the notions of me and stable 
coincide. 
From the above A -categories a model for PCF can be 
constructed. The "parasite' parallel or has been eliminated. 
However a new kind of "parasite" has been introduced namely functions 
which are not monotonic with respect to the extensional ordering. 
Such models cannot be fully abstract; they are not even order 
extensional with respect to the "hidden" extensional ordering.. 
Fortunately this can be remedied. The trick is to order the domains 
in two ways, both extensionally and stably. Then in forming the 
exponentiation functions must be continuous with respect to the 
extensional ordering and me or stable with respect to the stable 
ordering. Then dropping the stable ordering on morphisms gives a 
..A-category ordered extensionally. This produces an order 
extensional model (a standard model of the previous section); 
ground types are chosen so that the two orderings coincide. 
The most general. bi-ordered domains Berry considers form the 
category of BIOPCDs. 
Definition 8.2.12 
A biopcd is a structure (D,c,<,,,L) such that 
The structure (D,,L) is a cpo with continuous meet 
The structure (D,<,..L) is a cpo. 	The identity 
1D: (D,<,j) -> (D,c,i) is continuous. 
The function fl is <-continuous. 
(±v) The following property holds 
V S,S' 	D S,S' I= -directed 
w1i 
(Vs €S Vs' E St a  t e S,t' €5' s Gi t,s' 	t , ' t < t') => Us < 	Us'. 
Definition 8.2.13 
The category BIOPCD is defined to consist of biopcds as objects 
with morphisms functions which are continuous w.r.t. the extensional 
ordering and me w.r.t. the stable ordering. 
The category BIOPCD is cartesian closed and "forgetting" one or other 
of the orders on morphisms yields two A -categories. One is 
ordered extensionally and produces order extensional models. 
An important cartesian closed full subcategory of BIOPCD is 
DBIOPCD which has distributive biopcds as objects. 
Definition 8.2.14 
A biopcd (D,,<) is distributive 1ff (D,i) is distributive and 
x Ti y implies the stable supremum x  y exists and equals the 
extensional supremum x U y. 
The category DBIOPCD consists of objects the distributive 
biopcdz with niorphisms the me functions. 
The smallest category Berry introduces is the category of 
bidomain BIDOM.. The extra restriction defining them ensures that 
w.r.t. the stable ordering they are dI-domains. Thus considered as 
a full subcategory of BIOPCD the me restriction, on functions in 
8.2.13 is equivalent to insisting they are stable w.r.t.- . 
Definition 8.2.15 
A biopcd D is said to be a 'aidomainiff D is distributive and 
there is a <-increasing sequence { 'n I  € w} in [° -> me  D] so that 
the 	are (<-) isolated and <-projections with limit 
The category BIDOM is defined to consist of objects the 
bidomains with morphisxfunctions which are continuous w.r..t. 
and stable w.r.t. <. 
BIDOM is a cartesian closed full subcategory of BIOPCD (and 
DBIOPCD).. Forgetting about one or other of the orders 	or it 
produces two vk -categories; the extensional one gives an order 
extensional (standard) model of PCF - the domains at ground type are 
chosen to be D1, = (/ J , , ) and Db = ( 71' , , L). 	The model cuts 
out such functions as parallel or. However it is still not fully- 
abstract because functions like that df example 8.2.5 which are not 
sequential but still included. 
By induction on types Berry shows that the stable ordering is 
'thidden't in the fully abstract model of PCF and that the functions in 
it are stable with respect to it. As remarked above the fully-
abstract model cannot contain all such functions. For first order 
types (of the form (o 1 ,...'cr; ') where 	and IC are ground types) 
he shows that the stable order is the image of the syntactic order 
and that the extensional order is the image of Plot]dn's operational 
preorder 	on terms. He conjectures that this state of affairs 
holds at all types in the fully-abstract model.. 
The work of Berry and Curien (tBer and cur], [Cur]) on-models 
of algorithms shows the stable ordering will be very important for a 
semantic construction of the fully-abstract model. Some obvious 
approaches do not work however. The stable ordering alone does not 
support sequential functions; both parts of axioms Q.. for < can fail 
(see 8.2.10) and even coherence of < goes (consider < for example 
8.2.5).. This is why they have produced models of algorithms which 
are not extensional but do preserve the concreteness axioms up the 
types. Crudely put, an algorithm is built up from "events" which may ie 
decisions to output or decisions to test input.. 
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Chapter 9. 	Higher type event structures 
In this chapter we show how event structures may be used to 
represent exponentiations and products of domains. 	In particular 
we produce a category of stable event structures which represent a 
cartesian closed full subcategory of Berry's bidomains. We 
construct the category independently of Berry's results though, of 
course, the basic intuitions come from Berry's work. 	Finally we 
link up configurations of the event structures with bidomains. In 
fact this is how it was done based on a few heuristic guidelines 
which we present in the first section. There are many gaps in our 
understanding. In particular we introduce a new ordering 	a 
sort of dual to Berry's stable ordering; how is it to be inter-
preted and is there a natural operational characterisation like the 
one Berry conjectures for the stable ordering? In the final section 
we indicate how the techniques might be refined to construct a fully-
abstract model of POP which depends on capturing its sequential eval-
uation. There are many issues raised and left open by this chapter; 
in this sense it is an introduction albeit a rather lengthy one. We 
refer to [Mac] for the basic category theory used. 
9.1 Introducing higher type event structures 
We start with a simple example of a higher type event 
structure which illustrates what we mean by them and how they are to 
be used. 	Let us look at event structures of the form (E,<,') satis- 
fying the single axiom e > e' 5 e tt => e 	e". 	These were introduced 
in chapter 4 where we showed how such event structures represented 
coherent prime algebraic domains. We showed that such an event 
structure determined and was essentially determined by a coherent prime 
algebraic domain; the left closed consistent subsets of an event 
structure E ordered by inclusion formed the coherent prime algebraic 
domain 	(E) and conversely such a domain D determined an event 
structure E, with events the complete primes, so that L(E) = D. 
Suppose (E1.1) for i = 0,1 are two such event structures. 
Can we also represent the function space [1..(E0) -> '(E 1 )] of all 
continuous functions ordered pointwise? After Scott [Sco] we know 
the step functions form a basis of isolated elements. 	A little work 
characterises the complete primes of [L(E0) -> t (E 1 )] as precisely 
those step functions of the form '> y.y a x -> [e] ,J_ , abbreviated 
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as e[x,e], where x is an isolated element of ,E 0) and e an event 
of E 1 . 	In fact [,(E0 ) -> 'j,(E 1 )] is coherent and prime algebraic. 
Define the event structure E 0 -> E 1 to consist of events (x,e) 
(standing for e[x,y]) ordered by (x,e) < (xt,eI) iff x' 	x 	e 
with conflict relation (x,e) 	(x',e') iff x "t' x' S. e e' 
where we have simply expressed the ordering and incompatability in the 
functions space. Then by the representation result of chapter 4 we 
have 	(E0 -> E1) ' [(E0) -> '(E1 )]; 	the isomorphism simply 
expresses a continuous function f as the configuration 
(x,e) e E f(x)}. We have represented the function space as an 
event structure. 
Even more simply, we can represent products of coherent prime 
algebraic domains. 	Let (E.,<., 1) for i = 0,1 be two event structures 
as above. 	Take E0 0 E1 to be their disjoint ji.taposition defined 
by the disjoint union () of their sets and relations: 
E0 	E1 =(E0 aE 1 , 
Then 4 (EQ 	E1) '  1,(E ) X 	(E1 ); the isomorphism expresses a pair 
as the configuration which is a disjoint union of the pair's arguments. 
Of course we have ignored intuition about what the causality 
relation < on event structures means. In the above constructions it 
can no longer generally mean "must occur before in time". Accordingly 
a finiteness restriction on the relation such as an event dominates 
only finitely many events will not generally hold in representing a 
function space. 	(This occurs for the construction E0 -> E 1 in the 
innocent circumstances of E0 including an infinite conflict-free 
subset and E 1 being non-null.). A chief virtue of event structures is 
supposed to be their operational nature; they have previously 
prescribed possible behaviours in time. Can event structures like 
-> E 1 representing a function space be made to reflect behaviour 
in time? What finiteness restrictions can be imposed which reflect 
this? We expect some extra structure is involved in order to 
distinguish the behaviour of the functional events (in E0 -> E 1 say) 
from say basic input events. 
Suppose (E1,.~.1,) for i = 0,1 are event structures representing 
input and output domains. To reflect this, on both we impose the 
additional axiom 
{el I <M for events e. 




R 	 R 
,. L 	 (_t_,e) 
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The domain of continuous functions between the input and output 
domains is represented by E 0 -> E 1 . 	It is the ordering given by 
(x,e) < (x',e') iff x' cx and e <. e' which forces the finiteness 
restriction to go. However it naturally factors into two parts 
(z, e) <L  (x' ,e) <R  (x' ,e') where: 
(z, e) <(x' e') iff x'G0 x 2 e = e' 
(X, e) <R (x',e') iff x = x 	e <e'. 
Then we have the two finiteness properties: 
k<1 	{el( <Co 
and(<L fell <QO. 
The original order < can be recovered as (<L  v <' with < factoring 
as <L 0 <R. 	(Clearly the factorisation is unique too.) We can draw 
pictures of event structures using the orders <L  and 
Example 9.1.1 
Let E0 be the event structure consisting of two events a and b 
with a < b. Let E 1 be the event structure consisting of three 
events d,e,f with d. < e < f. 	The continuous functions, 
[(E0) -> 	(E1 )], can be represented by <-left closed subsets of 
-> E 1 .1 Draw E0 -> E 1 with the <L  and  <R  orderings between events 
L 	 L 	(-I, f') 
The function 	is determined by the following <-left closed 
subset of E0 -> 





The function 01 can be viewed as having this behaviour: output event 
it p.4 l 
_- 
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d. regardless of input; thereupon inspect the input for [a]; where-
upon output e; thereupon inspect the input for [b]; whereupon output 
f. 	This behaviour traces out a "path": 
Notice that the behaviour is determined by the <L-maximal events of 0 1 , 
marked by 'd's 
 in the above diagram. 





The function 02 is certainly extensionally greater than 0 1 . However 
neither has a behaviour which is part of the other's. They do 
however share, a common subbehaviour, namely: regardless of input, 
output d. Call the third function this induces 	The extensional 
ordering between functions i '2'3 corresponds to inclusion of their 
configurations whereas the ordering on behaviours (Iti a sub-behaviour 
of") corresponds to jflciUSIQn of their < -maximal event- -e 
This is no more than a suggestive example, of course. However 
note that for a configuration x of E -> E 1 ,. corresponding to a 
function, we can define ?I(x) to be its <L-maximal  events so that 
every event of x is < 
L-below an event of MW. This is because Di 
satisfies axiom F.. Then M is a 1-1 correspondence from configurations 
x to their <kmaximai elements M(x). The above example suggests this 
ordering as one on the behaviours of functions: 
x = x' iff M(x) 	M(x'). 
The stable functiais can be characterised easily using <L;  they 
correspond to configurations x such that 
V e E x 3e' E M(x) e <L  e'. 
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Call these stable configurations. 
A pay-off: The ordering 1. R is the image of Berry's stable 
ordering on stable functions. These facts follow from the 
definition of stable function (8.2.3) and the characterisation of the 
stable ordering (8.2.8). 	It also turns out that there is an 
ordering 	L on stable configurations so that 	factors uniquely 
as 	
L R o G R. (This fails if we take all configurations however; 
factorisation exists but is not generally unique.) Both 	and 
"extend" the corresponding relations J and <R  of the event structure. 
Example 9.1.2 
The continuous functions from 91' X(1) to (j) , I ¶ x4) -> 0 ], 







((ff,T),T)J 	L . 	/(ff,i),T) 
We use T to denote both the maximum element of (1) and the 
corresponding event. A function in [ ¶ x D -> D] is represented 
on this diagram by marking its 	 imal  events its M-image. We 
define the functions f 1 ,f2 and f3 in this way. 
f3 
The function f 1 disregards its inputs and outputs T. The 
function f2 inspects its first argument giving T if this is ft other-
wise it inspects the second argument until T appears whereupon it 
gives T as output. The function f 3 has an intrinsic parallelism in 
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that if the first ar ument turns out to be ff or if the second 
argument gives out T it yields output T. Functions f 1 and f2 are 
stable whereas f 3 is not. Using 8.2.3 the functions f 1 and f2 are 
easily checked to be stable. 	Function f3 is not because it outputs 
T for minimal inputs (I,T) and (ff,i_) which have the (least) upper 
bound (ff,T). This means that the event ((ff,T),T) is < -below 
two elements of M(f3 
 
) 
the <L-maximal events of f3 . 
We extend these results beyond first order functions. Event 
structures have the general form E,< ,< ,sj where the extensional 
order < is recovered as (< <1)*. For an event structure 
representing basic input or output < = 1 and? 	. The precise 
nature of the axioms they satisfy depends on the definition of config-
uration used. 
In this chapter we are chiefly interested in stable config-
urations - the definition mimics that of the first order. The 
associated event structures are called stable. They satisfy axioms 
which are preserved by a stable exponentiation ->. They possess a 
unique factorisation property: If < is defined from <L and? as 
,LR;* 	 L 	R i,j < 	then < factors uniquely as s o s • A stable event 
structure E has configurations R(E) ordered in three ways, by 
inclusion 	, by 9 R and by = L so that 	factors uniquely as 
L 	R 
	
; in fact the structure RE), , i. j is a bidomain. 
Given two stable event structures 	 for i = 0,1 we 
define the orderings < and? by: 
(x,e) <L (x'.e') jff x 1 	x and e 	e' 
(x,e) ? (x',e') iff x' 	x and e e'.. 
This generalises the first and zeroth orders dealt with, has an 
elegant symmetry clearly preserves unique factorisation and the 
finiteness properties of < and ? and provides a representation of 
Berry's exponentiation on bidomains. 	In other-words it works. 
Surely there must be a more direct justification. (i have in mind 
some argument based on intuitive interpretations of < L and <R or 
some formal argument forcing this definition as that which gives 
cartesian closethiess of events structures under some general 
assumptions sifted from the work of 9.8 demonstrating cartesian-
closedness.) The conflict relation on E 0 -.> E 1 is defined by: 
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(x,e) 	(x',e') iff x Ix' & e'1 e'. 
Configurations will be i-left-closed and satisfy two 
constraints, one ensuring consistency with respect to conflict 
relation 	and- the other stability. 	In fact 	will only impose a 
weak constraint in forming configurations, expressing the fact that 
configurations do not determine many valued functions. If one 
wished to represent domains of ground-type which were not coherent 
the conflict relation would have to be abandoned. Instead we could 
work with an inconsistency predicate (as in 3.3.17) or a consistency 
relation on events. Virtually all results of this chapter (not 
necessarily those stating coherence) go through if either of these 
is used instead. A consistency relation con on events E is a sub- 





If E0 and B 1 are event structures with consistency relations con 0 , 
con  respectively the consistency relation con of B 0 -> E 1 would be 
given by 
con {(x,e) (OE41 iffV4 {xp ( 	€ B}1' 	=> con{e I8Ei. 
Because the assumption 7 con A => 3e 1 ,e2 E A 1 con{e 1 ,e2 } (for A 
finite) is preserved by 	we can get by with a simple conflict 
relation. 	(In section 9.10 the sets of <L_maximal events associated 
with sequential functions of order 1 will he characterised. as 8ert1SdVeS eu 
configurations with respect to some enabling and consistency relations. 
A conflict relation alone would not be adequate.) 
A word on the examples: We shall draw event structures to 
illustrate properties or failure of properties. Event structures 
will represent bidomains and often those examples will correspond to 
fairly simple bidomains constructed from 7F and 0 by exponent-
iation and product. Where this is so we shall indicate the corres-
ponding bidomain and sometimes one which has essentially the same 
features. The manner of the correspondence is not strictly 
justified until later so we enclose these indications in brackets. 
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9.2 Stable event structures 
We begin the formal development motivated by the last 
section. The following axioms arose to support the definitions of 
stable configuration and exponentiation given there. "Arose" is a 
euphemism because other axioms true up to first order seemed natural 
too but were not preserved by exponentiation so had to be dropped. 
Definition 9.2.1 
A stable event structure consists of a quadruple (E,<L,<R,) 
where 
1. E is a countable set of events 
2. The relations <L  and  <R  are partial orders on E. 
3. Define < = (<L , 	Then 
e<e' => 2e" E E e <L ell <R e l .  , 
4. Define 	= (>L <R)* 	Then 
The set fe l l e' 	el is finite for all events e. 
The relation is a partial order. 
5. If two events e and e' are <L_compatible  then they have a 
.iL-supremum in E. 
6. The conflict relation A  is a binary irreflexive, symmetric 
relation on E such that for the < defined in 3. we have e > e' 
e" => e 	' et. 
The key axioms are 2., 3. and 4 (i).. The relation < defined in 3. 
represents the extensional ordering - we shall show it is a partial 
order. Axiom 3 expresses that < factors uniquely as <L o 
Axiom 4(i) certainly implies the finiteness properties of <L  and 
we introduced in the last section (viz.. < 	{e} and <L  e} are 
finite); its extra strength is needed so that -.> preserves them. 
Orderings based on 	have operational significance as we shall see 
and has been suggested in the introductory example 9.1.1. While not 
strictly necessary 4(u) facilitates showing this. Axioms 1. and 5. 
mean we get a bidomain from configurations while axiom 6. means 
expresses an extensional conflict relation; it imposes a weak 
constraint in forming configurations. Later we shall see some 
further assumptions which can be imposed on event structures so that 
preserves them. In an informal sense the axioms given are 
minimal with respect to the proofs. We give an example of one 
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natural choice of axiom true at order 1 and suggested by example 
9.1.1 but unfortunately false. 	It might seem that 
(e <H  e' & e <L  e") => 3 £ € E e' <R 9, e' <L 2 







,, e 	Le 
H 
However neither is preserved by _> 9 (cee ex 
Throughout this section we shall work with a fixed stable event 
structure E referring to orderings as they are defined in 9.2.1. 
The unique factorisation property expressed by axiom 3. is very 
powerful. It enables a style of ttp±c4u.e proof" using arrows 
and " _____' for <L  and <H 	This is illustrated in the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 9.2.2 
The relation < defined in 9.2.1 is a partial order.. 
Proof 
The relation < is certainly reflexive and transitive. To 
prove antisyinmetry we use a picture proof. 
Suppose e <,e' and e' < e. Then pictorially by factorising < 








we know e 	• Thus by factorising e < 8 we get: 
23'? 
Sn<R 
i.e. e 	 e for some 
But e 1 L 0  1R  e so the uniqueness of factorisation gives e = 
Then as <R  is a po e = a • Therefore the first picture collapses 
to 
L 	e l 
e 
The uniqueness of the factorisation of e' < e' gives e = e' as 
required. 
The following notation is useful. 
Notation 9.2.3 
For events e and e' write 
e 	e' i±± se" € E e <L  e".2. et <L e" 
iL 	 L 	L 
e e' iff 	e" E E e" < e - e" < e' 
and when the < L-join and <L-meet exist write them as e 
V  
et and 
L„.R 	R 	R 	R 
e A et respectively. Define I , , V , A similarly. For 
the ordering j we use  , 	V, A.. Thus for example axiom 5.. 
may be expressed as: 
AL If e 	e' then e L 
	exists 
L 	R We also write —< , —< and —< for the covering relations of 
<L <R and <respectively. 
R 
Thus e —c(' e' means e c, e: and 
or e' = e”. 
9.3 Stable configurations 
V e" E E e < R e" <Ret => e = e lf 
Suppose E is a stable event structure. 	In this-;section 
we define its stable ccnfigurations, characterise them in terms of 
their <L-maximal events (given by M) and examine the extensional 
order () given by inclusion. 
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Definition 9.30 
Let x be a subset of E. Say x is • 	-consistent iff 
V e,e' 	€ x 1 (e '5 	eO. 
Now we define the (stable) configurations of E. 
Definition 9.3.2 
Define the stable configurations of E to be subsets x of E such 
that 
x is <-left closed and 	-consistent. 
e,e' E x 	e 	e' => se" € x e,et <L e lt., 
Define (R(E),) to be the stable configurations R(E) ordered by 
inclusion. (Thus = R (E).) We write Li , .j and fl , n 
for suprema and infna of (R(E),) where they exist 
The definition imitates the first order one in § 9.1.. The 
condition (ii) restricts configurations to be stable. The ordering of 
inclusion on stable configurations corresponds to the extensional 
ordering on functions. 
As in section 9.1 the stable ordering will correspond to 
inclusion of the <Ljmai events of stable configurations. Such 
sets of <L-maximal events of configurations also provide another way 
of looking at stable configurations and in particular a character- 
isation of them (903.8)0 
Definition 9.3.3 
For x in R(E) define M(x) to be the < L-maximal events in x. 
We can establish the existence of sufficiently many IL-maximal 
events of stable configurations for the map M to be a 1-_1 corres-
pondence. 
Lemma 9.3.4 
V x € R(E) Ve E x 	e' E M(x) e <L e'. 
Proof 
Suppose e E x E R(E). 	From 4(i) of definition 9.2.1 we have 
{e' e <L ell finite. 	Thus 3 e' € M(x) e <L et. 	To establish 
uniqueness suppose e < L e' and e < L e
,, for e',e' € Mx). 	Then 
e' 	ell so using condition 11) of 9.3.2 defining stable 
21/-I 
configurations we have e' = e " . a 
Definition 9.3.5 
For x in R(E) and e an event in x define ni(e,x) to be the unique 
event e' provided by lemma 9.3.4. 
We can now use the following obvious fact in our picture-proofs. 
Lemma 9.3.6 
Suppose x € R(E). 	Then 
e € x £ & € x X e 
,L 
 e' => m(e,x) = m(e' ,x). 
In the main we shall draw <L  (or--) across the page and 
1R 
 (or 
.-._) up the page. 	Then lemma 9.3.6 can be pictured as 
<R-direction 
R 	. ' m(e,x) =m(e',x).. 
- 	L> 	 M(x) 
<-&irecti on 
It is now obvious that M is 1-1. 
Lemma 9.3.7 
The-map M defined in 9.3.3 is 1-1. 
Proof 
- 	Suppose x,f € R(E) and that M(x) = M(x-). Take e in x., 
Then m(e,x-) € M(x'). 	As M(x') 	x' 	and x' is <-left closed, we 
have e € 1t Thus x S Xt and similarly x t 	- x so x = 
We can characterise sets of the form M(x) for x in R(E).. 
Theorem 9.3.8 (Characterisation of the range of M) 
ax€R(E) y=M(x) 
if f 
y is 	-consistent 
Ve,e' € y e 
IL  e' => e = el 
'v'e € 37 Ve' ? e 3 e" € y e' 	e". 
Proof 
11>l? Suppose y = M(x) for some x in R(E). 	Then (i) is obvious 
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and (ii) is clear by 9.3.4. To show (iii) suppose e € y and 
e' <R  e. 	Then e' € x so e' . 	in(e',x) € y. 
tt<_t? Suppose y LE and y satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii). 	Define 
X = { e E E 13  e' € y e <L et}. 	We show x € R(E) and y = M(x). 
First note x = {e € E(e' € y e < e'}. 	For suppose e < e' E y. 
Then e <L  e"  <R  e' E y so by (i±) above 	y e't <L 	giving 
e <La. 
Thus x is <-left closed. Also x is consistent as y is. 
Suppose e,e' € x and e 	e'. 	Then e 
<L 	 L and e' 	' for some 
in y-. But IL e' so by (ii) above = E. Thus 
e,e' <L S C x. Therefore x C R(E). 	Obviously M(x) 	y and from 
(ii) the converse inclusion is clear giving y 
This theorem is very important technically. It also is very,  
suggestive.. Conditions (i) and (ii) can be regarded as together 
being a consistency requirement while (iii) indicates a kind of 
securing.. We explore this later in section 9.4. 
We now examine the structure (R(E)g).,- the domain ordered 
extensionally.. 
First- some notation. 
Definition 9.3.9 
For A a subset of , E we define [A] to be the <-left closure of A 
i.e. 
[A] =- {e € E 	E A e < a 
We shall write[e] for [{e}]. 
Theorem 9.3.10 (Properties of (R(E),)) 
(i) V  E E [e] € R(E) and 
Ve,e' €E (e <e' <=> [e][e']). 
(R(E),) is an C4 -algebraic, consistent complete cpo with 
...-L=Ø 
The supremum of a directed set S is Us. 
For X a non-null subset of R(E) we have Fix = fl x. 
For x in R(E) the element x is isolated in (R(E),) i'ff 
M(x) is finite. 
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Proof 
(i) Suppose e E E. 	Then [e] is certainly <-left closed and 
is easily seen to be consistent. Assume 0, 	[e] and 
Thus in a picture factoring E. e and 8 1 < e' we get: 
e 
for some 	in E. 
it 	• 
Unique factorisation gives fl= fl) so 	, 	 E [e]. 
	Thus 
Eel E R(E). 	For e,e' in E it is clear e < e' <=> {e] 	[e']. 
(ii) (a) The null set is clearly in R(E) and it is the 
-minimum element. 
Let S be a directed subset of R(E). 	Clearly if the 
supremum of S, say llS, exists then Us cjJs. Thus it suffices to 
show Us € R(E). This is trivial.. 
Suppose 	x<R(E). 	Clearly ifñl E R(E) then 
()X = fix. However () X is certainly :j-left closed and consistent and 
• also if e, e" € i iX with e 'IL e. then for any x in I there exists 
e V L.  et which is in x giving e V e' in flx. 
From (c) it follows that (R(E),.) is consistent-complete. 
Suppose for I a subset of R(E) and. y in R(E) we have X Y. Then 
(•\ {' I K 	yt I is in R(E) and equals Lix. 
Suppose x € R(E) and JM(x)j <oo • Then as 
x = {e' € E 	e € M(x) e' < e} we get x is isolated.. Conversely 
suppose x is an isolated element of (R(E),). Assume AM(x). 
Then it may be checked that , ( -" A) 	M(x) satisfies properties (i), 
(i±),. (iii) of theorem 9.3.8. 	Thus t 1A (\M(x)] € R(E). 
Consider 
S = [ [ -,< -'A /N M(x)]j A is a finite subset of M(x)}. 
The set S is directed and x 	S. Thus 
= [ 1 A 1 	M(x)] 	•.. 	[ 1AM(x)] 
for some finitesubsets A l . ... ,A of M(x). 	Therefore 
M(x) A. - 	3- 
As each A. is finite each 	A. is finite. 	Thus M(x) is 
finite as required. 
To show (R(E),) is algebraic suppose x E R(E). 	Then 
x= (J{[1ArM(x)]!Aisauinite subset  ofM(x)] 
as above where each element { 	A ,'\ M(x)] is isolated by (d) 
above. Finally it is W -algebraic by (d) as E is countable. 
pfme abe4/a1c 
InrelL1e cpo (R(E),) is not/nor are elements of the form [e] 
prime, and LI L U generally,, The following 
simple example suffices. 
Example 9.3.11 
Suppose E has this form: 
elt 
>T' 
Then [e] u [et] A R(E) so [e] i.j [e'] = [e s'].. 	As Li II 
the cro  (R(E),) is not prime algebraic. 	(E is the event 
structure of. [(p2 _> 01.) 
9.4 Images of P4 are-configurations, some "'staircase" orderings 
Throughout this section we work with a fixed stable event 
structure E. 
Recall theorem 9.3.8. It characterised configurations x in 
terms of the set P4(x) of its <L'-maximal elements. It said y was 
of the form P4(x) for some i in R(E) iff 
y- is 	-consistent 
Ve,e' € ye 	e' => e = e' 
V  E y Ve' <R  e 3 ell y e' J ell. 
These conditions make y itself look like a configuration.. 
Conditions (i) and (ii) express the consistency of Y. 
Condition (iii) suggests events in y are secured with respect to 
an enabling relation k— so that for e in r 
{ett € y 	e' .<R  e & e' <L ett} 1— e. 
Because 	is always finite we know events really are 
secured. We can picture the securing of an event in y as: 
We have only drawn one "thread" through the securing. 
Such "threads" look like staircases. In a sense they 
represent "relativisations" of 	to sets of the form M(x) for x 
in R(E). They are not restrictions of 	as the following 
example shows. 	(A more-real-life example is the event structure 
of [[PxP-> 5 Q ] ->1].) 
Example 9.4.1 
Suppose E consisted of three events 
as shown. Set r = {e0 ,e}. 
Clearly e2 	e0 yet —K' { e0 } = 0.. 
M(x) 
 
There are however three candidates for the relation 	relativised. 
to M(r); we might say two events e and e' were in this relation if 






M&) 	 M(z) 
Fortunately they all determine the same relation which we call -< M 
_\ x• 
In proving this we use the following relations. 
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Definition 9.4.2 ("Staircase" orderings) 
Suppose x E R(E). 	Define the following relations on E. 
=>L 	R o (e 	e':  
It, 
= 	t x2 (e 	e': 
= 	jM(x) 	(e 	
I) 
- >L P X2 0 <R2 (e 
	e':  
M 1 >L M() 
t 	o 	 (x) (e 	M 1e':  -  





The following- lemma shows that a 	chain determines a 
unique - 
	chain as its image in M(x). (This will be important 
later for the 	ordering on configurations.) This is then 
use& to show that the three relativised versions of 	above are 
the same. 
Lemma 9.4.3 
U) For e,e' in x where x € R(E) 
 e 	I 	e' 	=> m(e,x) 1vt1 m(e' ,x) 
 e -< 	e' => m(e,x) _41 "- m(e',x) 
(ii) rM(X)2 = 
Proof 
(i) Suppose e,e' E x where x E R(E) 
(a) Assume further that e 41 e' so e >L a  <.R et for some 2. 




------k- ----- 	 i 
2 
	
L 	 L 
where the dotted line represents the factorisation of 6 < m(e',x). 
We have n I  e so by lemma 9.3.6 we have m(,x) = m(e,x) so 
L  
 m(e,x). 	Thus m(e,x) 	
Ml
m(e',x). 
(b) This follows by induction on the number 	links in the 
chain e to e' using (a). 
(ii) Part (i) (b) gives 	= 	 We now show 
=Clearly 	 X . We prove conversely 
that 	
(e 	e' => ee') 
by induction on the well-foundedness of 	For minimal e' it 
is -clear. 	Otherwise suppose e < e' S,, e p e'. 	Then by the 
definition of 	we have, for some e", that e e" _<R  e'. 
Then m(e",x) Ji3 e' and, by (i) (b), also e M m ( ett, x). 
In a picture: 
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e 
By induction e .J-3 m(e",x). 	Thus e --- 	e' as required. 
It is quite possible to have e 	e' and n(e,) = m(e',x) as 
the following example shows. 
Example fl '. 4 . r A - 
e 	L 	
Take x = [ e1] in the event structure 
R 	 eft 	drawn. Then e 	e' and m(e,x) = 
e 	L 	 in(e',x) = e". 
(This situation occurs in the event structure of [[ (D -> (1) ] _>O].) 
Using the new relation 	we can give a characterisation of 
elements of the form M(x), for x in R(E), as a kind, of configuration. 
We define the appropriate enabling and conflict relations below 
(Cf. definition 3.3.1). 
Definition 9.4.5 
Define the stable-conflict relation 	by: 
24-8 
Say a subset x of E is 	-consistent 1ff 
V e,e' € x i (ee'). 5 
Define the stable-enabling relation !— 	&(E) x E 
by: 	A F5 eiff(i) Va€Aa — e 
A is 	'-consistent 
\ie e 3 a € A e' <L  a. 
Suppose e E E and x 	E. Say e is H-secured in x iff 
e,...,e € x e = e2 V'i < nA 	{e0 ,...e. 	A I- e.. 
Say x is H-secured iff all events in x are l-5-secured in x. 
Say a subset x of E is an s-configuration iff 
(1) x is a-consistent 
(ii) x is j--secured. 
Theorem 9.4.6 
3 x € R(E) y = M(x) iff y is an s-configuration. 
Proof 
tt>!t Suppose y = M(x) for x in R(E). 	By theorem 9.3.8 y 
is 	-consistent. Suppose e € y. That e is \-5-secured in y 
follows by induction on (- 	1 {e}t : first note-4x 1 {e} F e; 
then by induction each element of M 	{e} is secured so e is 
secured. 
Suppose y is an s-configuration. Then y satisfies (i) and 
(ii) of theorem 9.3.8 as y is X-consistent. To show (iii) we 
prove by induction on the well-foundedness of that 
V e'(e' <R  e € y => 3e" Eye' <L e tt) 
Suppose e' <R  e c y and further that e' ? e"— e for some 
e" (if no such e" exists the induction hypothesis is obvious). 	As 




'Factorising e' < 	we have e' <L a , <Rc for some 	'. As 
8 	e,by induction we have for some e" in y that' e". 
This/gives e' <L eft as required. 
Of course we have already studied configurations of the form 
given in definition 9.4.5. Then configurations were ordered by 
inclusion. From the results of chapter 3 we canmediately write 
down a corollary to theorem 9.4.6. 
Corollary 9.4.7 
The set MR(E) ordered by inclusion is an irreducible-
algebraic coherent cpo satisfying axioms F,C,R and V. 
Using the following observation we strengthen Irreducible-
algebraic to prime-algebraic. 
Lemma 9.4.8 
Let (E,/,) be an event structure as defined in 3.3.1. 
Suppose A F—e . A' )—e & At...' A' is consistent => A , A' He. 
Then P(E) the set-of configurations ordered by inclusion is 
prime-algebraic. 
Proof 
Let (E,F ,5) be an event structure satisfying the property 
above. Complete irreducibles are minimal securings of events. 
By induction on the depth of securing the supposition gives any 
two distinct complete irreducibles associated with the same event 
are incompatible. Let x be a complete irreducible, associated 
with event e, and assume x cUT for Y q P(E). Then e € y for 
some y in Y. The complete irreducible associated with e and below 
y must be x - any other would be incompatible. Thus z is a 
complete prime. Therefore any complete irreducible is a complete 
prime and P(E) is prime-algebraic. 
Corollary 9.4.9 
The set MR(E) ordered by inclusion is a prime-algebraic 
coherent cpo satisfying axioms F,C, R and V. The complete primes 
are minimal securings of events. 
Proof 
By the definition of 	we have A /- e . A' - e 
A / A' implies a ), a' for some a in A and at in A'. 	Then use 
the above result. The complete primes coincide with the complete 
irreducibles which are minimal securings of events.I 
Note the axioms C and R follow from prime-algebraicity anyhow while 
axiom V is then a consequence of coherence. 
In the next section we look at the structure (NR(E),c) in 
more detail. Intuitively it is the set of behaviours ordered by a 
sub-behaviour relation which will turn out to be Berry's stable 
ordering; we expect axiom F in such a situation. 
9.5 The structure (R(E),R) 
Again we work with a fixed stable event structure E. We 
study the inclusion ordering on sets of the form IYIR(E). As M is 
1-1 it is a partial order on R(E) which we call cZ. 	(As 
remarked it is Berry's stable ordering in fact - see section 9.7.) 
Definition 9.5.1 
For x,y in R(E) define 
y iff M(x) 	M(y). 




The relation 	is a partial order on R(E). 
e E M[]) iff e <.R  e'. 
F. , 	ri 	Rr 
L e 	e iff LeJ e' 
Proof 
Clear as M is 1-1. 
Suppose e E M([e']). 	Then e < e' so by 
factorisation for some e" we have e <L  e" 	e'. 	But e is 
2-1 
in [e] so e = e giving e <R e'. 
fl<=tt Suppose e <R  e'. 	By unique factorisation e E 
(j±) This follows from (ii) as Eel 	
R  [e'] iff 
From corollary 9.4.9 we know (R(E),R)  is a coherent prime 
algebraic cpo. We now list some properties of the suprema and 
R 	 R 
infima of 	. Note that for 	-compatible subsets suprema 
and. infiina coincide with those for 
Lemma 9.5.3 (the sup. and inf. properties of çR) 
The structure (R(E),R)  is a coherent prime algebraic cpo, 
with J. = $, such that 
If x is a = R 	tble subset of R(E) then 
M(L)RX) = UMX A. URx=L/x=LJx 
	
and M(flRX) = flMX 	flRxC}xflx 
If S is a 	di 	td subset of R(E) then 
LIRS = Us. 
Proof 
The additional properties (±) and (ii) follow using theorem 
9.3.8. 
Note that in general flRx  does not equal ()x as shown in 
the following example. 
Example 9.5.4 
e 	 e' 	For this event structure (associated with 
[C 
 
_>s D ri 	Eel] 	r 	, i 	ri 	Rr 1 LeJ ,' L  J = Le J . Y' = LeJ fl 	Le 
There follows an easy characterisation of .R_compatibility. 
Lemma 9.5.5 
For X a subset of R(E), x is 	R_compatible iff 
X is s-consistent 	,x2 E X Ve € x1 A x2 
m(e,x 1 ) = m(e,x2 ). 
Proof 
Use theorem 9.3.8. 
Corollary 9.5.6 
For x,x' in R(E) and e,e' in E, AR x' A e E x e' € f 
, 	\ 
< e 	e => mte,x) = m / e',x 
Proof 
Use 9.5.5 with 9.3.6.0 
We already know (R(E), q ) is prime-algebraic with the 
complete primes corresponding to minimal securings of events. The 
next lemma provides an alternative characterisation of the complete 
primes. 
Lemma 9.5.7 
Suppose x,y are in R(E). Then 
x 	y => Ve € M(x) 	M(y) 	M 1 { e } = M1 i} 
Proof 
Suppose x 	y for x,y in R(E) and that e € M(X)/) M(y). 
It is shown by induction on the well-foundedness of 	that 
•{e 	M-1 fel using lemma 
Another characterisation of the &_compiete primes: 
Lemma 9.5.8 
Let x be in R(E). 	Then x is a complete prime of (R(E) 	R) 
iff ae € M(x) Ve' € M(x) e' 	e. 
Proof 
Suppose x € R(E). 
n 	tt 	 / => Assume x is a complete prime of iR/Ej, R . 	Then 
	
/ .. M-1 	 c M-1 Mix) = .. 	where each set 	 satisfies the conditions 
eEM(x)X X 
of theorem 9.3.8. 	Thus as x is a complete prime x = 1 {e} for 
some e in M(x). 
'<= Assume M(x) =,', M-1.le} for some e in M(x). 	Suppose 
x 	URA for some 	-compatible subset of R (E). Then 
M(x).M(a). 	Thus for some a in A we have e € M(a). By 
lemma 9.5.7 as x a we 	ow Ml{ e } =.M_l{e} = M(x) so 
N(a) i.e. x 	a. 	Thus x is a complete prime. 
The above result justifies this definition. 
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Definition 9.5.9 




Define ev: Pr(R(E)) -> E by setting ev(p) equal to the unique 
M-1 
event e s.t. p = 	je 
We sum-up some properties of (R(E),cR). 	Note that the 
R_isolated elements of (R(E),c. 	are precisely those config- 
urations x such that M(x) is finite; thus they coincide with the 
isolated elements of (R(E),(). 	Any configuration x decomposes 
into complete primes. From the characterisation above this can 
be expressed simply in terms 
Theorem 9.5. 1 0 
The structure (R(E),R)  is a coherent C) -prime algebraic 




are those elements of the form Lejj for e in x. 	The 
R_ isolated elements are characterised as those configurations x 
with M(x) finite. 
Proof 
Clear from 9.4.9 and the results of this section. 
As the isolated elements of R(E) with respect to the two 
orders 	and g are the same the following terminology is not 
ambiguous. 
Definition 9.5.11 
Define R(E) 0 = 	€ R(E)j jM(x)L < bo}. 	Say the elements of 
f.\0 REj are isolated. 
9.6 The structure (R(E),i) 
With an eye 
structures we introd.0 
configurations. For 
ç )* and it is 
The new ordering 
to defining stable exponentiation on event 
e a further ordering 	L on stable 
an event structure is defined as 
assumed < factors uniquely as 
is defined so that 	factors uniquely as 
Definition 9.6.1 
Define the relation C. on R(E) byi For x,y in R(E), 
5-8 
5- IL 
If there exists 	L so that C= factors uniquely as 
the above definition gives it. For arbitrary partial 
orders instead of 	and 97 R the definition does not necessarily 
yield a partial order. That 	is a partial order will follow 
soon from the characterisation of G= L Unique factorisation 
follows directly from the fact that Q R_ compatibl e  elements of 
R(E) have a Q Rmeetq.ig( e 
Lemma 9.6.2 
For x,y in R(E). 
x 	y => 	z € R(E) 	 y. 
Proof 
Suppose x,y E R(E) and x 9 Y. 	Take z = IkR{ z t \x zt 	
R 
flz'jZ'ri by lemma 9.5.3. 	From the definition of 	we get 
L 	R 
x 	z y. The definition of x guarantees uniqueness. 
The characterisation of ..
L  is suggested by the following 
simple observation. 
Lemma 9.6.3 
For x,y in R(E), 
x 	y iff Ve E N(x) 	e, rz M(y) e < e'. 
Proof 
Suppose x,y E R(E).. 
=> 	is obvious by lemma 9.3.4. 
It<!t Suppose e € M(x). 	Then m(e,x) <L e' for some e' in M(y) 
giving e < L e' so e € y. 
Note that the event el is unique in the statement of 9.6.3. 
We can represent x 	y pictorially 
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The next theorem characterises M(z) for the unique z such that 
z 	y as being the smallest KM_left  closed subset of M(y) 
containing the <images of M(x). 
Theorem 9.6.4 (characterisation of G L) 
Let x,y be in R(E). 	Then 
y iff (i) V e € M(x) E1 & € M(y) e <L  e' 
(ii) V e E M(y) a e € M(x) e' 	M ni(e,y). 
Proof 
Suppose x,y € R(E).. 
"<=" Assume (i) and (ii) hold. By lemma 9.6.3 we have x 	y. 
Suppose x 	Z 97 y. 	Suppose e' € M(y). 	Then e' 	m(e,y) 
\ for some e in M( x).. As x z and z ' - y we have m / e,y) = /  
(by lemma 9.5.5). 	Then by lemma 9.4.6 we have e' E M(z). 	Thus 
z = y as required. 
Suppose x 9 L  y. Certainly (i) holds by lemma 9.5.3. 
Suppose (ii) failed i.e. for some e' in M(y) we had 
V e E M(x) ' (e' 	tn(e,y)). 
640, 	
3t 
rhen\set M(y)\ 	M e ?1 satisfies all conditions of theorem 
9.3.8. 	Thus it defines an element y' of R(E). 	Clearly 
x 	y'y so x 	y-, a contradiction. 	Thus (ii) holds as 
required. m 
Corollary 9.6.5 
The relation 	L on R(E) is a partial order. 
25(O 
Proof 
Reflexivity and antisymmetry now follow easily. To prove 
transitivity use part (i) (b) of lemma 9.4.3. 
The ordering = extends J in this sense: 
Corollary 9.6.6 





r e< e' iff 	9J '= 	e,  
Proof 
follows easily using theorem 9.6.3. 
Clearly m(e,[e']) <R e'. 	Also by theorem 9.6.3 for 
some 	<R ewe have m(a,[e']) = e'. Lemma 9.4.3 gives 
m(€ ,[e']) = m(e,[e']) o e < e' as required. 
From the characterisation of L it follows that any isolated 
elements of R(E) is =L_domjflated  by only finitely many elements 
of R(E) which are necessarily isolated. 
Corollary 9.6.7 
Suppose x € R(E) 0 . 	Then {y € R(E) \ x L  y} is finite and 
for all y E R(E) if x q y then y € R(E) ° . 
Proof 
If x € R(E) 0 then M(x) is finite. 	Thus E' 1 M(x) is finite. 
Suppose x .L  y. By the characterisation of 	L we have 
M(y) 	M(x) so M(y) is finite so y is isolated. 	As 
1 M(x) is finite there can only be finitely many such y. 
At this point it is useful to extend some previous notation. 
For e an event in a configuration x we use m(e,x) to denote the 
unique <kmaximai event of x <L_ above e. We have extended <L  and 
	
on events to orderings 	and 	R on configurations so that 
unique factorisation is preserved. Consequently we may extend in. 
Definition 9.6.8 
Suppose x,y are in R(E). 	For xy define-(x,y) to be 
the unique element x' in R(E) such that x 	x' EjR  y. 
Note ,M.([e],x) = 	1 {m(e,x)} fore in x (thus j. gives the 
prime generated by e in M(x)) and also that m(e,x) = ev(,,It([e],x)). 
We note some peculiarities of C L (it seems a very 
pee uliar ordering from the point of view of denotational semantics). 
It appears that x 	y means the behaviour of y "simulates" that 
of x but for less input (see 9.6.11). 
Example 9.6.9 
	 1 ;7 
A 
eo 2. > 
	
E 	 (R(E) 
In this example we have drawn an event structure E and alongside 
it the domain (R(E),R) — the dotted line represents the 
\ 	L additional ordering — gives. 	Below we draw i i  Rt/  Ej,( ). Note 
that 	• 	L. hl w-i1h 11 nihr' 	 hii 	41 
.. _minimum. 
e 0 1 
L i
. 
le 11 {el , e2} 	{e2} 
(The event structure E is that associated with stable functions 
from Tto 	.) 
Example 9.6.10 
e
ll 	 e 
E 
For the event structure E above (associated with [ N -.> D ]) stable 
configurations are either subsets of fe . i E(i)}  or the full set 
E. Ordering by inclusion gives 	. 	Ordering sets of the first 
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.2 5-8 
form by inclusion with E above 0 'but otherwise incomparable with 
RL sets of the first form gives g . Accordingly 	looks like: 
t. en-null subsets of fe ~ t~D 
So the configuration E =L_domiflates  an uncountable set of 
configurations. 
Example 9.6.11 	 -- 
io 
eO
- 	 '-. 
MC) 	 ) 
In this event structure take M(x) = {e0 ,e 1 ,e 2 1 and 
= {e, i 9213 	Then x CL y. 	Note 22  is not 
>L  any eveL in M(4. 
(T1e even&s+rticiure occurs ;n {[1x—iij—] with e0 = 60 = (€,T), 
= 	 e2 = (4 ,T), e 1 = ( )) ,T),. 	= (T ,T) and 
= ( ,T) where we represent functions from 9T'xO =I to 
by the minimal points at which they give T. I am grateful 
to P.L. Ourien for - this example.) 
L I do not understand 	. atall well: The converse relation 
has the more intuitive properties (e.g. 9.6.7). 
9.7 Stable erponentiation and products of event structures 
We have established many properties of R(E) for an event 
structure E satisfying the axioms of 9.2.1. 	In particular we 
defined two partial orderings 	and 	such that 	, 
equalling (L 	R)* factored uniquely as 	
L 	
We now 
define an exponentiation on event structures satisfying the 
axioms of 9.2.1. 	The term "exponentiation" will be justified in 
the next section where we define a category of event structures. 
Definition 9.7.1 
Let E0 and E be event structures satisfying the axioms of 
9.2.1. 
Define E 0 	l 
-> E to consist of events s 
{(x,e) 	 € 	 e E E 1 }0 ) 0 
ordered by iL  and < where 
(x, e) <L (x'e') 	x' 	x 	e <
L
e' 
(x, e) <R 	,ee) iff x' L  x e 	e' 
with relation' given by 
(x,e) 	(x',e') iff xtx' R e 	e'. 
(In the above definition we have not indexed relation symbols to 
indicate their domain,which above, and in future, should be clear 
from the context.) 
It would be a sick joke if, having got this far, the axioms 
failed to hold for the exponentiation of event structures. They 
do. The only difficulties are in showing axiom 4 is true for the 
exponentiation. From the definitions of the orderings < L and 
	
on the exponentiation the relation (x,e) 	(x',e') has two 
parts; one is e 	e' in E while the other is 
(Lf'R(E) 	RfR(E)O)I 	By previous results an isolated 
element 	-dominates and is = L -dominated by-only isolated 
elements. This gives 
Lemma 9.7.2 
Let E be an event structure as in 9.2.1. Then the relation 
(jLR)*tR(E)Q is identical to the relation 
(.LtR(E)° 	RR(E)O) 
Definition 9.7.3 
Let E be an event structure as in 9.2.1. 	Define 	on R(E) 
as 	 and 	as 	J'R(E) ° . 
Proofs of properties about 	on exponentiations will depend 
on corresponding properties of above holding. For example 
showing 	is a partial order on E0 -> 	will require that 
is a partial order on R(E0 ) P. In fact the next lemma shows this. 
M (x0 
9-co 
It has an intriguing proof. 
Lemma 9.7.4 
Let E be an event structure satisfying the axioms of 9.2.1. 
Define 	on R(E) 0 as in 9.7.3. Then 	is a partial order on 
R(E)0 . 
Proof 
We need only show antisytnmetry. Thus suppose for x.,x! in 
/ RE we have: 
(i)0 R ,L x1 
 .R 	 L 	R 	£ x = x0 L x 
We shall show x. = x! = x. = x for all 	 the 
01 	1 	3 
definition of - 	it follows that 	is antisyminetric. 
Define fix =IIM(r.). 	We first show fix E MR(E). 	Conditions 
(i) and (ii) of theorem 9.3.8 are obvious. 	It remains to show 
(iii). 
Thus suppose e E fix and 	e. Consider the chain 
As x0  q R X 1 we have in(,x0 ) = m(,x6). At the next link in the 
chain x 	
L x
1 with € in x and x 1 so m(',x) >L m(,x 1 ) (by 
lemma 9.3.6). 	In a picture: 
Continuing in this way along the chain (i) we get:. 
m(9-,x0) = m(E,x) >Lm(e ,x 1 ) = m(2.,x >L m(,x2) 
>L m(,x). 
But x0 = x 	m(2,x0) = 
m(€,x0) for all i. 	Thus m(€,x0 ) 
(iii) of 9.3.8. 
As <L is a ro,m(,x.) = 
E fix so fix satisfies condition 
Consequently fix € MR(E) and clearly [fix] R X•,X for aii'L 
21 
It remains to show [fix] = X. = x! for all i. Without loss 
of generality it suffices to show x 0 =x = [fix]. 
Take e € M(x). 	Then by repeated use of theorem 9.6.4 
characterising 2i' we deduce from (i) that 
jM 	, L 	, L 	L 	 L 
(2) e = 	e0 e1 ,ei > e2 ...> e e l > e+1... 
0 1 	 m] 
(here [m] is mmodulo n) 
for some e. in M(x[]) and e! in M(x[.]) where i € ( i. 
The sequence has been continued infinitely by going around 
and.. around the loop (i). 	As M(x0) is finite and the sequence (2) 
visits M(x0) infinitely often there must be em,  e  in N(x0) such 
that m 	and [mm = [] = 0 and em = eq . Then as 4 is  po, 
e = e' = e 	=...= e . 	Thus e E fix so the sequence (2) m 	m 	m±1 q m 	 R 
eventually contains an element of fix. As fix l 	x.,x I for all 1, 
using lemma 9.5.6 we have e0(=e) must be the earliest element of 
(2) in fix. But e was chosen to be an arbitrary event in M(x). 
Thus M(x) = fix.. Therefore x 0 = x = [fix] as required. 
Thus the relation 	0 on R(E) ° is a partial order.1 
The next lemma is used to prove 4 (i) holds for the 
exponentiation of two event structures. It generalises axiom 
F on (R(E), cR)  and corollary 9.6.7. 
Lemma 9.7.5 
Let E be an event structure satisfying the axioms of 9.2.1. 
Define -,< 0 on R(E) as in 9.7.3. 
Then for x in R ( E)0 	 - Jo—ic , we have 	is finite. 
Proof 
As x € R(E) ° we have'l MWI < 00. Also by theorem 9.6.4, 
characterising 
L  it is clear that 
Z' -,< O ' x => Ye' € M(') .E1 e € M(x) e', e. 
Thus x' 	x => M(x - ) 	J{{e} I e. € M(x)}. 	As M(x) is finite 
and 	lel is finite for any event e we have ix' x' 
2O  x} is 
finite, as required. 
It is not clear that <is a partial order/at least not 
from the proof that 	is. 
It now follows that the exponêntiation -> ea event structures 
preserves the axioms of 9.2.1. 
Theorem 9.7.6 
Suppose E0 and E are event structures satisfying the axioms 
given in 9.2.1. 	Then E0 -.> E 1 satisfies the axioms too. 
Proof • 
Axiom 1 is clear. Axiom 2 follows as 	and Q are pos. 
Axiom 3 (unique factorisation) follows from the unique factorisation 
of E 1 together with the unique factorisation of Q as 
Axiom 4 (i) follows directly from E 1 satisfying 4 (i) and lemma 
9.7.5. 	Axiom 4 (ii), that 	is a partial order on E0 -> E 1 %,  
follows from the corresponding fact for B 1 and lemma 9.7.4. Axioms 
5 and 6 are straightforward. 
We point out some further axioms which are also preserved by 
Proposition 9.7.7 
The following axioms may be added (together or separately) to 
those of 9.2.1 so that a direct analogue of theorem 9.7.6 holds: 
IL 
1) e je'=>e 	e' 
iL 	 •L 
11) e 	e' => e A e' exists in E. 
Proof 
We shall only show how (i) is preserved by ->. Suppose 
B,. and B, satisfy the axiomsof 9.2.1 and (i) above.. Suppose 
 in E _> B 1 . Then € and £' have the form 
	
= (x, e) and 	j = (x' , e' ) . ;.As 	
, 	
' we have 
e e'. As (i) holds f or B 1 we know e 	e' i.e.. 
e,e' J e". 	By lemma 9.5.3,9ivihj con Ee7k-cpiâne,xrl R  x' exists. 
Combined we get 
' 	(x 
flR 
 x',e") as required. 
We give, an example showing how properties may fail to be 
preserved by exponentiation. After introducing the axioms we 
mentioned two "reasonable" further axioms true at zeroth and first 
order but which were not preserved by -.>. Recall the two 
properties; informally they said that in the event structure we 
could complete 	and 	,f toF 	andj, 	respectively. • 	 I 
Example 9.7.8 
We show the following properties are not preserved - by our 
exponentiation construction: 
(i) e <R ell & e <L  e' => 	E e' < 	ell .L 
(2) e' <R e £ ell 	<L  e => 3 e E E P, 21 e", e'. 
We first show why (2) fails to be preserved by _>. Suppose 
e = (x,1,), e' = (x', 10, e" = (XI?, yLtt ) and et < Re 2, e" J e. 
Then we must have x = L x' and x . R x for the isolated x,x' ,x It 
ri' 	4-,.. 1, +~ i= ti 	 Cz nTniz I nl P±d Y so that ,, = L 
. Thus if we can produce an event structure E 
	
/ \ 	 ,, 	R 	L 
satisfying 2j but such that for some x,xt ,x with x x — 
there is no 	so that x' 	 xt' we have shown -) does not 
preserve (2). 
L  it x 
R) 	 4R 
x 	L 






Clearly it satisfies (2). 	Take M(x) = {a},. M(Xt) = {b} and 
'I?' 	 ,, 	R 	L. Mx = ja,c. Then we have x x — X. • However 
implies x' =% but then we cannot have x" 
Thus there is no X such that x' 	
L1, 
Therefore (2) is not preserved by ->. A further simple 
observation uses this fact to show (i) cannot be preserved either. 
Let 1.} be the event structure consisting of a single event 
(it represents (C) ).. Let the event, structure H and its config-
urations x,x',x" be as above. Then in the event structure 
((H _> {}) -> {•}) we have: 
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ett = ([(",.)],.) 
R 
e = ([(x,.)],.) 	
L 
	e' 
Clearly H satisfies N. If -.> preserved (i) then we could 
complete the above diagram to a "square" and this would give some 
z so that in R(H _>•}): 
L). 
4 	 R __________ ,3 
However by the characterisation of 9 L  there would then be an 







But then we would, have- 	
,, 	




proved impossible.. Thus (1) is not preserved by 	either. 
The product of two event structures is defined simply as 
(disjoint) juxtaposition. 	The use, of the term "product" will 
be justified in the following section. 
Definition 9.7.9 
Let E. = 	 ), for i = 0,1,. be two event structures 
satisfying the axioms in 9.2.1. Define B0 ® B 1 to be the event 
structure (B0  C, B1, <C<, 	'O) where 	denotes 
disjoint union. 
Similarly define 	E., where i ranges over an indexing set 
- 	 jEI 1 I, to be 
(CE., y 	P4 , Qwi) 
where U denotes disjoint union. 
It is clear that the axioms in 9.2.1 are preserved, by 
countable "products". 
Theorem 9.7.10 
Let I be a countable set, indexing event structures E. 
(i E I) which satisfy the axians in 9.2.1. 	Then 	E. satisfiesiEI 
the axioms too. 
We point out an alternative way of producing higher type event 
structures. With the wisdom of hindsight it would be a better way 
to proceed. From our results in, 9.4 it is clear that we could have 
worked with the s-enfigurat±ons M(x) rather than the configurations 
r, for x in R(E).. This would have advantages. Firstly our 
definition of the configurations R(E) is a little unnatural because 
of condition (ii) in 9.3.2. 	Secondly the-conflict relationX only 
imposes a very weak constraint in forming configurations.. 
Interestingly our work can be paralleled in the following way. 
Define event structures instead as being of the form (E,<L,<R, A&•) , 	, rf1. 
satisfying all but axiom 6 whereL 1 is to replace 	as the 
conflict relation determining s-configurations. Let the definition 
of exponentiation be like 9.7.1 with the one modification that 
(x, e) 	(x1,et) iff x 	x' 	e j' e'. 
Then the assumption that A'I-q determines the same s-configurations 
as 	(which equals 	u( 	remember)is preserved by 
exponentiation and product. (It is not the case that their' being 
identical is.). Thus the ordering <L  is used explicitly in defining 
the enabling relation but need not be mentioned in defining the 
conflict relation appropriate to s-configurations.. 
9.8 The category of stable event structures 
In this section we form a category from event structures 
satisfying the axioms in 9.2.1. We show the category is cartesian 
closed and in the next section that it determines a cartesian- - 
closed full subcategory of Berry's category of bidomains. Within 
the category of event structures -> and ) will correspond to 
exponentiation and product thus justifying those terms in the 
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previous section 
A configuration x of E0 	E1 has an obvious interpretation 
as a function x now defined. 
Definition and proposition 9.8.1 
Suppose E0 and E 1 are event structures satisfying the axioms 
of 9.2.1. 	For x in R(E0 -> E.) taking 
= {e E E 1 	(y,e) E x y g x0 l for x0 in R(E0) 
defines a function : R(E0) -> R(E 1 ) which is continuous with 
R respect to It and stable with respect t0.. In fact xt-3' 
defines a 1-1 correspondence between the configurations and such 
functions. Also 
= {e € E J3 (y , e) € M(x) 
Proof 
Let E and E be event structures satisfying the axioms of 
9.2.1. 	Suppose x E R(EQ .-> E 1 ). 	From the fact that x is a 
configuration it follows that for x0  in R(E0) the set (x0) is a 
configuration of E0 . Thus x is a function: R(E 0) -> R(E 1 ). 
That it is continuous w.r.t. 9 follows routinely. 
We now show for x in R(E0) that M((x0)) = {e € E113 ( y,e) E 
M(x y 9 
R 	Let e be in M(i(x0)). Then there is z with 
z G x0 and (z,e)in x. 	The element m((z,e),x) of M(x) has the 
form (y,e) with y 9 x showing e € r.h.s. as required. Conversely 
suppose for some (y,e) in M(x) we have y çR  x0. Assume 
e' E - (x where et is <L-comparable with e (so e 
L 
 e'). 	Then 
(y',e') E x where for some y 1. x0 . 	Clearly as (y,e) 1, (y ,. ) 
.11 / 	\ 	 \\ as required. in x,y',e') 	y,e) so e' <L e. 	Thus e E MI,-x ,x0 ))  
From the above characterisation of M(i(x0)) it follows that 
- 	 n.R 	 / ' x is i -continuous. 	Suppose z • z' for Z,Z' in RE0 ). 	Then 
z ri z' = z n z'.. For i to be stable we further require 
(z nz') = ( z) n (z'). 	By .monotonicity we have 
(z flz') 	R()  n (zt) where i(z) n (z') = (z)r 	(z'). 
Suppose e € (z)r (z'). 	Then (y,e),(y',e) € x for some 
R 	, 	 i R y — z and y z'. As x s a configuration and y i 
we have (y n R  y',e) € X. 	Therefore e € - x(z 11  z'). 	Thus the 
sets (z nz') and (z) n (z') are equal so 	is stable. 
We now construct an inverse to x 1—> L Suppose 
f: R(E) -> R(E 1 ) is continuous w.r.t. 	and stable w.r.t. 
Define 
$(f) = {(z,e) € R(E0) ° x Ed e € f(Z)J. 
We show (f) € R(EQ 	E1 ) and 077 = f and Ø() = x. 
In showing (f) E R(E6 -> E 1 ) it is easily checked to be 
.1-left closed and consistent. 	Suppose for (z,e), (zt,et) in x we 
I 	\1L I 	 AR have z',e'); then z i 	z' and e 	e'. 	As f is 
R / z) n R , 	 / \ AR ( 
	
-monotonic f 	fz'). 	Thus as we have flz) fz') 
e E f(z)' e' E f(z') & e.,L e' by lemma 9.5.6 we get m(e,f(z)) = 
ni(e,f(zt)). 	Put € = m(e,f(z)). 	Then as f is stable w.r.t. 
it follows as G € f(z) and 8 € f(z') that e € f(z n z'). There-
fore (z ri z',€) € 0(f) with (z,e),(z',e) <L  (z ri z', €.) as required 
to show 0(f) is a configuration. 
As £ is continuous 077 = f. Also by a direct translation of 
the definitions $() = x. Thus the map x i—p i is 1-1 .e 
We now define the category of event structures. Morphism from 
to E 1 are taken to be configurations of E0 -> E 1 . Composition 
x • y is defined so that x • y equals i a y the usual function 
composition on the function x and y. 
Definition and roposition 
Define C to be the, category consisting of objects event 
structures E satisfying the axioms in 92.1, morphisms E 0 to V. 
being elements of R(E0 -> E) with the following composition denoteds: 
For x in R(EQ _> E) and y in R(E 1 -> E) define 
Y • x = {(x0 ,e2 ) E R(E) x E2 1 3 (x i  ,e2 ) E y 
Then y 0 x € R(E0 -> E) and y. x = y a x the usual composition 
oc the functions and 3F. 	(We call 	the category of stable 
event structures.) 
Proof 
First we must check that the definition is correct, that E is 
indeed a category.. We check that for x in R(E0 -> E) and y in 
R(E 1 -.> E) we have y •x in R(EQ -.> E2 ). 	It is easy to check that 
y • x is <-left closed and consistent. 	Suppose for (x0,e2), 
(x',e) in y • x we have (x ,e ) j,.L (x',e) i.e. x 	and 
e2 4.L e. 	We show (x0 t-i P x, . ) € y • x for some > e el 
As (x09 e2 ) and (x,e) are in y 0 x we have for some (x 1 ,e2 ) and 
(x,e) in y that x 1 	(x0) and x; 	(x); clearly by factor- 
isation,without loss of generality,we may assume x 	x (x) and 
R (x). Summarising the facts in a picture: 
-,. U R 
—X ( x6) 
R 
However as y is a configuration containing (x 1 ,e2) and (x;,e) 
with (x1,e2) 
4L  (x' e') there exists (X-,) in _y such that 
Xc x 1 ,x and e2 ,e 	. As x is stable x(x0 
(x0) 	
R 
M x) = 
R 	 R Thus % 	(x 	 X6 , ) € yx 
as required. 	 - 
Suppose x € R(EQ -> E 1 ) and y E R(E 1 _> E). 	Then routine 
manipulation of the definitions gives for any x0 in R(E0) that 
= yo x(x0). Thus yx = 
Finally composition is clearly associative as function 
composition is and each object E has an identity morphism 
1E(=I(x,e) e € xD in R(E -> S  E). Thus E is a category as stated. 
The category EE is closed under products.. Given two event 	- 
structuresand. E 1 in 	a product will be (E0 e E 1 , 	m) 
where the projection function Ii to E. are obtained by restricting 
II  configurations to EL. 	(It is well-known that products of E0 ,E 1 
are isomorphic.) 
Lemma 9.8.3 
The category E is closed under (w-) products. A product 
of BO 9 E in 	will be (E0 ® E 1 , 0 , it) where. 
= {(x,e) € E0 6 E 1 -.> ELI e € x t't E.} for i = 0,1. 
Proof 




defined above Ti: € R(E0 ® 	-> E). 	In order that   
s
2 
(E0 3 E 1 , 71- 3 , ii) be a product we require for any x in R(E -> E) 
and x in R(E _> s E ) there exists a unique element [x 0 11x 1 ] in 






For the above set-up taking [x0 ,x 1 ] = x0 j x 1 (where strict±y 
speaking the configurations x are formed on the disjoint copies of 
the events E0 and E 1 in 	E1 ) makes the above diagram commute in 
the uniqueness of [x 0 9.x 1 ] follows by routine manipulation. 
We now give some useful notation. 
Definition and Notation 9.8.4 
Suppose we have the following set-up in 
zQ x i where x0 € R(EQ -> 	E) 
€ R(E 1  
Then certainly by the above result EO e E, and El ® E l  are 
products in E . The operation 	extends to a functor. For 
the morphisms x0 ,x 1 above define x0 ® x 1 to be the unique map 
making the following diagram commute: 
E0 0 E 1 
E 	





E t 	E t 
Z, 
So using the notation in the above proof x 0 	x 1 s[x0 . 710 ,x 1 • iT 1 1 
and has the commutativity properties IT.x0 ® x 1 = x.. Tj . for 
i=O,1. 
Consider the following diagram in which the null configuration 








Clearly by the properties of product there is a unique morphism in  
making the above diagram commute. Similarly there is a morphism 
in 1 : E 1 -> E0 c 	E 1 . 
The following observation allows us to simplify notation. 
Lemma 9.8.5 
Let E0 ,E 1 be event structures in E . Let 
Th1: E0 ® E 1 -> E for i = 0,1 be the projection morphisms 
introduced in 9.8.3. Then R(EQ ® E 1 ) is isomorphic to 
R(E0) x R(E) consisting of pairs ordered coordinatewise under the 
map 




Henceforth we shall identify R (E0 	E1 ) with 
R(E0) x'R(E 1 ) in which the orderings are determined coordinatewise. 
Thus instead of x in R(E0 (D E 1 ) we shall often write (x0 ,x 1 ) in 
R(E0) x R (E 1 ) where x0 =(x) and x1 =ft1 (x). 	With this id.entif- 
ication,the function x0 ® x 1 : R(EQ 	E) -> R(E ® E) may be 
expressed as the function (y0 ,y1 )i- 	( 0(y0),i1 (y1 )) by simply 
using the commutativity properties of x 0 ® x 1 . 
To show 	is cartesian closed we require the further fact 
that it is closed under exponentiation. In establishing this we use 
the following configurations which correspond to application (ap) 
and curryification, or abstraction (ab). 
Definition and proposition 9.8.7 
Suppose E0 ,E 1 and E are event structures in 	. Then, with 
respect to E and E 1 defining 
ap = {((x,x0 ),e 1 ) € (E0 -) E1) ® E0 -> E 1 (x0 9e 1 ) € x} 
gives ap E 	 -> E1) (j E -.> E 1 ). 
Also,with respect to E0 ,E 1 and E2 , defining 
ab = {(x,(x0 9(x 1 ,e2))) € (E ® E 1 ->'E2) -> (E0 -) E 1 -.> 
((x01 x 1 ),e2 ) € x} 
gives ab € R((E0 J E -> E 2) _> (E0 -> E 1 -.> E2 ))... 
Proof 
The subset ap is clearly <-left closed. Suppose 
((x,x0),e), ((xt,x),et)  are in ap and ((x,x0),e) L  ((z',x),e'). 
Then x Ila x', x0 'i x and. e 	e t . 	Thus (x01 e) € x and 
(x,e') € x' with (x0  ,e) 
,L 
 (x,e') and x'i x'. 	By 9.5.6 we have 
nI((x0 ,e),x) = m((x,e'),x'); call this common event (X,2). Then, 
as required, we have ((x,x0),e), ((x',x),e') 	((x ii R X', X) 	) E ap. 
The proof that ab is a configuration is similar. 
That the configurations ap and ab do correspond to application and 
abstraction of functions is justified by the next lemma. 
Lemma 9.8.8 
For' the situation described in 9.8.7 
(i) for all (x,x0) in R((E0 -> E) ® E) 
= 
(iii) letting y be 	for x in R(E0 (D E 1 -> E), for all 
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(z09 z 1 ) in R(EQ  G E) 
= 
Proof 
A routine consequence of the definitions.R 
Theorem 9.8.9 
	
The category 	is closed under exponentiation. An 
exponentiation of E0 ,E 1 in E  is (E0 -'> E 1 ,ap) where ap is as defined 
in 9.8.7. 
Proof 
Let E and E 1 be event structures in EFl. . As in 9.8.7 we 
have ap E R((E0 -> E) () E _> E 1 ). 	In order for (E0 .-> E 1 ,ap) 
to be an exponentiation we require for any E in F  and any x in 
R(E ® E .-> E 1 ) there is a unique y in R(E -> S B -> E 1 ) such that 
x = ap.(y G 1E 
----p 
- 
(E0 -> 5 E 1 ) 	E0 	 E 
The requirement is satisfied by taking y = ab(x). Firstly the 
diagram commutes. Let (z,z0) be in R(E ® E0). Then 
ap • y ® 1 E(z,zo) 
= ap 0 y ® E (z,z0) 
0 
= ap(y(z),z0 ) 
= (z)(z0 ) 	by lemma 9.8.8 part (i) 
=x (z,z0) 	by 9.8.8 part (ii). 
Thus the functions i and ap . y (D 1E  are equal. As x 	is 1-1 
we have the diagram commutes when y i 0s 7b-(x). To establish that this 
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choice of y is unique assume x = ap . (w 6 1E  for w in. 
R(E 	(E -.> E 1 )). 	Then as in the above manipulation 
= 
for any (z,z0) inR(E ®. B0). Therefore using.the fact that 
x I— x is 1-1 w equals y as required. 
We note one further fact about the category 
Lemma 9.8.10 
The category 	has a terminal object, the null event structure. 
Proof 
Clearly for any event structure B in E there is a unique 
morphism $ in R(E _>) so the null event structure is the terminal 
object of 
Collecting facts together we have: 
Theorem 9.8.11 
The category 	is cartesian closed. 
In fact now it follows routinely that the categories (, R) 
and.. 	obtained by ordering the morphisms by just 	or just 
are .J\-categories. There are stable event structures 
representing the domains T and N ; the truth values T are for 
example represented by ({tt,ff),1,1,(tt,ff)}). 	By the result of 
Berry and Curien we have two models for PCF. The one obtained from 
is order extensional. We show 	represents a full sub- 
category of bidomains in the next section. 
We end the section with cute characterisations of the 
application and identity morphisms. 
Lemma 9.8.12 
The application morphism ap defined in 9.8.7 is characterised. 
by 
M(ap) = {((p,x),e) I p E Pr (R(E0 ->)2. (x,e) = ev(p)}. %
The identity morphism of B in E is characterised by 
M(1E) = {(p,e) I p € Pr (R(E))& e = ev(p)}. 
Proof 
Simply consequences of .-maxiItality.R 
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9,9 Cartesian closed categories of domains 
	
We introduce two categories of-domains, R 	with objects 
of the form (R (E), Q L 
	R) and BIF with objects of the form 
(R (E) , , R). 	The categories R 	and B 	will be trivially 
isomorphic as categories and both equivalent as categories to 
In this sense F represents them. The category B. will-be a 
cartesian closed full subcategory of Berry's category of bidomains 
(BID0M). 
We start with a lemma which is a key result in proving F  is 
equivalent to the category RE and also that our future definition 
of HE is proper. 
Lemma 9.9.1 
Suppose E is in 	. 	Then 	e E E x = tel iff (i) x is a 
R 	 , -complete prime and (ii) y x0,x1 
= I 
- 	x 
x = x 0  0 
x 1 =>(x = x or x = xi). 
Proof 
9=>Il' Suppose x is of the form Eel for e an event in event 
structure E. Then (i) is clear, by the characterisations of 
n 	 r-i 	n -i complete primes. 	Supposing x 	R Le], 11 	L Lej and ej = x0U 11 
gives e E 10 or e E x 1 . 	Thus x = Eel or x= [] as required for 
(ii) to hold. 
"<=" Suppose (i) and (ii) hold for x in R(E). 	If x were not 
of the form [e] where e = ev(x) then taking x = Eel and 
= [4M 	
{e '}]for some e' E M(x)\[e] contradicts 
Thus events identified with [e] in R(E) may be picked out as those 
R_compiete primes x with no non-trivial decomposition as x U 
with 10 =x and x 	I. Having picked out such representatives 
of events in the domain the orderings q 
L 
 and Q restricted to the 
representatives return <L  and  <R  by lemmas 9.6.6 and 9.5.2 (iii). 
\ 
We wish to form a category of domains i \ L
, 
 C-R ) fromE.  
As morphisms from R(E0) to R(E 1 ) we take functions I for x in 
R(E0 -> E1 ). However a little care is needed as distinct event 
structures may yield the same domain; we want 'the definition of 
morphisms in the new category to be independent of the event 
structures chosen to represent the domains R(E0) and R(E1). 




El and Ei,E1 are in 	. 	Then (R(E . ) , L , R) = 
(R(E!) ,, R) for i 	0,1 implies (R(E0 -> 	 = 
(R(Ec -> Ep,L,cR). 
Proof 
Using 9.9.1 it is clear that the events and orderings of 
E0 	E and E .-> El are identical. 	Suppose X £ R(E0 -> E 1 ) and 
X J R(E .-> E). Then this must be because,for some (x,e0) and 
(x,e 1 ) in X,we have e 0 	e 1 where 	is the conflict relation of E. 
However e0 ,e 1 are in (x) which is in R(E) so consistent, a contra- 
diction. 
We may now define the category RE assured the definition is 
good. 
Definition 9.9.3 
Define RE to consist of objects (R(E),cL,l) for E in IF 
with inorphisms R(E0) to R(E 1 ) precisely the functions for x in 
R(E0 _> E 1 ) with the usual composition. 
Clearly by the properties of xF-we have: 
Lemma 9.9.4 
The structure RE is a category. 
We establish that RE and F are equivalent as categories 
[Mac] so the categorical properties of E transfer to 
The category 	represents the category RE. 
Proposition 9.9.5 
Define R: F -> R 	to act on objects by E —R(E) and on 
arrows by x t—> X. 




Then R is a natural equivalence of categories. 
Proof 
That R is a fuiictor follows directly from proposition 9.8.1. 
In [Mac] (theorem 1 page gi) it is shown that R is an equivalence of 
categories is equivalent to R being full, faithful and dense (R is 
dense if each object in the codomain category of R is isomorphic to 
an image object under B.) As R is onto the objects of R E the 
functor R is clearly dense. 	Proposition 9.8.1 shows R is full and 
faithful.I 
In the above sense the category of event structures F represents 
the category of domains R . 	If domains of the form R(E) were 
axiomatised a more impressive representation theorem would hold. 
From a domain D satisfying the axioms one would obtain an event 
structure representing it as follows: For events take those elements 
of D satisfying (i) and (ii) of lemma 9.9.1 ordered by the 
restrictions of 	and Q with conflict relation e 	e' iff 
Y X € D e CZ x => e' 	x. 
Because of proposition 9.9.5 the categorical properties of 
transmit to RE 
Proposition 9.9.6 
The category R F, is cartesian closed. A product of R(E0), 
R(E 1 ) in RE is R(E0) x R(E 1 ) the set of pairs having orders 
and 	determined pointwise with projections the usual set-theoretic 
projection functions. An exponentiation of R(E0), R(E 1 ) is 
(R(E0 _> E 1 ),) where ap is defined in 9.8.7. 	A terminal object 
in RE is {$}. 
From the category R E it is easy to construct an isomorphic 
category which will turn out to be a full subcategory of Berry's 
category of bidomains (BIDOM). Recall for a domain (R(E),c,.R) 
we 	 a,uIs (L u R)* 
Definition 9.9.7 
Define BE to consist of objects (R(E), 	 for E inlE with 
morphisms R(E0) to R(E 1 ) which are functions for x in R(E 0 -> E) 
with the usual composition. 
Theorem 9.9.8 
The structure B. is a cartesian closed full subcategory of 
BIDOM, Berry's category of bidomains. 
Proof 
We conclude BE is a cartesian closed category directly from 
theorem 9.9.6 as RE and B. are obviously isomorphic categories. 
The functor establishing this is given by 
(R (E)c) .- (R (E),(LR)*,) 
on objects and as the identity on morphisms; noting we can recover 
from - and Q provides the inverse. 
We cannot immediately prove the objects of B E are bidomains 
as these are defined in terms of morphisms in the category of 
distributive biopcd.'s DBIOPCD (see section 8.2). We first show the 
objects of B e are distributive biopcd's. Refer to2.2 and 14 
for the axioms on distributive biopcd's. 	(Throughout this proof we 
will abbreviate (R(E),, 	R)  to R(E),) 
Suppose R(E) is an object in BE The distributivity axiom 
clearly holds for R(E) by the properties of 	in particular that 
(R(E), R) is prime algebraic. 	Of the remaining axioms all but 
axiom (IV) follow directly.. Recall axiom (IV) is: 
VS,S' S,S' 	-directed subsets of R(E) 
Vs E S ' s" € s' 3 t. € s,t' € S' s 	t 9 s 	t 	t 	R  t 
=> UsUs'. 
Assume the hypothesis of the axiom 	Remember US = Us for 
-d.irected subsets S. We require M(US) 	M(US'). 	Take e in 
M(ZJs). Then e € M(s) for some s in S. As e is <L-maximal in 
Us (= Us) we have 
(i) 	V  €S s 	t => e € M(t). 
By assumption, taking s' some arbitrary elements of S', we have for 
some t in S and t' in S' 
CZ 
R 
 t Z st & 5' Q t'. 
tJèirig (i) we get e € M(t'). 	Suppose t' CZ t. 	Then again by 
assumption e E M(t), Thus for tj 2 t we have e € M(t). Thus 
e € M(Us') as required. We conclude the objects of B E are 
distributive biopcd' s. 
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The inorphisms of DBIOCPD are exactly those functions which are 
continuous with respect to the extensional order and stable with 
respect to the stable order. As the objects of BE are 
distributive biocpd's from proposition 9.8.1 we get that B E is a 
full subcategory of DBIOCPD. 
As BE is a full subcategory of DBIOCPD we know that products 
and exponentiations in BE are respectively products and exponent-
iations in DBIOCPD. Berry's exponentiation is formed from a set of 
functions which are ordered both pointwise and according to his 
stable ordering on functions. Ours is defined as a set of config- 
urations ordered by 	(inclusi xi) and 	However as exponentiatiDns 
are isomorphic the two constructions of exponentiation give isomorphic 
domains and, in particular, our ordering 	coincid.eswith the stable 
ordering on functions. (That the ordering Q
R on configurations x 
induces the stable ordering on functions x can be proved directly 
without using the fact that BO= is a full subcategory.) In view 
of this fact we use R for Berry's stable ordering on functions. 
It remains to show that each R(E) is a bidomain. Recall from 
definition 8.2,15 that the one further requirement on R(E) is that in 
DBIOCPD the identity 1 B  is the 9 
R_supremum  of a countable 
QR~-increasing chain of finite projections w.r.t. Q .. We have 
1 	= T . 	 The set M(i,) is certainly co untable; enumerate its RE, 	g M-1 
elements as e0 , e 1 , . .. , e, . ... . 	Define X = 	{e0 ,.. . , el. 
Then {[x] n EC4J I forms the required chain of projections. 
Thus B is a cartesian closed full subcategory of BIDOM. 
Corollary 9.9.9 
Products and exponentiations in BE are isomorphic to the 
products and exponentiations, respectively, in BIDON. In 
particular the configurations x in R(E Q -> B.1 ) are in 1-1 corres-
pondence with the functions R(E0) to R(E 1 ) in BIDOM with Q and CR 
on configurations inducing Berry's extensional and stable orderings 
on functions. 
9.10 Sequential configurations 
We have seen how- stable event structures determine a full 
subcategory of bidomains. Thus they yield a stable model for POP. 
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Can the method using event structures be refined to construct a 
fully abstract model of PCP? The definition of suitable event 
structures and configurations of them must capture the sequential 
evaluation of PCF; it is hoped that then a fully abstract model will 
result. This approach has some promise as the results of this 
section show. 
Although we have largely worked with <-'-'Left closed sets as 
configurations x it turned out that the <L-maximal elements M(x) 
could themselves be regarded as another form of configuration. It 
is this form of configuration which captured the operational 
behaviour more closely. We noted that all the work of this chapter 
on stable event structures could be based on a definition of a stable 
configuration which determined subsets of the form M(x). It is an 
interesting fact then we can define stable configurations (M(x)) as 
subsets y such that 
(1) V e E yVe' <R e 	elt E y e' <L  et' and (ii) y is 
consistent where 	is inherited up the ty -pesby (x,e) 	(x',e') 
iff x IR x' & e A e'. Thus the ordering <L  is involved in the 
enabling but need not be mentioned explicitly in the conflict 
relation. 
It is hoped that by adding axioms to 9.2.1 and refining the 
definition of configuration a category of sequential event structures 
with sequential configurations can be formed.. To capture the 
operational flavour it seems best to work with the configurations 
M(x).. They should be secured as in (i) above and consistent in some 
sense. Consistency is open. Firstly we cannot. get away with a 
simple binary 	relation like A. as the example 8.2.5 shows. 
Rather we must work with a consistency relation. There is a chance 
that it need not explicitly mention < L and be inherited up the types 
in a way only mentioning 
The following modest results at first order add some faith to 
this approach. 
Lemma 9.10.1 
Let A and B be concrete domains. Suppose f is a continuous 
function from A to B. Then f is Kahn-Plotkin sequential iff 
(*) Vz c  V q € d(f(1'7Z))((Vz € z f(flZ)-'( f(z)) => 
(Bp € d.(flZ)V z € Z flz<z)). 
Proof 
"->" Suppose Z A and q € d(f(flZ)). Assume 
V z € Z f(flZ)-< f(z). If Z is null it is obvious so assume Z is 
non-null. Then from the definition of sequential for some p in 
d.(flz) we have Vx n  f(flZ)-'f(x) =>flZ-<x. 	Thus by the 
assumption on Z we have V  € zflz- z as. required. 
"< 	Assume (*) above. 	Suppose x E A and q € d(f(x)) and 
that 3 z x f(x) - f(z). Then define Z = Iz 1 x f(x) -' f(z)}. 
It is non-null. We have x F1 Z. 
If x = n  we have f(x) = r(flz) so by (*) above 
€ d(x) Vz € Z x - z. Thus 
3p € d 	V z -_J x (f (x) ­4 f 	=> xz) as required. 
If z n  then x.—c x' 	flz for some x'. Take p = [,'] 
i.e. take p to be a direction at x filled by x'. Then 
VZ E Z x-/, z so by the definition of Z we have 
Vzx f(x)-4f(z) => x - z as required 
Proposition 9.10.2 
Let E. = (E.,<.,.) i = 0,1 be event structures so that 
.(E.) U = 0,1) are distributive concrete domains.. Define 
E0 -> E 1 to be the event structure consisting of events 
(E0) 0 xE ordered by (x,e) <L  (x',eO iff x' 	x R e = el 
(x,.e) <R  (x',e') if  x' = x 	e < e' 
with this consistency relation: 
con{(x.,e)J i € II iffJc Ile . j € 	occupy the same 
direction implies either (i) 	d Vj €3  flx. - x. 
j€J 3 
or (ii) Vj,k € r (x.,e.) = (xk , ek). 
For y a subset of E0 -> E 1 say y is a configuration 
iff (i) 	e € y Ve' <R e' je" € y e' <L e" (y is secured) 
and (ii) con(y) 	 (y is consistent) 
Then y is a configuration iff y is a sequential function: 
-> 
(The proof uses the above lemma.. In its present state it is 
inelegant and uninformative, so omitted.) 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion 
In conclusion we summarise the achievements, problems and 
inadequacies in the work presented here. The inadequacies should 
guide us in future work to a more complete theory of events in 
computation. 
10.1 Achievements 
The unifying role of events has been apparent in this thesis. 
Even at the most superficial level, the number of introductory 
chapters, necessary to its development, is atestimony to this. 
The approach relates to some degree the theories initiated, by Petri 
and Scott and some more specialised work of authors like Kahn and 
Plotkin, Berry, La.mport and Hewitt. 	The thesis providesan 
introduction to apparently diverse fields through following a common 
theme, the fundamental part played by events in computation. 
We have seen how nets, and thus event structures, model 
computations and receive definite interpretations (section 2.3). 
In particular this 	highlighted when extra structure was called 
for and exhibited the nature of computation, for' example, how - 
d.atatypes were involved in the process of computing. 
Through new representation results we linked and compared 
theories. This established some concepts in common and some 
rMnt (f 	 nrtiii 1 g' it cast 	' ­ is f Petri 
("real processes determine K-dense causal nets") and, admittedly 
far less thoroughly, the thesis of Scott ("computable functions are 
continuous'-in the new light of an event-structure setting. Event 
structures inject a new venom into the theories of nets and of 
denotational semantics; for net theory it is a more abstract 
approach to foundations and for denotational semaaics a way of 
incorporating ideas of behaviour' more completely. Specifically 
we contribute mathematical ideas on states, conditions, expressiveness 
and extra structure to the foundations of net theory while to 
denotational semantics we provide more physical realisations of 
its ideas with some promise of solving full-abstractness problems. 
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10.2 Problems 
Here are listed some mathematical problems left unsolved in 
this thesis. 
1. (End of section 3.3) 
Axiomatise the class of domains represented by event structures 
of the form (E, H,) defined as in 3.3.1 but now with 'c'(E) 
(the set of finite subsets of E); configurations x are secured as in 
3..3 and consistent in a new sense: VAX A x. 
Subsequently axiomatise the classes of domains Dom (n€) 
represented by event structures of the form (E, - , 3 ) as above 
but with. restriction: VA- ' IA.I.. :5 n. 	(Note we have represented 
the domains Dom2 as then the incompatibility predicate can be 
replaced by a binary conflict relation). 
It might be thought that event structures of the form above 
relate to transition nets where more than one token may reside on 
a condition [NP]. However the domains represented. by such event 
structures satisfy axiom .0 while those represented by such nets do 
not, for example: 
This time conditions may carry 
3 	more than one. token so although 
events-2 and 3 cannot occur 
together initially, they can 
after event 1 has occurred. The 
appropriate domain is 
which fails axiom C. What is the representation result for domains 
represented by such nets? 
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(Section 6.3 
Are the expressiveness relationsand 4 the same on condition-
extensional occurrence nets of finite-depth and satisfying N3? 
Let E be an event structure of finite depth. Forb in B (E), 
characterise those subsets X of B (E) which satisfy 
VC COS (E) (on (b,C)3b 1 E X on ( b',C)). 
(Such sets X arise for the expressiveness relation 	- see 6.3.). 
(Section 6.4) 
Characterise the relation 	(of 6.4.2),for restless events. 
Ii.. (Section 7.3) 
Can the reachability classes be axiomatised neatly, without 
using a direct driain analogue of the metric? 
5. (Chapter 9) 
Can the work of chapter 9 be mimGL(ed_ for exponentiation 
corresponding to all, continuous functions while maintaining 
identical definitions of M and G so that 	is still natural as 
an ordering on behaviours? (This will involve appropriate axioms 
on orderings 5L  and 
6.. (Section 9.7) 
Is. the relation (defined in 9.7.3) on all stable 
configurations a partial order? (It is when restricted to isolated 
configurations by 9 .7'.4). 
7... (Section 9.8) 
What were the key event-structure facts which enabled us to 
construct a cartesian-closed category of event structures in 
section 9.8? 
8. (Section 9.9) 
Axiomatise the domains in RL 
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9. (.Section 9.10) 
Can the full-abstractness problem for PCF be solved on the 
lines indicated in section 9.10? If so, is there a syntactic 
characterisation of 
10.3 Future work 
This thesis has demonstrated the fundamental and unifying role 
of events in computation. However here is presented only the 
beginnings of a reasonably complete theory of events; while 
indicating the scope and depth of such a theory there are several 
counts on which our work is inadequate or incomplete. This is 
due, in part, to its exploratory nature and our attempts to relate 
different approaches. Though there is still a fair deal to be 
done at this general level much should be learnt by trying to solve 
specific more well-defined problems within the. framework of event 
structures. Of course solutions to well-chosen problems can (&row 
light on the theory overall. We sketch some future projects. 
They have various degrees of openneSs as sometimes basic concepts 
involved have yet to be formalised to give the problems a strictly 
mathematical nature. 
It would be very- satisfying if the full-abstractness problem 
can be solved on the lines suggested by chapter 9. We need a far 
L 	 L 
clearer understanding of the 	VecuJiar :5 and 	orderings. From 
1 LU WSi
b 
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objects  to study. Even if this fairly direct approach fails the 
approach of Berry and. Curien [Ber and Cur] may well succeed and it 
uses event-structure concepts. At present they have a cartesian-
closed category of concrete domains with algorithms as morphismS. 
Though this does not yield an extensional model they hope to achieve 
extensionality by a form of quotienting. If successful they will 
be essentially mapping algorithm configurations (with extra control 
events) to function configurations which should determine the 
definitions of higher type event structures and configurations 
appropriate to PCF, as well as providing some ideas on event 
structure morphisms. 
Another major project is to link-up net and event-structure 
ideas with. those In Mimer' $ book [Mull. 
replacing synchronisation trees by event 
more general definition of observational 
synchronisation trees suffice, as Milner 
might yield a mathematical. justification 
fundamental role of the concurrency re1a 
A prerequisite for 
structures will be some 
equivalence; without it 
shows. If successful this 
of Petri's ideas on the 
ion in parallel computations. 
g5- 
A major inadequacy of the work presented here has been the 
omission of a systematic treatment of event-structure morphisnis. 
We have seen how to formalise some idea of implement5 	one event 
structure by another (5.3) and how to regard one event structure as 
a datatype involved in another (5.6) using the relations  
The relations are close to inorphisms. In chapter 7 we used the idea 
of collapsing a convex subset of events to an event, again suggesting 
morphisms. In chapter 9 morphisms arose in a different way; they 
represented continuous functions, essentially by introducing extra 
causality relations between event structures.. All this should be 
unified. Then for example one might settle the question of whether 
or not an event structure is physically feasible by demonstrating 
that it can or cannot be implemented by one which clearly is. 
(This is like the. result\3which showed that being implemented 
by a finite-width event structure induced restrictions, like 
countability for instance). Another example: One would expect 
that event structures of the form CE, F , ) would be "generated" 
by morphisms from a basic class of the form (E,.:5, 	) which assume 
an event is caused in a unijie way 	As the definition of observer 
stands (5.1), time, is in a sense outside the theory. 	Should we not 
regard recording time-of-occurrence as a computation based on 
modelling a clock as a process? Then observers themselves would 
be morphisms within the theory of event structures. Unfortunately 
many ideas of morphism depend for their naturalness cA, event 
structures hing add.i - onal structure, for example to ensure certain 
events occur. 
Here are some cases where event structures must possess 
additional structure if they are to model correctly. We have seen 
how some new idea is needed to distinguish situations where 
something (like an event occurrence) is inevitable from other 
situations C2.3 and j 6.4). A careful modelling of Milner 
processes on the lines of 2.3A should help clai'-ify things. 
More speculatively It might be informative to study episodes (see 
the introduction) which. are events without the atomicity restraint; 
they are a. bit like critical, regions. And, how can event structures 
he generalised to continuous processes like example 5.6.5? Perhaps 
ideas like those of CardeLli [Car] might guide and motivate such a 
study. 	Suitable mathematics might be [Nac] and [C&.iaiJ. 
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